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ABSTRACT
Frizzell, Jeffrey Scott, Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May, 2016. The
Impossible, Only Solution: School Busing and Racial Integration in Memphis,
Tennessee, 1972-1975. Major Professor: Aram Goudsouzian, Ph.D.
This study examines school busing in Memphis, Tennessee as a remedy for racial
inequality in education. Busing to achieve integration was a paradox. It was
simultaneously the only method available to effectively balance Memphis’s dual school
system and also an impossible solution that encouraged white flight and a weakening of
the school system. Studying the varying responses to court-ordered busing not only helps
explain its shortcomings, but also serves as a flashpoint to reveal a transitional moment in
civil rights, conservatism, and evangelicalism.
Most Memphians disproved of the initial busing plan. Many black Memphians
felt the plan did not go far enough, while others worried about the safety of their children
going to white schools far from home. The disagreement among black Memphians
highlighted a growing rift with the local NAACP, as well as generational divides over
tactics and goals of the civil rights movement. Unity that had appeared during the earlier
Black Monday protests for equal treatment in schools had fractured. Although most black
Memphians ended up supporting busing, the evident divisions warned of struggles
approaching.
At the same time, white Memphians fought against busing using language of
conservatism or evangelicalism. For example, some argued that the government was
invading the private sphere of education, and needed to be limited. Others suggested that
busing would disrupt law and order, or the safety of their children and neighborhoods.
Still others suggested that a secularizing school system no longer served their needs,
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voting to enroll their children in private, Christian academies. Although white
Memphians’ verbal responses varied, issues of racism and fear intertwined with all of
their excuses.
Busing marked a new era in the civil rights movement. Integration became
personal to many white families. Many former white allies abandoned equal rights to
protect their wealth, security, status, or children. Private school enrollment soared.
Additionally, division among black activists deterred any significant, galvanized support
for busing. Overall, busing was the only option for a necessary aim. But it was a doomed
prospect from the start. Rather than ending a dual school system, it simply reconfigured
one that still stands largely unchanged in Memphis today.
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Introduction
The Most Hated Man in Memphis
It was a typically sticky summer morning in Memphis, with waves of summer
mosquitos and thick, heavy humidity. The sun slowly rose over the Bluff City, turning an
already warm downtown district into a veritable sauna. On this morning in 1972, Robert
M. McRae Jr. slowed his car to stop at the light at Poplar Avenue and Third Street. His
lowered car windows supplied only minimal relief from the heat. As he waited, another
car pulled up next to him. Although he did not know the driver, he immediately
recognized the high-profile passenger. It was Henry Loeb, the recently retired mayor of
Memphis. The city’s political power broker for the majority of the past decade, Loeb had
built a reputation as someone who kept the city’s whites happy by enforcing the racial
status quo, while keeping the local blacks quiet with minor political gifts and patronage.
Loeb was less concerned with the official laws of political governance than with keeping
Memphis divided by race.
As McRae glanced across his empty passenger seat, Loeb ordered his plainclothes
policeman driver to slowly crank down the driver-side window. Just as the light turned
green, Loeb yelled across the driver and through McRae’s open window: “Hey you son
of a bitch, quit integratin’ those schools!” Loeb then sped off, flashing a maniacal grin
out the back of his sedan. This treatment, even from the city’s former mayor, was no
surprise to McRae. The judge was easily “the most despised man in Memphis.”1

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
See Robert M. McRae (in collaboration with the Oral History Research Office at the University
of Memphis), Oral History of the Desegregation of Memphis City Schools, 1954-1979
(abridged), 146. See also John Branston, “Battering Ram: The Tragedy of Busing Revisited,”
Memphis Magazine, March 2011 (digital article). For quote, see Tom Pike to Robert McRae,
1972, in Judge Robert McRae Papers: Northcross v. Board of Education, Mississippi Valley
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McRae presided over the controversial Northcross v. Memphis Board of
Education case, which through numerous appeals stretched from 1960 through the busing
crisis of the mid-1970s. The case began as an attempt to integrate Memphis City Schools,
and it placed a handful of black students at several white schools across the city.
However, the Memphis branch of the NAACP pushed for more complete integration.
McRae initially denied demands for busing in 1968, claiming, “the solution is not to be
found in transporting an undetermined number of Negro or whites students to distant
parts of the city.”2 However, in 1971 the United States Supreme Court, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, upheld “bus transportation as a tool of
school desegregation.”3 In light of the Swann decision, the Northcross case was
remanded to McRae. In response, McRae ordered, after numerous delays, a small number
of students bused during the 1972-73 school year. However, “Plan A,” as it was named,
lacked the size and strength to make a dent in Memphis’s problems of de facto racially
segregated schools. One year later, amid massive white flight, McRae ordered Plan Z,
named to serve as the last solution. And although much larger in scope, Plan Z still left
twenty-five schools all-black. Other schools would remain all-black due to white
absences or departures. 4 Attempts to tweak Plan Z into a successful plan continued

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Collection, University of Memphis Special Collections (hereafter McRae Papers), Box 6, Folder
15.
2

Quoted in Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 297.
3

Stephen Mintz, Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2004), 326.
4
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“Judge Orders Busing of 39,904,” Press Scimitar (Memphis, TN), May 3, 1973.
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throughout the rest of the decade. Busing to achieve racial balance continued until the
early 1980s, when the program stopped.
When McRae and the city of Memphis initiated a school busing program in 1972,
the project aimed to correct legal, educational, and social failings.5 The express social
aim of the program was to further integrate the city and continue to improve race
relations. However, it rapidly became apparent that busing had the opposite effect. A
movement that aimed to improve race relations through integration scared many white
families (and their monetary support) out of the school system, while simultaneously
destroying numerous black and white neighborhood schools. The end of the
neighborhood schools weakened many previously strong communities; white flight to the
suburbs undermined them further. At the end of Memphis’s busing experiment, schools
had made little improvement on racial integration.
Was the perceived failure of busing’s social experiment due to poor planning and
implementation, or to factors beyond the control of the school board? First, a seemingly
random partial blending of some but not all schools hardly seems an adequate solution to
decades of segregation, mistreatment, and poor race relations. Second, the busing
solution was further undermined by simultaneous developments that paralleled and fed
off of resistance to busing: the rise of the New Right, a Southern religious revival, and a
more politically contentious atmosphere as many African Americans adopted aspects of
Black Power. Third, the strategy of busing was doomed because it tried to solve
education problems while ignoring structural racial inequalities.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
Legally the project aimed to correct violations of Constitutional rights; educationally, the project
sought to provide equal education to all. Socially, the project aimed to improve race relations and
end segregation. Each of these aims was incredibly ambitious and dealt with numerous differing
obstacles. For clarity, the study will focus primarily on the social aims of busing.
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The timing of these three simultaneous developments, moreover, pushed the
impact of busing far beyond the 1970s. Each gave opponents of busing a language of
resistance. Was opposition to busing a matter of racism, deep devotion to God, adherence
to Black Power separatism, or dedication to small government? In reality, it was often a
combination of many of them, as all threads of resistance were intricately intertwined.
Given the already significant challenge facing the busing project from the start, the
multiple and murky strains of resistance made it difficult to garner wide support for such
a school integration plan.6 And while the black community certainly held a conflicted
position on busing, it was the overwhelming resistance from the white community that
doomed the experiment. The great tragedy of busing is that it was simultaneously the
only option for complete integration, and a wholly unworkable one.
A number of historians have discussed busing in various American contexts
during the 1970s. However, the existing scholarship fails to fully examine the unique
political, racial, and religious context of Southern cities in the 1970s. In fact, most of the
foundational works on busing focus on the urban north. For example, Ronald
Formisano’s Boston Against Busing argues that the busing crisis was about more than just
race. Longstanding religious-ethnic neighborhoods, structural inequality along racial and
economic lines, and the tension of the 1960s all contributed to the explosion of hate in
Boston – not simply blunt racism. In Boston, religion and ethnicity intersected, especially

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
While diverse in several ways, the Memphis story is very similar emotionally to existing
accounts that describe terror across racial and class lines. For a dramatized account based on the
events in Boston, see J. Anthony Lukas, Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of
Three American Families (New York: Vintage, 1986).
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in the Irish Catholic community. In southern cities, such as Memphis, however, religion
was not as tied to ethnicity. Religion played a vital but very different role.7
Books that do examine busing in the South fail to fully consider the nuanced
relationship between growing Southern conservatism, the emerging power of evangelical
Christianity, and the changing politics of the black freedom movement. For example,
Matthew Lassiter argues that grassroots organization led to the rise of white Southern
suburbs. In these suburbs formed by white flight, a conservative voting bloc formed,
intent on preserving its middle class status. While Lassiter examines the rising Southern
conservatism and shifts in the black freedom movement in relation to busing and the rise
of suburbanization, he missed the importance of evangelical Christianity in those trends.
Additionally, his study is more economically centered, ignoring certain social aspects
such as the changing language of Black Power. Furthermore, Lassiter’s study focuses
geographically on the Sunbelt cities of Atlanta and Charlotte. But Memphis’s history
does not parallel these cities due to its lack of federal economic investment.8 In a similar
vein, Kevin Kruse in White Flight draws links between the black freedom movement,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and
1970s (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Robert O. Self focuses on
busing in Oakland in American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Similar to Formisano, the aspect of evangelical religion is
underappreciated in Self’s study. In a forthcoming study on busing, Matthew Delmont further
examines busing in the north, pointing to its long legislative history. Delmont stresses the need
for viewing resistance to busing for what it is, resistance to school desegregation. However, the
complicated stances of many African Americans certainly question such a clean dividing line. For
more, see Matthew Delmont, Why Busing Failed: Race, Media, and the National Resistance to
School Desegregation (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016). Additionally, several
other studies deal with the results of busing without studying busing directly. For example, see
Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975
(New York: Vintage Books, 2006).
8

For more on the rise of the Sunbelt and why Memphis does not fit, see Bruce J. Schulman, From
Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the
South, 1938-1980 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 206-221.
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suburbanization, and the rise of the New Right. He too, fails to account for how
evangelicalism shaped white flight. Finally, Joseph Crespino briefly examines busing in
Jackson, Mississippi, in In Search of Another Country. While focused on busing in a
Southern city and studying evangelical private academies, Crespino never fully examines
religious motivations as anything other than a tactic to hide racism.9
Furthermore, political histories of the rise of the New Right have failed to provide
a compelling approach. Studies of the New Right, such as Rick Perlstein’s trilogy, focus
particularly on political motivations, such as local government or tax rates. Others begin
to unpack the social motivations of the New Right, but not make connections to busing or
religion. For example, Jefferson Cowie examines the draw of the New Right for workingclass Americans.10 These families had been consistent Democratic voters, but social
changes, specifically the domestic threats seemingly battled by “Law and Order”
candidates, attracted them to the New Right. Recently, Kevin Kruse has suggested the
connection between corporate America and evangelical religion, suggesting that the
identification of a “Christian America” was a creation of power-hungry corporations
protecting their financial and political interests.11 While these studies are rapidly
advancing, they still ignore a thoroughly nuanced examination of how busing, religion,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2006); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern
Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Joseph Crespino, In Search of
Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007).
10

Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York:
The New Press, 2010).
11

Kevin Kruse, One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America
(New York: Basic Books, 2015).
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and government intersected to support the rise of the Republican Party among typically
Democratic voters as well as traditional Republicans.12
Many studies of the Southern civil rights movement stop before reaching the
1970s, so they rarely discuss the period after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination.13 For
example, Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar’s landmark work on Black Power expertly examines the
rise of Black Power and its connection to African American identity.14 However, Ogbar’s
study stops at the beginning of the 1970s, failing to examine how ideas of identity and
Black Power shifted with the advent of school busing. While recent studies in civil rights
advance the narrative into the late 1960s, and occasionally the early 1970s, they rarely
discuss busing and its impact on the movement at all. The story is similar for local studies
on the region. Bobby L. Lovett’s The Civil Rights Movement in Tennessee barely
discusses busing, despite carrying the civil rights narrative into the 1980s.15 Studies of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of American Consensus
(New York: Nation Books, 2001); Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of
America (New York: Scribner, 2008); The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of
Reagan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014). For another work with similar focuses to
Perlstein’s, see Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2014).
Some works such as Donald T. Critchlow’s biography of Phyliss Schlafly have aimed to examine
the grassroots appeal of the New Right. For more, see Critchlow, Phyliss Schlafly and Grassroots
Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
13

The major studies on the civil rights movement in Tennessee also do not discuss busing in
Memphis in significant detail. For more, see Bobby L. Lovett, The Civil Rights Movement in
Tennessee (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 2005) and Beverly Bond and Janann
Sherman, Memphis in Black and White (Making American Series) (Charleston, SC: Arcadia
Publishing, 2003). For a legally-centered example of some of the coverage of busing in Memphis,
see the work of Daniel Kiel: Kiel, “Exploded Dream: Desegregation in the Memphis City
Schools,” Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice XXVI (2008); and Kiel,
“Memphis Dilemma: A Half-Century of Public Education Reform in Memphis and Shelby
County from Desegregation to Consolidation,” University of Memphis Law Review, 2011.
14

Ogbar, Jeffrey O. G., Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
15
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Lovett, The Civil Rights Movement in Tennessee.
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civil rights movement have largely avoided busing, perhaps because they are unable to
frame it solely within that field, needing a larger, more complex lens to properly view it.
The study of Memphis allows the historian to consider the relationships among
multiple sources of resistance to busing in ways that illuminate both local and national
trends. First, Memphis was home to a growing conservative movement at a moment
when the Republican Party was experiencing a national resurgence. Local politicians
such as Wyeth Chandler, Mayor Loeb’s immediate successor, exemplified how New
Conservative politicians utilized the language and spirit of busing dissent to their
advantage. Although Henry Loeb could criticize McRae openly on the street, Chandler
was more careful in his language. He was equally resistant to busing, but he employed
racially coded calls for law and order. The mayor tried every legal option open to him
(and a few of questionable legality) to halt McRae’s orders. While Chandler failed to stop
busing, he still benefitted, building political capital and blocs of political support. In
addition to battling liberals politically, New Conservatives encouraged stronger
municipal governments and the numerous, independent suburbs they spawned.16
Chandler represented a local manifestation of the New Right politics signaled by the
presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.17
Memphis was also a hotbed of religious revivalism, epitomized by the religious
schools that boomed during the crisis, such as Harding Academy and Briarcrest Christian
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16
This support of local government encouraged the creation of an additional school district,
Shelby County Schools, for children who lived in the suburbs. This provided one of many
opportunities to dodge busing.
17

For more on the New Conservatism, see Crespino, In Search of Another Country; Dan T.
Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the
Transformation of American Politics (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1995). For
a political history of Memphis, see G. Wayne Dowdy, Crusades for Freedom: Memphis and the
Political Transformation of the American South (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2010).
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School. There were over one hundred private schools in operation in Memphis at the
height of the busing scare. A vast majority were religious schools. Many, no doubt, fled
to these schools out of racial fear. They were additionally motivated by truly religious
concerns, birthed from a fear that the country was rapidly abandoning Christian morality
and legislating religion out of public education, such as the banning of prayer in public
schools.18
Furthermore, Memphis had long been a site of civil rights activism. In the 1960s,
activist strategies that embraced Black Power had been a key factor to increasing African
American success at the ballot box and a surge in black pride. But by the 1970s, Black
Power, like many other strategies before it, had failed to effectively ameliorate poverty
and de facto segregation. The local NAACP, led by Maxine Smith, co-opted the radical
language of Black Power into a traditionally liberal organization. Smith and the NAACP
required the radical rhetoric of Black Power to gain acceptance from the black
community. However, pushing for school integration through the court system was a
decidedly liberal strategy. The Memphis NAACP was stuck; in order to gain local
support, it embraced Black Power-influenced language of black solidarity against a
powerful white establishment. Yet the traditionally liberal organization could only push
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18
For more on parochial schools in the South as an escape for white Southerners, see Crespino, In
Search of Another Country, 173-204. David Nevin and Robert E. Bills, The Schools that Fear
Built: Segregationist Academies in the South (New York: Acropolis Books, 1976), 1-93, is a
1970s account of schools that were founded to escape busing. For more on the religious revival in
the South and politics, see Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian
Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 69-104. For more on the rise of the religious
right, see Steven Miller, The Age of Evangelicalism: America’s Born-Again Years (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-60. Similarly, Darren Dochuk’s From Bible Belt to Sunbelt:
Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 2012) provides a useful account of the Religious Right’s support for
Republicans in Southern California. Finally, although later in focus, J. Brooks Flippen’s Jimmy
Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2011) is useful for contextualizing the power of the Religious Right.
!
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for the legal resolution of de facto segregation – not racial separation. Smith’s cornered
NAACP forced the busing issue, attempting to draw support from two very different
philosophies.
This strategy worked for a time, mobilizing the black community in the Black
Monday protests, where thousands of black students walked out of class on consecutive
Mondays to protest inequality in the school system. However, the imperfect marriage
could not survive. Division among the leaders of Black Monday led to disagreement over
the eventual settlement and underscored the difficulty of merging separatist Black Power
rhetoric with more traditionally inclusive NAACP strategy. The result of the attempted
co-opting of Black Power language was weakened support within the black community.19
African Americans proved increasingly difficult to unite, and within the context of
busing, a merging of Black Power and liberal NAACP strategy was ineffective.20
Some members of the black community sided against busing, arguing, like many
of their white counterparts, for the continuation of neighborhood schools. This
perspective often overlapped with a rhetoric of protection of children, both white and
black, which was rooted in a climate of fear that pervaded the 1970s. Adults began to
perceive the world as more dangerous because of the hostage crisis in Iran, gasoline
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19
For a detailed look at divisions in the NAACP during and after the Black Monday protests, see
James David Conway, Jr., “Moderated Militants in the Age of Black Power: The Memphis
NAACP, 1968-1975” (PhD diss., University of Memphis, 2015), especially chapters three, four,
and five.
20

For more on Black Power, see Jeffrey Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African
American Identity. For a rather partisan account of Maxine Smith, see Sherry L. Hoppe and Bruce
W. Speck, Maxine Smith’s Unwilling Pupils: Lessons Learned in Memphis’s Civil Rights
Classroom (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007). Finally, for studies on the black
community in Memphis, see Sharon D. Wright, Race, Power, and Political Emergence in
Memphis (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000) and David M. Tucker, Black Pastors and
Leaders in Memphis, 1819-1972 (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1975).
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shortages, a domestic spike in violent crime and kidnapping, and accompanying
depictions of such horrors in popular culture. This rise in fear corresponded with a surge
in parents’ fears for their children’s safety. Busing accentuated those fears.21
The busing crisis profoundly changed Memphis. Today, wealthy private schools
ring the city limits, with few remaining in Memphis proper. Money (and whites) followed
the schools out of the city, leaving much of the inner city devoid of wealth and racially
segregated. The public school system has suffered from this departure as well, as it
continues to often lag in national standards. The Shelby County School System and
Memphis City School System began merging in 2011, only for most of the suburbs to
break away yet again into independent districts by 2014. But was this a result of busing,
or a result of the failure of busing? Busing in Memphis was at the epicenter of dramatic
social and political changes, a tragedy with few heroes and many missteps. One
Memphian no doubt represented the opinion of many of his fellow citizens struggling to
comprehend the rapid and radical changes wrought by busing when he anonymously
complained to McRae about busing in a letter, “I cannot help but think that some

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21
For more on the history of childhood and family as it relates to this study, see Jennifer
Ritterhouse, Growing Up Jim Crow: How Black and White Southern Children Learned Race
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 1-22, 221-235, and Stephen Mintz,
Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 305-308.
For more on the 1970s and fear, see Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties
and the Making of Eighties America (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), 66, 106-152;
Natasha Zaretsky, No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline,
1968-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 183-247; Robert O. Self, All
in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2012), 32-42, 339-366; Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 1-21, 125-67; and Bruce J. Schulman, The
Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Da Capo Press,
2001), 53-77, 102-117.
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enterprising businessman could really clean up at City Hall and the Federal Building
selling front ends for horses.”22
This study begins by examining the historical context for busing in Memphis
before turning its attention to topically organized chapters. Chapter one examines the
story of busing by looking at McRae’s first solution to achieve racial balance in Memphis
schools, Plan A. McRae did not initially support busing, but gradually changed his mind
throughout the process due to Supreme Court decisions in other states. McRae eventually
found Plan A to be insignificant to the challenge of desegregation, and he hired a team of
experts to create a bigger plan. The local NAACP lobbied for an even larger plan. McRae
ended up choosing the plan that his experts created and titling it Plan Z. However, many
Memphians were not enthused with McRae’s new plan. Many strongly disliked Plan A,
and when McRae announced the much more significant Plan Z, many Memphians
figuratively lost their heads.
Chapter two examines the NAACP, Black Power, and the fracturing of the black
community. The NAACP had orchestrated numerous school-based activism campaigns
for over a decade by the time of busing. Yet, support for busing was not as strong in the
black community as it had been earlier. Part of this was due to the growth of Black
Power, which the NAACP attempted somewhat unsuccessfully to co-opt. Although Black
Power had helped support the NAACP’s Black Mondays protests, by the arrival of
busing, that coalition had collapsed. Another part was emotional exhaustion following a
decade of activism. A third factor was more general personal disapproval of NAACP
leaders or their strategies. Infighting within the organization following Black Mondays
undercut their reliability to many in the black community. The examination of these
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22
Anonymous to Robert M. McRae, undated, in McRae Papers, Box 1, Folder C12.
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tensions should help illuminate why busing did not command unanimous support in the
black community. Busing offered black Memphians a chance for a stronger education,
but fear of white reprisals and an embrace of local, Black Power-led schooling created
uncertainty within the black community.
Chapter three examines white political opposition to busing, characterized by
Wyeth Chandler. The mayor, aided by a complicit City Hall, tried numerous methods to
prevent busing, including some of dubious constitutionality. Chandler and his allies
represented a new political movement called New Conservatism, which gave
conservatives the color-blind language necessary to resist social movements from the
ever-growing federal government without seeming like virulent racists. These New
Conservatives embraced localism and encouraged the growth of an external school
system to avoid busing. Key to this story is the history of Citizens Against Busing
(CAB), a largely white organization of parents created to halt busing. During Plan Z,
CAB established numerous private schools in an attempt to circumvent the busing order.
However, these schools often failed, as they lacked adequate teachers and accreditation.
These groups protested largely through political action and demonstration, representing a
key demographic throughout the struggle.
As Chandler and CAB encouraged flight from the school system, religious-based
institutions benefitted tremendously. Chapter four details religious opposition to the
busing program, especially as represented by Harding Academy. Although religious
schools welcomed people fleeing the public school system out of racial hatred, they were
also part of a significant Southern religious renaissance. Legislation outlawing school
prayer and a general opinion that the government was attacking religion led to a revival
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in Southern evangelicalism. Although established in the early 1950s as a response to
World War II, Harding experienced explosive growth during the busing crisis. At its
height, Memphis was home to the two largest private schools in the country. Who
powered this growth in Memphis religious schooling? Was it families looking for a
religious enclave from the growing secularism of the United States, or was it simply
white families who didn’t want to go to school with black families? In most cases, it was
a complicated combination of both.
Finally, Chapter five moves away from political protest and into the minds of
everyday Memphians, black and white. How did most parents feel about busing?
Through a large oral history collection, this chapter reveals a general fear of busing. That
fear was directed in a variety of places. Many parents feared the geographic distance of
busing, for their children’s safety once they were out of sight. Others feared the
environment into which they were sending their children. Additionally, the “average”
Memphian praised the value of neighborhood schools, a major causality of busing plans.
These Memphians feared what might happen to the city, its neighborhoods, and its
citizens if neighborhood schools disappeared. Unfortunately, many of their fears are
confirmed by Memphis today. The loss of neighborhood schools held significant
repercussions for both black and white communities in Memphis, as well as the city and
school system as a whole.23
The busing crisis shaped the politics and culture of the 1970s, locally and
nationally. The controversy was a key flashpoint to observe the numerous political,
social, and geographic changes at work during the 1970s. Many in the black community
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did not think busing was a great solution, but lent it their support because of potential
upside. Meanwhile, the white community overwhelmingly condemned busing, often
relying on numerous and diverse threads of resistance as their reasoning. Busing reveals
the sticky ground at the middle of civil rights activism, liberalism, and racism.!!
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Chapter 1
The Inconsistent Judge
Long before Judge Robert McRae became the most hated man in Memphis, he
was just another federal circuit court judge. In fact, to those who knew him well, McRae
was a very well-liked man prior to his involvement in the busing controversy. One of the
hate letters written to him later complained, “I know several people that knew you real
well before you became a judge, and they can’t understand why such a change. I guess it
went to your head and if much more goes in, guess the little thing will blow up.”1
McRae began his career in law as an Assistant City Attorney, working his way up
the ladder to federal district circuit clerk. In 1966, he took over as federal judge for the
Western District of Tennessee. His time as a circuit clerk was productive, but largely
uneventful.2 However, he made important connections. McRae built a strong rapport with
local leaders. Of special note was his good relationship with local black figures such as
NAACP leader Benjamin Hooks. Hooks was a longtime member of the Memphis
NAACP before eventually landing the job as NAACP executive director. Hooks and
McRae crossed paths frequently, as Hooks worked within the Tennessee state judicial
system. Down the road, when the federal judgeship opened up, Hooks used his newfound
national influence to help McRae land the appointment. Once he was confirmed as a
federal judge, McRae became heavily involved in desegregation, inspiring the ire of
Memphians when he brought about the end to neighborhood schools. But McRae was
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hardly an “outside agitator” coming to destroy Memphis education. He held a significant
record within the Tennessee judicial system, and was himself a veteran of Memphis City
Schools, attending Snowden Middle School and Central High School.3
The task of desegregating Memphis schools would never have been easy as the
city had a long history of residential segregation. By the dawn of the twentieth century,
clearly distinguishable black and white neighborhoods already dotted Memphis. Black
neighborhoods were located in northeast and southeast Memphis, including the historic
Orange Mound neighborhood. There was very little blending between white and black
neighborhoods. For example, in the northeast Klondyke neighborhood, “African
Americans owned nearly 95 percent of the land.”4 Separate neighborhoods and white
prejudice spawned separate parks, theaters, hospitals, and churches. The residential
segregation of the city created numerous challenges for any attempts to desegregate the
neighborhood school system.
In addition to the geography causing significant roadblocks for desegregation,
Memphis, like many other Deep South cities, had a very poor record of violent racial
discrimination and white supremacy. Following Reconstruction, large numbers of
African Americans migrated in to Memphis. Relationships between black and white
Memphians were always stressed. “Boss” Crump, the longtime mayor of Memphis
throughout the early 20th century, managed to paste over most racial issues through
political patronage and intimidation. But Crump and others like him were not able to hide
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everything from sight. Violence ran through Memphis’s post-Civil War timeline. Noted
anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells was driven from Memphis by angry whites when she
began to publicize the horrific violence against African American communities in
Memphis and the South at large. As Ida B. Wells fled the city for Chicago, Memphis
locales like People’s Pharmacy reminded her of the racial hatred and violence levied by
white Memphians.5 To many African Americans living in Memphis, landmarks of racial
violence dotted the city.6
Overcoming decades of intransigence from the white community, school
desegregation began in Memphis in 1960 with the Northcross v. Memphis Board of
Education case, named for Dr. T. W. Northcross, a prominent dentist in the black
community. 7 The NAACP was hoping to counteract what it saw as an evolving
movement to keep black children out of white schools. Black and white were already
segregated residentially, so segregating schooling was not difficult for the Memphis
School Board to enforce. However, by the early 1960s black families settled on the
outskirts of several traditionally white neighborhoods. Maxine Smith, an important mover
within the NAACP and Memphis education, explained that the school board “started
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building all-black schools like Carver or Lester near white neighborhoods just to keep
them [black children] out of schools like Southside and East.”8
Maxine Smith and her husband, Dr. Vasco Smith, began canvassing black
neighborhoods looking for families willing to risk their safety as members of a test case
against the Memphis school board. Through their canvassing, the Smiths located over
thirteen children whose families were willing to let them participate. The children were
spread out over four different schools in the Memphis City Schools district. “I bet we
went to two hundred houses trying to get volunteers,” Vasco Smith recalled. “It was
difficult to persuade mothers this was good for their kids.”9 But the Smiths argued to
parents that the opportunity for a superior education at a better funded white school
would be beneficial to their children, despite the struggles it would create.
The legal case officially succeeded in 1961 by utilizing the Tennessee Pupil
Assignment Law to prove an educational double standard in the city. But the hard work
was still to come – the actual process of desegregation. The thirteen black first graders
would face a difficult task not only in arriving at unhappy white schools the first day, but
also in continuing to attend throughout the school year despite the likely hardships. City
leaders such as Henry Loeb saw the need for a peaceful desegregation. If the city
desegregated quietly without much fuss, the NAACP would get no more fuel for their
fire. These thirteen kids might graduate from white schools, but further integration might
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be unlikely. Therefore, Memphis Police Chief Claude Armour assured the city of the
safety of the thirteen young activists.10
Chief Armour ensured the physical safety of the children throughout their time at
the white schools. However, their physical health was not the only challenge of
desegregation. The first graders endured cruel harassment at the hands of their peers.
There was taunting, name-calling, and other verbal abuse. They were frequently pushed
down stairs when no one was looking. Finally, the students frequently remembered other
students asking to see their tails, evidence of the racist education provided at home from
white parents.11 Although the thirteen students peacefully desegregated four all-white
schools in Memphis, there was still a high price to pay for the activists themselves.12
Despite the resolution of the case, Memphians did not seem angry. Memphis
survived the initial integration of Memphis City Schools largely unscathed because of the
timing and the details. Memphis City Schools desegregated seven years after the
controversial Brown vs. Board of Education decision that ordered all schools to
desegregate. However, ambiguity in the enforcement of the decision led many school
districts to attempt indefinite stalling. Memphis’s school district had survived seven years
without federal intervention, and even when integration did come to Memphis, it was
only thirteen first graders. The integration cleared the Memphis school district with the
federal government’s new laws, while simultaneously limiting the impact of those laws.
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In view of other school desegregation catastrophes, such as in Little Rock, Arkansas,
where the National Guard was required to enforce the order, Memphis seemed like a
rousing success. The city achieved the barest amount of integration to prevent significant
federal involvement.
Segregation and White Supremacy Continue in Memphis
The city also avoided condemnation from its citizenry because of the geographic
sprawl of Memphis. The city of Memphis begins on the eastern banks of the Mississippi
River, where the town once boomed as a trading center for boats sailing down to New
Orleans. Beginning in 1920 (and not including Depression years), Memphis grew by
100,000 citizens each decade.13 Following World War II in 1945, Memphis followed a
national trend by experiencing a mass exodus of white families into the suburbs. In
Memphis, large numbers of white families reached for middle-class status and home
ownership east of the city limits, while downtown Memphis, located on the eastern bank
of the Mississippi River, was emptied of wealth, expertise, and whites.14
By the 1960s, housing in Memphis remained firmly segregated. From 1950-1970,
the white population of Memphis declined two percent, while the black population
increased two percent. These figures would have been much starker, but the city
government annexed the very white suburbs of East Memphis, Frayser, Parkway Village,
and Oakhaven to keep the numbers (and the tax revenue) fairly stable.15 Therefore,
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integration of white schools close to downtown hardly influenced the rank and file of
Memphis whites, who resided on the outer rim of the city.
The strictly segregated housing situation in Memphis, combined with a strong
adherence to a neighborhood school policy and significant school zone gerrymandering,
kept the Memphis school system heavily segregated. Memphis’s “‘traditionalistic’
political culture,” consisting of domination by a “small group of business elites, a weak
white working class,[and] exclusion of blacks” provided a political framework that
protected these unjust practices.16 Realtors and banks also played a key role in this
process, refusing to sell houses in white neighborhoods to blacks for fear of alienating
white clientele.17 Through a carefully cultivated defense of near-complete segregation,
political powerbrokers in Memphis could claim successful integration while blaming a
lack of further desegregation on de facto living patterns unrelated to their jurisdiction.
The successful failure of school integration was reinforced in 1968. Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. made his famous visit to Memphis on behalf of striking sanitation
workers. The movement connected to King’s recent interest in helping the poor through
his Poor People’s Campaign. When he arrived in Memphis, it was a firmly segregated
city where poor black men such as the sanitation workers were unable to fully provide for
their families. Despite the promise of token integration, the results had not been
noteworthy. On his return visits, King was assassinated on the balcony of the Lorraine
Motel, immediately catapulting Memphis into national consciousness as an unrepentantly
racist town. African Americans living in the Bluff City could look at the progress they
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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were supposed to have achieved, and wonder if any gains had truly been made at all.18
The schools were just as segregated as they had ever been, Dr. King had been slain on
their turf, and racism was rampant within the city.
It was in this context that Robert McRae officially became involved in Memphis
school desegregation in 1968, when all school desegregation cases were officially
rerouted to McRae’s courtroom.19 Quite literally, any change to Memphis education had
to go through McRae first. At first, McRae ignored appeals from the NAACP that argued
the “concurrent existence of residential segregation and neighborhood schools in the City
of Memphis has helped preserve segregation in...public schools.”20 In November 1968,
ignoring calls to legislate the end of de facto housing segregation, McRae similarly
refused a busing solution. He was already aware of the tension around the concept of
busing, which several cities across the country had already tested.21 Although he admitted
that “there has been a lot of speculation about that,” McRae insisted that he did not
“know of any authorities that require that.”22 Although the only clear solution to ending
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one-race schools was the death of neighborhood schools and the establishment of crosstown busing, McRae steadfastly denied that such a solution was possible or required. In
1971, Memphis City Schools boasted a total enrollment of 148,015, the tenth largest in
the country, but it remained, essentially, completely segregated.23 McRae inspired the
confidence of white Memphians as he steadfastly stood against effective desegregation,
hiding behind not personal preference, but judicial precedent.
In 1969, McRae faced the strongest push for substantive desegregation yet, led by
the leaders of the local NAACP. Led by Maxine Smith, they made fifteen demands of the
school board, focusing on mass desegregation and utilizing busing as a tool to achieve
that goal.24 Smith did not plan to allow McRae to shrug off busing as easily this time.
Along with LeRoy Clark, she orchestrated “Black Monday,” a series of protests
throughout late 1969 to parallel an appeal of the original Northcross decision. The
protests lasted six consecutive Mondays and focused on keeping as many black students
out of school as possible. The effects were palpable, as parents held nearly 67,000
students out of school throughout the Black Monday protests.25 McRae faced a stern
challenge in Smith, who was carefully marshaling powerful political pressure against
McRae. Despite the pressure brought by Smith, McRae continued to hold out, deciding
against busing in Memphis City Schools. Instead, McRae opted for tightening the
schools’ transfer policy in an attempt to staunch white flight from schools that were
becoming black. The rule banned a transfer by “a member of a minority race in the zone
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of that pupil’s residence to a school where he would be in a majority racial enrollment.”26
It was a bittersweet victory for Smith and the NAACP.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg School District
Everything changed with the Supreme Court decision in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg School District. The case began in relatively progressive Charlotte, North
Carolina. Charlotte had a reputation as a city that solved racial problems through peaceful
settlement, rather than letting such scenarios boil over into violent chaos.27 Darius
Swann, a college professor, jump-started the litigation by requesting a transfer for his son
into an integrated school. The benefit to the Swann family was due not only to school
quality but also proximity to their home. The all-white school was much closer, as the
Swann’s son had been bused further from home to attend an all-black school. To many in
Charlotte, such litigation was shocking. City leaders had assumed their city had
progressed farther than others in the South.28
At first, the city tried to avoid the lawsuit, making a compromise that allowed free
transfers. This was similar to the action taken by McRae in Memphis. However, Swann
took issue that white students could transfer out of integrated schools, arguing “an
integrated school will best prepare young people for responsibility in an integrated
society.”29 The NAACP got behind the case as well, giving Charlotte’s segregated
schools national attention. With the NAACP’s support, the case was brought before
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Judge James. B. McMillan, a resident of a Charlotte suburb. The eventual decision on the
case would influence school busing policy across the country.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education stands out among
desegregation cases because of the argument brought by Swann and the NAACP. The
plaintiffs argued “that residential segregation in Charlotte resulted from official policies
enforced by the municipal government and subsidized by the federal government.”30 This
argument highlighted residential segregation as de jure segregation rather than de facto,
meaning residential segregation was due to local and national law rather than
happenstance. Acceptance by the court on this contention would dramatically affect
desegregation law. Municipalities explained away still-segregated schools by pointing to
housing patterns that they could not control. However, the Swann decision argued not
only that cities could control it, but also that they were the cause of the problem in the
first place.
First, Swann and the NAACP won over North Carolina Judge McMillan, whose
conversion was especially meaningful considering his role as a long-time Charlotte
resident. Judge McMillan exhibited a total change of heart, stating “I lived here twentyfour years without knowing what was really going on. I really didn’t know.”31 Through
appeals, the case reached the United States Supreme Court. In a final decision in April of
1971, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld busing to achieve racial balance as
constitutional and necessary.
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The Swann case triggered powerful repercussions across the country.
Municipalities were now responsible for actively ending dual-school systems rather than
blaming it on “natural” segregation. If schools were liable for maintaining integrated
schools despite residential segregation, it put residential practices under scrutiny, from
neighborhood covenants to real estate practices. In short, Swann changed the way cities
handled segregation, and Memphis was no different.
In Memphis, the Northcross case was remanded back to Judge McRae to be
reconsidered in light of the Swann decision.32 The result of the Swann decision provided
a judicial precedent McRae could no longer dodge. He considered the question, “Are the
one-race schools, or virtually one-race schools, genuinely non-discriminatory?”33 Of
course, anyone who was completely honest with themselves knew the obvious answer to
this question: the Brown decision had answered it seventeen years earlier. McRae
wrestled with his decision. He was well aware of negative public opinion toward busing,
as an intense letter-writing campaign would not let him forget. He was not only wrestling
public opinion and judicial precedent, but also his own personal opinions. As a judge,
such opinions had no place, but they almost certainly ran through his mind.
Several years previously, while his daughter was attending Overton High School,
one of the elite, eastern suburban white schools in town, the judge had revealed his mixed
feeling on racial issues. His daughter met one of the few black students at Overton, and
the young black woman invited McRae’s daughter to join her for lunch. McRae panicked.
He would later recount that he “was strongly opposed” to his daughter attending.
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However, while racism certainly colored McRae’s perspective, he was even more
concerned about “what would people think?” This story speaks not only to the mixed
personal position occupied by McRae, but also the treacherous territory of race in
Memphis. His decision on the busing case mattered to people exponentially more than the
color of his daughter’s lunchtime friend.34
McRae’s opinions had clearly evolved since his experiences with his daughter. He
was considering a monumental shift within the schools and the city itself. The one-race
and virtual one-race schools weighed the heaviest on McRae’s mind. McRae defined a
“virtual one-race school” as a school that was ninety percent or more one race.35 And in
light of McRae’s expanded definition, the situation in Memphis was grim. By McRae’s
definition, eighty-seven percent of blacks and seventy percent of whites were in one-race
schools.36 In addition, 143 of the 166 Memphis City Schools were one-race schools by
the court’s definition.
Although McRae certainly had private opinions, whether they involved his
daughter’s lunch plans or the mountain of angry letters that arrived on his desk weekly,
he strove to make his decision purely on the constitutionality of the move. The
ambiguous constitutionality of busing is what allowed him to put off a decision for so
long. It was not obviously essential under the law, therefore no immediate action was
required. But Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education changed all of that.
Now court ordered busing to achieve racial integration was requisite and constitutionally
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supported. And with the legal side of the issue perfectly clear, McRae would not allow
others’ opinions, no matter how harshly worded, to dissuade him. He warned citizens that
“I am not going to be persuaded by any private or public communications,” even as he
later noted “some of the letters were dripping with white racist prejudice.”37
Plan A
In January 1972, McRae finally announced his long awaited decision. Busing was
necessary to combat “continued de jure segregation through a pattern of school location
decisions, selective construction, and systematic over and under utilization of school
buildings.”38 Backed by the Swann decision, McRae declared the current system unfair
and ordered the Board of Education to create its own plan for desegregation. McRae set a
deadline for the beginning of the next school year in August 1972.39 McRae ordered the
Board to consult an expert to create the plan and directed it to Dr. Gordon Foster,
Professor of Education at the University of Miami and Director of the Florida
Desegregation Consulting Center.40
As the board worked to devise a busing plan and sort out the logistics, most
Memphians probably doubted that busing would ever happen. To be sure, McRae
received numerous letters of complaint during this time, but the quantity was
insignificant compared to later periods. Further, flight from the public school system was
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still minimal. Many Memphians likely assumed that their city government would find yet
another loophole around full desegregation.
In April 1972, McRae was poised to make the final decision. Would he accept
“Plan A,” the solution created by the Board, or would he select an alternative approach
filed with the court by the Memphis NAACP? Plan A centered upon a “clustering”
approach. In clustering, two high schools, one black and one white, would be merged.
Then, all of the ninth and tenth graders, black and white, would attend at one of the
buildings, with juniors and seniors going to the other. 41 Clustering affected only half of
the school system. Under the Board’s plan, only about ten thousand students would be
bused. 42
The NAACP plan was much more involved. It would bus nearly six times more
students than Plan A. Many in the black community rallied around the NAACP’s
attempts to finally force busing nearly ten years after the start of the Northcross case. As
McRae was deliberating on his final decision, there were three separate protests vying for
his and the press’s attention. Maxine Smith organized a massive sit-in at the courtroom,
so that black parents occupied roughly 110 out of the 120 seats in the auditorium.
Meanwhile, a group of white parents protested busing outside the building. Finally, an
integrated group marched to the courthouse in support of busing.43
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During the three simultaneous demonstrations, McRae issued his decision. Plan A
would be implemented in August of 1972. In his decision, McRae insisted on providing
equal opportunity for formerly one-race schools, arguing that “the only apparent means
of effectively overcoming the present problem of one-race schools is to assign students of
each race to schools of the opposite race.”44 Logistical delays managed to slow the
eventual implementation of Plan A. Instead of the fall of 1972, Plan A would go live in
January of 1973.45 McRae’s decision shocked Memphis. Average citizens expressed their
disapproval through numerous letters suggesting that it “seems that anyone with a little
common sense could see that the majority of both white and black are opposed to the
busing order.”46 The Board itself seemed quite shocked by the judge’s decision. Despite
that its members had created the plan, they seemed convinced that the judge was simply
asking for a plan to satisfy federal orders and that he had no intention of following
through. The School Board immediately tried to stop the order, filing an appeal against its
own plan.
However, the Board was slowed by its new members. During the recent elections
in January of 1972, three African Americans, including Maxine Smith, had been elected
to the school board.47 There was no simple vote to overturn, but there was significant
debate on Plan A. The final vote to overturn Plan A was 5-4 in favor of overturning. All
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three black members plus the liberal (at the time) Frances Coe voted for busing.48 The
Board filed its appeal with McRae, who promptly dismissed it, much to Smith and her
allies’ delight. And while some Memphians were bound to be upset and the dissent of the
school board against its own plan was surprising, more surprising complaints came from
white civil rights supporters.
In some ways, a person losing their ardent support for civil rights by the late
1960s and early 1970s was a widespread phenomenon. Black Power had scared away
many white moderate supporters of civil rights. This was less a function of Black Power
being necessarily bad, and more a result of white liberals experiencing backlash when
forced with confronting their own personal racism, rather than the easily lamented racism
of arch-segregationists. As early as 1966, Memphis newspapers were noting this trend;
pointing out that white activist Leonard J. Kerpelman “opposes any further extension of
civil rights for Negroes.”49 Many Memphians couched their displeasure with busing in
clearly non-racial terms, not wanting to be painted as racists. For example, Janice A.
Karask wrote to McRae, “I am for ‘civil rights’ not Black Rights or White Rights….I for
one will not bus my children.”50 In another example, Joy Lomax Martin described how
she had supported integration, but not busing, which would send her sixteen year old
daughter to all-black Melrose High School. She explained, “I cannot…send a sixteen year
old white girl into an all black school….the moral code, the dress code, and language
code are not equal.” She further refused “to have my children knifed, stabbed, shot, and
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raped in a black school.”51 Although their racist assumptions and fears clearly pierced
their rhetoric, their concerns were couched in a language of safety and morality. Yet all
three were inseparably wrapped up within their fight against busing.
Some students, often conditioned by their parents thinking and often white, did
not care for busing either. Doug Garner, a student at all-white White Station High School,
forwarded Judge McRae a paper he wrote for school. He had been charged with writing a
fable, a story with a moral often told with animals. Garner wrote about life after humanity
in 2037. Animals ruled the world and attempted schooling just like the humans used to
do. It ended a massive failure with the cats killing the other animals. Garner stated his
moral very clearly at the end: “togetherness is sometimes fatal.” Garner’s story very
closely parallels the busing saga, and his moral clearly stated he did not support it. His
teacher gave the essay an A- for “excellent content.”52 Garner represented many in the
white community. Integration was fine as long as it did not affect their lives, but once it
crossed into their geographic areas and into their schools, it became abhorrent.
Support in the black community was not as overwhelmingly supportive as Maxine
Smith might have expected either. Some have suggested that black disapproval of busing
had more to do with Black Power and cultural conditioning and that, as Doug Garner’s
essay stated, there was an “ultimate futility of integration in American life” because the
two sides just could not understand each other.53 Others’ disapproval had less to do with
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an inability to trust in integration, but because they did not see the need to integrate. In a
newspaper piece examining black views on busing, school teacher Mrs. Frances Hall
explained that “now that we have teaching and equipment in the black schools to give our
children what they need, I don’t feel that full integration is necessary.” 54 Clearly,
something about busing and the climate that birthed it made parents, black and white,
hesitant to see their children leave their neighborhood. However, despite less-thanexpected black support, anti-busing activity from Memphis’s African American
community were but a drop in the bucket compared to the hate that spilled from many in
the white community.
Many whites skipped school on the first day of busing. Out of the roughly thirtyfour thousand students at schools affected by busing, thirteen thousand skipped school on
the first day.55 Because of widespread absenteeism, some bus routes were extremely
depleted. On the first day, each bus carried an average of sixty-six students, about half of
their capacity. On the route from the white suburban escape of Frayser to black Cypress
High School, only one white student showed up to ride. The local newspapers reported
that Police Chief Bill Price had little to do on day one, unlike his counterparts in Boston
when they started busing.56 In Boston, busing started with a bang through protests and
riots; in Memphis, it started with a whimper. The paper stated that the police “had not

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54
Art Gilliam, “School Busing: The Black Viewpoint,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, Oct. 9,
1972.
55

“Absences, Calm Mark Busing,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, Jan. 24, 1973.

56

For a description of the hectic first day of Boston busing, see Ronald J. Formisano, Boston
Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1991).

!

34

!

received a single call which could be classified as an emergency call in regard to school
buses.”57
Although the busing campaign started very weakly with little public support, it
gained steam relatively quickly. By the third day, bus ridership was up to roughly ten
thousand out of an estimated thirteen thousand.58 However, this should not be interpreted
as full-scale support for busing. Although more whites went back to school, many did so
due to lack of alternatives. Although several private schools had rapidly organized to
begin school in January of 1973, few offered an actual academic alternative. W. W.
Woolley enrolled his child in a city school, stating,, “I just think a newly organized
private school would be unable to provide as good an education as this school” in
reference to his child’s city school location.59
Plan A ran through the conclusion of the 1972-1973 school year, and it certainly
created a mixed legacy. Some, such as William J. Haner, attacked McRae and his new
project, accusing McRae and his fellow jurists of being “not judges but dictators working
for the NAACP, a communist-backed organization.”60 Others, such as civil rights analyst
John Egerton, claimed, “In a very real sense, the Memphis story is a success story.”61
Most importantly, about eight thousand voted with their feet and left the public school
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system after the 1972-1973 school year. Of those, the vast majority were white students
who had been assigned to attend a black school.62
As the 1972-1973 school year came to a close, frustration and protest against
busing was growing louder, not quieter. One particularly salient vein of protest was that
of New Conservatism, a rebranded political platform that allowed former segregationists
to continue fighting racial integration, but with a more acceptable language. New
Conservatism was about more than simply rephrasing racism in a more acceptable way,
of course; it also capitalized on the “dramatic social and economic transformation of the
American South and the implications for the Southern political ruling class.”63 New
Conservatism used the language of Richard Nixon to demand “law and order.” Busing
was a gift to politicians who embraced a philosophy of New Conservatism, motivating
the masses to change political allegiances in defense of their children and neighborhoods.
The rise of Nixon and his supporters would “initiate a new, more conservative era
in American politics.”64 Nixon stood for protecting local government rights and limiting
the interference of the federal government.65 Although this platform can seem devoid of
racism, the way it was utilized by politicians and citizens in Memphis proves the
opposite. In fact, much of the initial boon for Nixon came from “supporting efforts to
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curtail busing and slow the pace of school desegregation.”66 Nixon rode a landslide of
support in Southern states like Tennessee to the Presidency in 1968. Two years later,
Memphis dentist Winfield Dunn was elected governor of Tennessee, the first Republican
governor of the state since Reconstruction. Dan Kuykendall, a “militaristic, anti-civil
rights, free-market Republican” dominated the Memphis congressional district from
1966-1974 despite a large black constituency, in part by allying himself with the policies
of Richard Nixon.67 In 1972, Memphis elected Wyeth Chandler as mayor, who also
aligned his policies with Nixon’s New Conservative principles, but adapted to a Memphis
context. Many white Memphians powered Chandler and his rhetoric forward as a
significant opponent of busing. Politically, conservatives were gaining traction across the
nation and in Memphis, and they were coalescing around the presence of busing, which
was far from over.
Plan Z
Many Memphians’ anger was still high. Many white families were threatening to
leave the school system, and a handful already had. McRae stepped back to survey the
results of Plan A. Yes, a significant number of students had been bused. However, the
more McRae studied the plan, the more he was convinced of its inadequacy. In February,
he announced to the school board that Plan A was inadequate and that it must write a new
plan to bus more children. McRae would not hear dissent from the school board, which
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drove white flight. McRae later claimed that the loss of white students that year could
easily be attributed to “normal attrition during the school year from dropouts and other
causes.”68
In an attempt to dissuade McRae, the dissenting members of school board
revisited many of the arguments they had previously trotted out in objection to Plan A.
Many of the arguments the conservative members of the board discussed again with
McRae had already been published. In the original iteration of the busing component of
the Northcross case prior to school board elections, these arguments had helped net
greater black representation and put Maxine Smith on the school board. They fought
“busing of pupils to achieve biracial enrollment,” arguing yet again that “to assign pupils
to a school solely on the basis of a pupil’s race is…noxious.”69 They argued that busing
served no educational purpose, but was solely tied to “racial quotas in the schools.”70
But the conservative members of the school board and the constituents that
backed them hardly limited themselves to concerns of reverse-discrimination and racial
quotas. They reiterated most to McRae about the potential damage to schools and
education. For example, a prominent theme was the harm to extra-curricular activities
and athletics within schools. If students could not stay after school because of busing
schedules, teams would be weaker and some extra-curricular activities would not survive.
They argued that this would harm students, as many parents were convinced that a key to
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a strong education was an involvement in diverse extra-curricular activities that
broadened horizons.71
Finally, the conservative board members revisited one of their final key
arguments: cost and supplies. Memphis was already “totally devoid of a transportation
system,” unlike Charlotte in the Swann case.72 Not only would further busing exacerbate
the supply and demand problem of buses themselves, but the costs of fuel would go up as
well. It was not only a complicated plan to create, but a challenging one to fund. The
logistics alone could create “nightmarish problems,” while the probability of a terrible
accident happening would increase significantly. Such danger was “a grave risk” that
should be avoided if another route existed.73
The conservative members of the board reflected the New Conservative tactics of
their mayor. They fought increased busing tooth and nail, yet never resorted to racist
proclamations. To the contrary, they defended educational equality, cost saving, and child
safety. Their insistence that opposition to busing was not about race allowed liberal white
Memphians, who might have previously supported civil rights activism, to oppose
busing. As long as busing was officially “not about race,” whites did not have to feel guilt
about supporting a movement that resisted black equality.
This defense was at best paper-thin. The NAACP was unhappy with the limited
scope of Plan A, and it welcomed an enlarged busing plan more similar to its original
plan. Maxine Smith made it clear that race could not be divorced from busing. Black
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Memphians had been slighted for decades, and busing was the only visible way to correct
it. McRae saw things similarly. When hearing the rehashed defenses for stopping or
limiting busing, McRae was reminded of how antibusing advocates “ignored basic
constitutional principles” that had been clearly established in the Swann case. 74 McRae
was convinced that school segregation in Memphis was due to residential segregation
from discrimination in real estate practices.75 Swann had made it explicitly clear that
rectifying school segregation caused by residential discrimination was requisite. The new
interpretation of the Constitution strictly forbade local officials from turning a blind eye
to something they claimed was not their fault. McRae summarized the views of many
busing supporters when he claimed that the arguments he kept hearing from the
conservative board were “another expression of the Caucasian Board continuing its
defiance of the Constitution and repeatedly showing that Negroes were unwelcome in
white schools.”76
The defiance from the recalcitrant segments of the board only convinced McRae
of the failure of Plan A. The plan had not bused enough children. The final plan had
compartmentalized the effects of busing, limiting integration to a select few schools,
permitting many white families to completely ignore it. A new plan would have to
increase the students and schools involved. McRae observed that the best method to
ensure mass involvement in busing was a satellite zoning plan, rather than clustering.77
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McRae had advocated for a satellite zoning plan earlier in the Plan A process.
“Clustering” meant pairing schools, but a satellite zoning plan required more wholesale
upheaval. McRae described satellite zoning as population swaps between black and white
schools.78 Entire regions of town would be “balanced.” Rather than merging two schools
in the cluster approach, there would be numerous swaps across the district. This plan had
a much greater chance of achieving complete integration across the district.
There were, however, significant drawbacks to a satellite zoning plan. The
logistics of mapping could be overwhelming. The likelihood of errors and unaccounted
students would dramatically increase. More buses would be required, while the mapping
of their routes would become more complex. To account for morning traffic, buses would
need earlier departures, depriving students of rest. Extracurricular activities would be
upset on an even larger scale.79
The white conservative community objected to satellite zoning. This population
might have first assumed McRae was talking big to prevent federal intervention. But
now, he was not only acting on his busing plans, but also increasing the size and scope.
Such parents now had little hope of keeping their children in segregated schools. Former
president of the Memphis School Board Edgar Baily “advised some members of civic
clubs and other citizens to communicate with Judge McRae if they wanted to be heard on
the school case.”80 Unsurprisingly, McRae was again flooded with disgruntled letters.
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McRae again refused to be influenced by any of them.81 McRae was convinced that
Swann gave him clear judicial instructions on how to act, and no amount of handwringing
or threats from the public could sway him.
Despite the vocal dissent to further busing, McRae ordered the school board to
draw up a plan that would more effectively integrate the schools, in line with the
NAACP’s plan. McRae found the right man for the complicated job in Dr. O. Z.
Stephens, a veteran of the Memphis City School System who had long served as director
of school board research.82 Stephens ultimately paid the price for his direct involvement
in busing planning. He later claimed that his penning of the plan “killed me
professionally in the school system.”83 Ironically, Stephens did not personally agree with
busing, but insisted that he would complete the most effective, law-abiding plan possible
because he was a professional.84
Stephens collaborated closely with Louis Lucas and William Caldwell, two of the
men heavily involved in the case for the NAACP. Lucas was a legal mastermind. He had
worked for the United States attorney’s office in New Orleans, where he grew up. In
1967, Lucas moved to Memphis, where he opened the city’s first integrated law firm. In
his previous law work, Lucas had helped desegregate Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Dayton,
and other cities. Lucas was the perfect complement to Stephens. Lucas understood the
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difficulties of working on difficult issues across racial lines, but he had worked in his
integrated law firm long enough to know how to maximize his relationships without
damaging them. He could extract help on a race matter from a white lawyer without
triggering a negative reaction. Ironically, Lucas lived in Germantown, a suburb of
Memphis that consistently refused incorporation. So despite his heavy involvement in the
busing plans, Lucas’s own children went through the suburban and un-bused
Germantown School District.85
Throughout the spring semester of 1973, Stephens, Lucas, and many others on
their teams worked constantly on a solution to school busing. They tried to create a plan
that struck balance between integration and appeasing the white community. Although
they did not want to let the white community wriggle out of integration, they attempted to
prevent massive white flight from the school system. In late spring, they presented the
specifics of their plan to McRae, who approved the results of their difficult labor. McRae
named the proposal “Plan Z,” later explaining “having started with Plan A as the first
truly significant, involuntary means of desegregation in this city, the court hereby
designates the combined approved plans as Plan Z in the hope that this will be the
terminal plan for this long-standing problem.”86
Almost immediately, Plan Z met strong resistance. Much of the white community
decried the board’s plan, lamenting its involvement in what they considered their private
lives. Many knew that busing was now inevitable and had therefore begun preparing
themselves to accept some form of busing, but the announcement of Plan Z was too
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much. The announced figure of roughly 35,000 bused pupils was far too many and
significantly beyond the worst of what they had expected to hear. Representatives from
this group began preparing to take Plan Z to court in an attempt to mitigate the damage.87
But white conservatives were not the only ones distraught about the specifics of
Plan Z. The NAACP was equally frustrated. From the beginning of the Northcross saga,
the NAACP plan had called for significantly higher numbers of students bused. For
Maxine Smith and other leaders of the NAACP, the 35,000 bused were well short of their
target of 50,000 pupils. Plan Z would certainly have an impact on segregation, but it did
not achieve the complete success in school integration. The NAACP faced a choice of
compromising on Plan Z, or holding out for a complete victory.88
Throughout the public outcry, McRae split the middle. He tried placating both
sides. He stressed to white conservatives that 35,000 was well short of the NAACP plan,
so it indeed could have been much worse. To the NAACP, McRae cited budgetary
limitations. Although the NAACP plan would more effectively desegregate the Memphis
City Schools, the cost of the buses, drivers, gasoline, and other logistics would skyrocket
in comparison to Plan Z. He encouraged the NAACP to get on board with Plan Z, rather
than extend the battle.89
Despite his conciliatory attempts, McRae was unable to forestall further court
action. Opponents of busing had already failed to get the Supreme Court to revisit busing
by taking an appeal on the Northcross case, but they were able to appeal the specific
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busing decisions in Plan Z to a District Court.90 The court began a three-day hearing on
April 18, 1973, to decide Memphis busing with some finality.91 And so, a court case that
began in 1960 with thirteen first graders to desegregate Memphis City Schools would
now be settled. A three-judge panel would settle the fate of over a decade of litigation
and activism.
The three-day hearing produced emotional highs from all sides. The NAACP
presented its comprehensive busing plan. The school board (or at least its conservative,
white majority) both argued against busing in general and supported Plan Z – a preferable
alternative to the NAACP plan. Local media followed the proceedings with rapt attention.
The Commercial Appeal claimed that Plan Z “would be bad enough,” but that the
NAACP plan “doesn’t make any sense at all…. Memphis needs responsible leadership,
not wild-eyed schemes.”92
In the courtroom, the claims were equally impassioned. The NAACP criticized
the board’s pleas, claiming that they were “primarily an emotional appeal.”93 From the
viewpoint of NAACP lawyers, anything short of complete integration was dodging the
issue. The board, they believed, was not speaking from an informed position that
observed the numbers. Instead, they were convinced Plan Z was created in an attempt to
placate the while community. They weren’t completely wrong.
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Meanwhile, speakers for the conservative members of the board claimed that the
NAACP plan “would add to the deteriorating quality of life in our urban areas.”94 It is
hard to ignore the bias in these statements. They based their arguments for urban decline
on the collapse of neighborhood schools. Without neighborhood schools uniting
communities, they would be at risk of disintegration. Although it might be extreme to
claim that neighborhood collapse was solely due to the loss of a school, their defense
perhaps suggested that if black teenagers were in white communities, even if only for
schooling purposes, then it would damage the health of these communities.
Amid loud and diverse public protest, the court ruled 2-1 that the busing order
should be upheld. The judges agreed that Plan Z was the most effective means of
achieving integration in Memphis City Schools. Plan Z left thirty-three schools
untouched by integration. The final count of pupils bused, following revisions, reached
just under forty thousand.95 The NAACP fell in line with the decision, having previously
stated that it would embrace Plan Z if the court ruled that way.96
The dissenting opinion in the 2-1 decision reflected much of the commentary that
would emerge over the next year in Memphis. Judge Paul C. Weick, who sided against
court-ordered busing, argued that “the burden of eliminating all the ills of society should
not be placed on public school systems and innocent school children.”97 Although
outnumbered by his fellow judges at this early stage, Weick’s opinion would resonate
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significantly in Memphis across racial and economic lines before the busing controversy
was over.
With Plan Z officially approved on May 3, 1973, buses were set to roll forward
that August. They would desegregate all but thirty-three of the 133 schools in the
Memphis City School district.98 Twenty-four schools were left virtually all black and
unaffected by busing, and nine schools were left all white. This setup kept the white
community happy for two purposes. First, it kept many of the teenagers that whites
considered dangerous in black neighborhoods, far from their children. Second, although
only nine schools remained virtually all white, this was more than in the original plan,
and those nine schools were some of the largest and nicest in the city.99
On August 28, 1973, the first students were bused under Plan Z. Similar to Plan
A, numerous students were absent throughout the first week of busing. Under Plan Z,
nearly half of the students who were supposed to be bused showed up, and that half was
overwhelmingly black.100 Considering the massive logistical undertaking of Plan Z,
complications were relatively low, with only several “fouled-up schedules, a few
equipment breakdowns, and eight children temporarily lost on their way home.”101
Although administrators were probably grateful for the relatively small number of
mistakes, the press and the public did not tend to view it in that light. Instead, eight
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temporarily lost children confirmed their previous fears that the government could not be
trusted with their children.
There were significant costs to Plan Z. Some of the costs had been anticipated,
others feared, and others completely unexpected. The school board had prepared for some
of these costs. For example, none were surprised that the costs of buses, bus drivers, and
gasoline was significant under Plan Z. And although the board had estimated less, the
board was not shocked when school transportation costs increased tenfold from $51,000
to $524,000 annually.102 Costs of material and manpower, though unpleasant, were also
expected.
Many feared white flight out of the school system. Unfortunately for Memphis
City Schools, those fears were met with reality. With the implementation of Plan Z,
school enrollment took a disastrous turn. As early as the beginning of the 1973-74 school
year, the black population in Memphis City Schools remained relatively stable,
increasing by about four hundred. However, the white population already began to drop
precipitously. Prior to Plan Z, there were slightly fewer than 11,000 white students in
Memphis City Schools’ high schools. At the start of Plan Z, that number had dropped to
8,581.103
White flight increased throughout the 1970s. Plan Z triggered a massive spike in
private school enrollment, white flight to the suburbs, and a declining tax base that
furthred urban decay. By January of 1974, one year into busing and six months into Plan
Z, Memphis boasted one of the largest private school systems in the country, largely
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supported by white Memphians fleeing the school system.104 From 1971 to 1975, African
Americans went from constituting just over fifty percent of the Memphis City Schools to
over seventy-five percent.
The white flight from the school system took both tax dollars and booster
fundraising from the schools. Private schools boomed. Neighborhood schools suffered,
and neighborhoods themselves suffered from flight to unincorporated suburbs. White
Memphians often maintained that their flight was not driven by racism. In reality, many
of those white Memphians probably held racially motivated reasoning for opposing
busing, even as those prejudices intermingled with their concerns about religious
education, neighborhood schools, or their children’s safety.
Unfortunately, one of the greatest costs of busing was almost completely
unexpected. When the NAACP began pursuing busing, it expected full support from the
black community. Initially, black Memphians consistently backed all of the NAACP’s
integration efforts. For many, however, busing was a breaking point. Busing exacerbated
long-simmering tensions in the black community. It tested divisions that had been
smoothed over by a generation of civil rights protest. Many black Memphians struggled
to balance the often-dueling concerns of their child’s safety and an equal, quality
education. Through this atmosphere of division, fear, and uncertainty, the NAACP
undertook the challenging task of trying to unite the black community in support of Plan
Z, something Maxine Smith and her supporters unequivocally believed would improve
the lives of all black Memphians.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104
Branston, Rowdy Memphis, 124.

!

49

!

Chapter 2
The Relentless Activist
The buses rolled for Plan Z at the start of the 1973-1974 school year. Although
thrilled with their progress, many African Americans were concerned for the safety of
their children. The last fifteen years had witnessed numerous school desegregations
across the country, and many knew the danger that could entail. A “peaceful” integration
meant that only an angry, shouting mob greeted children. More worrisome examples
ended in violence, either inside or outside of the school building.
Reverend Samuel “Billy” Kyles was a board member of the Memphis NAACP. A
longtime activist in the Memphis school desegregation movement, he was standing on the
balcony of the Lorraine Motel when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in
Memphis in 1968. Kyles was well aware of the potential for danger. The climate of
protest had shifted in the last few years, and violence seemed increasingly possible. Kyles
knew it, and he was a leader that Memphians recognized and respected. In this seemingly
more dangerous context, Kyles and other black Memphis leaders refused to allow
children to enter the fray alone. Although the buses rolled out in 1973 to escort children
to their new schools, often in very different demographic areas, they were not alone.
Kyles and other key black leaders often rode the buses with the students. They hoped the
presence of battle-hardened activists, aware of the possibilities of white hate, would calm
the children and discourage any unchecked violence by angry whites. Their aims were
largely realized. The first weeks of Plan Z, although not without controversy, were
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generally without large outbreaks of violence. But the steadfast support of lifelong
activists such as Kyles was hardly the only viewpoint in the black community on Plan Z.1
While Kyles was on some Plan Z buses, usually heading from mostly black
communities to largely white communities, Allan Bradford was going in the opposite
direction. Bradford was a fifteen-year-old black teenager. He had spent the last year as
one of the few black students at mostly white Sherwood High School. Sherwood was
located in a heavily white neighborhood in East Memphis, a generally affluent segment
of Memphis. Although Sherwood was located in a more working-class segment of the
neighborhood, it was still a significant difference from the black community in Orange
Mound where Bradford previously lived.2
Plan Z would send Bradford from Sherwood to Melrose High School, located in
the historically black Orange Mound neighborhood. Unlike many of the adults in his life,
Bradford’s busing concerns had little to do with educational quality, and more with
concerns befitting a teenager. He worried about the quality of cafeteria food. He worried
about friend groups and fitting in socially. And perhaps most interestingly, he “lamented
the fact that he wouldn’t be able to skip classes as often.”3 Apparently Bradford had been
able to skip class with great ease when he was the black student in a white school;
teachers did not seem to mind if he was not present. However, in a majority black school,
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Bradford seemed aware that he would not have the same opportunities to slack off any
more. He would be noticed, which he saw as a bad thing. Bradford’s inherent assumption
was that within the black community he was more cared for, and perhaps would receive a
better quality education, much to his dismay.
Kyles and Bradford, although extreme examples, represent some of the differing
viewpoints on busing among African Americans in Memphis. Many, like Kyles,
unconditionally supported the quest for educational equality. To pro-busing advocates, it
was all about the possibility of improving the quality of education and nothing else.
Deborah Northcross later reflected, “Desegregation gave whites the impression we
wanted to be with them…. That was not the point. It was a matter of school choice and
educational equality.”4 Educational equality was not equivalent to integration, but the
ability to choose any school would be a vital prerequisite for true equality. Another group
of people, including Bradford, appeared either apathetic or had deep concerns about the
consequences of busing. Finally, some disagreed with busing entirely either due to a fear
for their children’s safety or because of a preference for all-black schools that could
inculcate pride and self-esteem rather than preach black inferiority.
Younger activists who fought for a new direction of activism heightened the
divisions within black politics. Their platforms demanded poverty relief, encouraged
black pride, and called for greater black representation in black politics; for many of
these activists, a strengthening philosophy of Black Power provided the ideal avenue to
achieve these ends. But the Black Power movement was diverse, with no unifying
national structure. Each local group practiced as it saw fit. Sometimes, the appearance or
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attitude of a group like the Oakland Black Panthers could color people’s views on Black
Power, despite the good work done by the Oakland Panthers.5 For example, the Oakland
Black Panthers were known for carrying guns and policing the police. These
confrontational tactics were some of the best-known examples of Black Power in
practice. However, the Oakland Black Panthers also practiced Black Power by feeding
local schoolchildren and underprivileged families in the black community. And the
numerous Black Power-espousing groups across the country ran the gamut between
confrontational tactics and peaceful community uplift. Furthermore, groups that
proclaimed Black Power often used in in support of differing aims such as electoral
politics, anti-war protest, economic equality, or decolonization. 6
As increasing numbers of activists embraced Black Power ideas, they adapting the
ideas to their own contexts, splintering in numerous directions. Many African Americans
embraced some Black Power ideas without becoming Black Power advocates. The rise in
popularity of these goals, often contradictory to the more middle-class aims of
established civil rights institutions such as the NAACP, challenged existing community
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leadership. But Black Power activists were far from the only pressure in black politics. A
connected challenge was a growing generational rift among leadership. Although often
connected with Black Power ideals, the generational divide could manifest through other
divisions as well. The Memphis story reveals this nationwide trend, with some especially
interesting particularities. The most important of these was the Memphis NAACP’s longheld dominance in civil rights activism locally. The local chapter was now facing
increased opposition from younger activists while struggling to maintain nonviolence in
the shadow of Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination.
Of great assistance in constructing this narrative are two recent dissertations by
University of Memphis students. In Shirletta Kinchen’s “’We Want What People
Generally Refer to as Black Power’: Youth and Student Activism and the Impact of the
Black Power Movement in Memphis, Tennessee, 1965-1975,” the author details a
growing youth movement in Memphis. This movement utilized the language and tactics
associated with Black Power nationally to push for their economic aims as well as battle
older, more traditional activists. Through Kinchen’s work, the presence of this movement
in Memphis is made clear. Additionally, in James Conway’s “Moderated Militants in the
Age of Black Power: The Memphis NAACP, 1968-1975,” the author examines how the
local NAACP maintained local dominance while attempting to adapt to the increasing
influence of younger, more radical activists. The story begins well before busing, in the
1960s.7
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Desegregation in Memphis
Bonnie Jamerson lived in the Binghamton community. Binghamton bordered the
Memphis Zoo and Overton Park, in the heart of Midtown Memphis. Jamerson was a
lifelong Memphian. Her educational history was markedly similar to other African
Americans in Memphis. She grew up attending all black schools, even though she lived
within walking distance of immaculate, all-white East High School, one of the nicest
schools in all of Memphis. Because of the color of her skin, she was not welcome at East.
Instead, she had to take a nearly hour-long ride on a city bus to Booker T. Washington
High School, the closest black school. Jamerson witnessed the problems of segregated
schools, observing the age of textbooks she used throughout her education. “New”
textbooks at Jamerson’s schools were ten-year-old dilapidated books from white
schools.8 But these separate schools were the reality for Memphis and the rest of the
South prior to 1954.
In the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case, the Supreme Court ruled
that separate facilities were “inherently unequal,” triggering a school desegregation order
across the country. Students like Jamerson would have the opportunity to attend
traditionally white schools. Initially, this was viewed as a benefit. Not only were superior
materials often available at such schools, but in the Brown case, the NAACP had
effectively argued that separation of black children created and enforced notions of
inferiority. In the famous doll test, black children repeatedly chose a white doll as the
nicer toy, despite being offered an otherwise identical black doll. So integration would
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not only supply greater materials, but also counteract long-taught societal notions of
black inferiority.9
Locally, the Memphis chapter of the NAACP, led by Executive Secretary Maxine
Smith, sprang into action. In Memphis, the NAACP had long been the only show in
town. Being the only major civil rights organization in Memphis was a double-edged
sword, as the Memphis chapter “fluctuated between periods of lethargy and intense
activism.”10 The lack of competition meant that the pressure was not always on, often
leading to very quiet periods without fear of alienating their long-term support. However,
when it did actively organize protests or campaigns, the Memphis chapter of the NAACP
could mobilize large numbers of activists under a relatively unified banner. The Memphis
NAACP was frequently recognized by the national branch for its size, strength, and
success, despite the fact that it often lagged behind national trends in tactics because of
what was perceived as a slow-moving leadership team.11
On the occasion of the initial desegregation of Memphis City Schools, Maxine
Smith and the Memphis chapter demonstrated what the organization could do at peak
effectiveness. They recruited over one hundred families to potentially test continued
school desegregation. Smith enlisted the services of national NAACP star litigator
Thurgood Marshall. Legally, the Memphis chapter located thirteen of their one hundred
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families that met the complicated qualifications for Memphis City Schools Pupil Transfer
order. Next, through careful negotiations with the city, they managed a peaceful
integration of Memphis City Schools. White Memphians in power locally, such as Police
Chief Claude Armour, compromised with Smith to ensure a peaceful and limited
desegregation that would protect business interests in the city.12
In the initial letter notifying the school board of their intent to desegregate, Vasco
Smith, Maxine’s husband and prominent local activist, wrote, “we welcome the
opportunity to discuss with the Board of Education, at its earliest convenience, way and
means to bring about constitutional operations for our school system.”13 The language
was emblematic of the early 1960s Memphis chapter, formal, legalistic, and open to
discussion in the hopes of compromise. Throughout the early 1960s, the organization
continued to build a record of working out compromises with the Memphis school board.
In addition to negotiating the deal to integrate the schools with thirteen first graders, the
school board and the NAACP agreed on a mutually beneficial transfer rule in 1961. The
rule was in response to white families avoiding desegregation by transferring with great
ease. The renegotiation of the rule effectively closed the loophole that many whites might
use to escape integrated schools.14
As the 1960s drew to a close, the tenor of the Memphis Branch and Maxine
Smith’s speeches began to shift. The Memphis NAACP’s trend towards compromise
began to dissolve following the assassination of Dr. King in Memphis in 1968. While
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earlier editions of the Memphis chapter had been eager to find mutually beneficial
agreements that would slowly increase their standing in Memphis society, the
assassination changed the organization. Historians have noted that following King’s
death, the Memphis chapter became unwilling to compromise short of achieving its
complete goals.15 Part of this can be attributed to a changing political dynamic. With
African Americans winning some local political offices, the continued existence of
residential inequality, workplace discrimination, and police brutality was especially
rankling. The fight against inequality had long roots, and anything short of complete
success given the new political context of the 1970s seemed like a failure. Maxine Smith
and others began pondering ways to overcome this continued segregation, and busing
emerged as the most effective solution. Busing would force whites to finally comply with
complete desegregation. It could be the capstone on decades of litigation for equal
opportunity in schooling. However, Smith would face a challenging task in selling busing
to the black community in the changing context of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Black Mondays and the Rise of Black Power Groups in Memphis
Oliver Smith was twenty-nine years old in 1973. Smith lived in Orange Mound, a
traditionally African American neighborhood in East Memphis. He later described
himself at that time as “a very hard-working man from a very hard-working family.”16
Smith worked as a car mechanic at his family’s shop. He described Orange Mound as not
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the safest place at the time. It was “not the best, but I made the best out of it.”17 In 1973,
Smith was not as concerned about educational integration or the use of public facilities,
but instead was very aware of the dangers of police brutality. He warned that it was
dangerous for a young black male, explaining, “you would not want to be out all night.”18
In a heavily black Southwest Memphis neighborhood, Deborah Horton was
twenty-three years old. Her father died when she was younger, but Horton still lived with
her mother, sister, and brother. Much like Oliver Smith, Horton was becoming
increasingly aware of the tenets of what would become known as Black Power. She and
her friends were “finally realizing that it was okay to be black, and to be of African
descent.”19 Horton had grown up, like Bonnie Jamerson, through the Memphis City
Schools and observed the inequalities in materials such as books, desks, and buildings.
While attending these schools, Horton became even more aware of Black Power issues
through police brutality. She “witnessed them [the police] commit a seemingly limitless
amount of what is now known as police brutality against myself as well as my peers.
Unfortunately I developed a fear of my so-called protectors.”20
Horton additionally experienced first-hand the struggles of integration during her
time as a student at Memphis State University. Through an earlier success of
compromise, the NAACP had helped lead the integration of Memphis State University.
Although officially desegregated, the university was still overwhelmingly white. Horton
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describe that it was quite clear “that the white faculty, administration, and students did
not want us there.”21 Additionally, Horton described a situation where “professors would
not reward African Americans students with grades higher than C’s regardless of how
intelligent we were.”22
Smith and Horton are emblematic of a growing force within the black community
that the NAACP grappled to effectively harness. People like Smith, Horton, and even
Jamerson wanted equality, but they were beginning to question if equality was best
achieved through integration. Horton witnessed firsthand that integration did not
necessarily equal a better education. Smith worried that further interactions between
black men and white police officers would only put black men at more risk. Separate but
equal, if actually enforced, often remained more attractive to black Memphians for whom
integration could spark more trouble and danger. These questions were reinforced by the
length of time that continued to pass. The further Memphis was from the 1954 Brown
decision with continued failed enforcement, the more people questioned the effectiveness
of the NAACP’s long-held stratagem.
Several smaller groups of activists emerged in the late 1960s, challenging the
NAACP’s dominance of local black activism. The Invaders, a group with a reputation
for “danger and disruption,” was one of the newer, younger groups to question the
approach of the NAACP. 23 As similar groups assessed the progress gained versus what
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remained, several key problems stood out as ignored. First, many black neighborhoods
struggled disproportionally with poverty, and integration had done little to improve this
situation. Connected to this problem, was a poor public housing system in need of
overhaul, which also overwhelmingly affected black Memphians. Finally, the Invaders
pointed to the need to stress black pride in black schools. In 1954, the doll test in the
Brown case had established that segregated schools reinforced feeling of inferiority
among black children. However, the Invaders and others questioned if integration was the
most effective way to counteract these feelings. Questioning the status quo, the Invaders
utilized tactics that the NAACP found questionable at best, such as inciting a small
student uprising at Carver High School to fight for more African American studies
offerings.24
The Invaders were not the only group challenging traditional NAACP strategy.
Charles Cabbage, co-founder of the Black Organizing Project, argued for multiple
avenues toward community improvement, only a few of which coincided with actions
taken by the NAACP. Cabbage had a vision of Black Power in Memphis that included
increasing black pride, improving housing, combatting poverty, and ending police
brutality.25 One of Cabbage’s many initiatives focused on the depressed black
neighborhoods in South Memphis.26 Unlike the NAACP, which sought integration,
Cabbage and his allies wanted to improve life for black Memphians where they were.
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Instead of moving black people out of South Memphis into white neighborhoods, he
wanted to improve the black neighborhood, making it a source of pride and sustainability.
Neighborhood organization projects such as Cabbage’s were growing in
popularity. The Tri-State Defender, the local black newspaper, realized the allure of
community organizing and unity long before these groups began to question the
NAACP’s tactics. A 1968 editorial argued that “black is beautiful and unity is our
salvation.”27 Neighborhood projects would unite the community and increase race pride,
factors that would be significant as many still fought for equality, according to the
newspaper. The media’s embrace of neighborhood projects suggests a larger sea change
in opinions on black activism. Initiatives that built up the black community were
becoming more popular than those that integrated it with the white community.
The NAACP did not ignore Cabbage’s growing organization. Maxine Smith and
the rest of the Memphis branch began audibly concerned with the same problems that
Black Power espousing groups like the Invaders and the Black Organizing Project
addressed. For example, in 1969 the Memphis NAACP announced it was “gravely
concerned about the marked increase in police brutality which is generally the trend
during demonstrations by the black community.”28 However, Maxine Smith and the
NAACP still fundamentally disagreed with Black Power advocates about the direction of
education in Memphis.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
“Soul Set: Neighborhood Organizing Project Helps Build Black Pride,” Tri-State Defender,
July 20, 1968.
28

“Report of the Executive Secretary, Oct. 8 – Nov. 4, 1969,” pg. 2, in The Maxine A. Smith
NAACP Collection in Memphis and Shelby County Room, Memphis/Shelby County Public
Library and Information Center, processed 2004 by Patricia M. LaPointe (hereafter Maxine Smith
Papers) Box 1, Folder 9.

!

62

!

Many youth-led organizations in Memphis, perhaps the most affected by
educational policy, argued for separate schools, or at minimum for more black history
and black arts at their schools. Community pride would follow from black neighborhood
schools that taught young children to have pride in their black heritage.29 The NAACP,
on the other hand, continually insisted on integration as the most effective path to
equality. Separate schools would definitely be deprived of resources, the NAACP argued,
no matter how effective they might be at instilling black pride. Smith and her allies
maintained that black children would always feel inferior, no matter how much they
knew about their heritage, if they were excluded from area schools for white children. In
the face of the disappointment of Brown v. Board of Education, the NAACP’s continued
insistence on integrated education undervalued the importance of separate education.
As the NAACP ignored the regained popularity of separate education, the
Invaders, the Black Organizing Project, and newer often-younger organizations were
rising in power, while establishment groups like the NAACP were losing credibility and
influence in Memphis. The year 1970 had ended with a sharp membership decline for the
organization, representative of its lack of resonance in the community.30 Despite their
divisive tactics, the Invaders were gaining a following in Memphis, spurred on by larger
cultural shifts pointing activists towards issues like poverty and race pride, which were
most often associated with Black Power. Examples like the Poor People’s Campaign or
the work of SNCC in Lowndes County Alabama underscored these intellectual trends.
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Afraid of losing its near-monopoly of the black community, the Memphis
NAACP attempted to co-opt the language of Black Power for its own purposes. Smith
and her allies began to address many of the grievances of these younger, frustrated
activists, but within the NAACP’s more legalistic framework. For example, the NAACP
began attempting to gain political control of black communities. In order to gain political
control, the NAACP would need to elect a black mayor, the strongest branch in local
government. 31 However, as many within the organization doubted their ability to do this,
they focused on the next best option, electing large numbers of black city council
members. When Maxine Smith eventual ran for a seat on the school board, for instance, it
could be interpreted as attempting to fulfill Black Power ideals and maintain the support
of younger activists, while still remaining true to the NAACP’s agenda.
As Maxine Smith ran for a seat on the school board in the fall of 1971, arguments
over Plan A’s partial bused integration of city schools were just beginning to heat up, but
Smith had already been in Memphis neighborhoods attempting to rally support.32 During
her run, Smith faced significant challenges from black communities. One major challenge
was from fellow black candidate Tarlese Matthews. Similar to Smith, Matthews had a
long history of activism, specifically at the grassroots level in Memphis. Matthews had
worked with the NAACP, but was not associated with its leadership, instead organizing
people who often joined the NAACP’s campaigns.33 Busing, Matthews claimed, was the
opposite of what the black community needed. Instead of transporting children across the
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city, the NAACP and the school board should be more worried about “saving black
schools, more hiring of black teachers, black parents in control of schools in the black
community, more self-awareness textbooks, and keeping children in their community
schools.”34 Matthews relished the opportunity to debate Smith over busing in front of the
black community, claiming, “I don’t feel she has a leg to stand on.”35 Matthews stressed
the need for improving black schools, arguing that busing would only be detrimental to
black students. When juxtaposed against the aims of activists who embraced the separate
but equal aims of Black Power, busing looked extremely costly for the black community.
Smith chose to avoid the debate with Matthews.36 This was a wise decision from Smith,
who was already well known around town. She prevented a bigger stage for Matthews,
and avoided having to manage a potentially difficult defense of busing. When placed next
to Matthews’s argument for better black schools, busing became a tougher sell.
Matthews was not Smith’s only major black critic from during the race. The
“Christian Citizens of District Four” did not support Smith. This group, similar to
Matthews, claimed that Smith was “not concerned about the well-being of the black
community.”37 There was growing support for activists that were looking to help the
black community directly, while Smith faced the tough challenge of selling busing as
directly beneficial as well. Throughout both her campaign for the school board and her
attempt to rally support in the black community for busing, Smith faced significant
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criticism. The Memphis NAACP was losing members and support to Black Power
organizations that better understood what Memphians wanted. However, at the end,
Smith received the support she needed. She won the school board election over Matthews
and the other competitors.
Elections provided an opportunity for the NAACP to engage various black
communities in Memphis, but its attempts to do the same in school desegregation proved
much more controversial. As Smith’s election opponents warned, busing could be
troubled for support when placed in direct opposition with support for local black
schools. The rifts among the black community first became visible during the Black
Monday protest campaign. Complaints from black teachers in the newly integrated school
system were flooding into Memphis NAACP headquarters. One unnamed complainant
cited not being rehired by the school system because of their race. Maxine Smith
suspected a pattern of hiring overwhelming numbers of white teachers and especially
administrators in the newly consolidated system. The complaints resonated with Smith
and others at the Memphis headquarters, and they began crafting a way to protest and
advocate for greater black representation in the school system.38 Through the problem of
employment discrimination in schools, Maxine Smith saw the opportunity to stop the
slide and return the Memphis NAACP to power and lead the liberation of black
Memphians using its preferred tactics.39 It spurred what would become the Black
Monday protest movement, which involved a significant portion of the community, but
ended with derision, disappointment, and division.
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Instead of focusing on employment discrimination in all education, Smith focused
on school administrators. In 1969, there were twenty-two white administrators in
predominantly black schools. Smith filed complaints with the Memphis school board,
insisting that those jobs should go to black administrators since they were within the
black community. The school board resisted the idea. It claimed they could not afford to
hire more administrators unless they fired some of the existing white administrators,
which was non-negotiable. The two sides were at a stalemate.
When her demands were not met, Maxine Smith found a way to apply pressure to
the school board. Since the school board claimed it was a money issue, the NAACP
responded in kind. If it was financially impossible to hire more black administrators for
black schools, they would make it unprofitable to resist. The Black Monday protest
centered upon encouraging black students to skip school. The students would then join in
protests, rallies, and marches. Black teachers were encouraged to join in, as well,
although they did so in smaller numbers considering the professional risks involved.
Since schools received funding based upon attendance, massive student skips could
trigger significant consequences for the school system’s bottom line.40
First and foremost, Black Mondays attracted attention to inequality in education
employment. However, Black Mondays forced action by causing monetary loss for the
school board. With massive walkouts, many schools in predominantly black communities
were forced to close for the day. In those cases, teachers could join in without too much
risk of reprisal. The massive shutdowns caused significant financial loss for the school
system, while simultaneously protecting the jobs of teachers by using students to make
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the point. Following over 62,000 absences, the school board and the NAACP met in an
attempt to broker an agreement.41
While initially making significant headway, Black Mondays turned problematic
for the NAACP. After exerting their pressure, Smith was ready to go back to the table
and find a compromise. But many other leaders in the black community who had
partnered with the NAACP in the effort were not ready to settle. There were also
problems within the local branch, where lingering resentment from power struggles
within the Memphis branch led to significant infighting about whether or not to
compromise with the school board to end Black Mondays. These problems led to
“fractured relationships among the branch and organizations in the coalition.”42 A sizable
faction of NAACP leadership resigned and formed the United Black Coalition, which
refused to compromise with the school board.43 Both organizations competed with each
other for support from the black community. The United Black Coalition’s refusal to
compromise made the already unsavory prospect of giving in on some demands
extremely uncomfortable for the NAACP, especially if it wanted to maintain its support
among black Memphians.
The most serious aspect of this organizational split was the departure of Ezekiel
Bell from the NAACP. Bell was the sitting president of the NAACP, who resigned one
day and became a key player in the United Black Coalition the next. Bell’s departure was
a significant blow to the NAACP. He rose to prominence organizing anti-poverty
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campaigns within depressed black neighborhoods in Memphis. Bell connected the
NAACP with many of the aims of Memphis’s Black Power groups, which had been
focused on economic issues in the inner city. With Bell’s departure, many wondered if
the NAACP would still be as committed to those goals.44
Despite dissent to the contrary, Smith compromised with the school board on a
plan that could not fully deliver the Memphis NAACP’s goals. The United Black
Coalition spoke out against the compromise, believing the NAACP had sold out the black
community to the school board by giving up when success was so close. To many, it was
just another example of the NAACP being more concerned with middle-class
respectability, keeping professional relationships intact, and being disconnected from the
average Memphian. The outcry from other organizations led to significant division
among the black community. Mr. Cleo Jackson summarized the problem in a letter to
NAACP executive secretary Maxine Smith, complaining, “If our leaders are divided
openly what can you expect from us?”45
Organizations such as the Invaders grew in power during the Black Monday
protests.46 These groups of activists focused more on improving the black community
itself, rather that integrating with the white power structure.47 Despite an emphasis on
separation, equality remained the final goal; it was just a shift in tactics. From their
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perspective, an NAACP compromise to end Black Mondays left power in the hands of
the white government. While getting more black administrators at black schools had been
a unifying theme, a compromise that ended with some black administrators landing jobs
seemed far too little reward, given the significant momentum behind Black Monday. The
disagreement pushed to the surface a difference in focus between the NAACP and other
groups operating in Memphis. Where the NAACP focused on integrated education,
groups claiming Black Power ideologies questioned the effectiveness of integration.48
The NAACP also had to contend with black church leaders. Religious leaders
historically held significant roles in the black community, specifically within the civil
rights movement.49 Memphis’s black clergy, much like their fellows in other cities,
remained “otherworldly in its rhetoric,” focusing upon Biblical allusions in their rhetoric
to encourage black citizens forward.50 This type of encouragement had certainly aided the
NAACP in the past. However, perhaps due to their frequent interactions with the
downtrodden in their communities, these religious figures remained “visually in touch
with the people’s here-and-now.”51 However, perhaps it was ministers’ more personal
connection with people on the ground that led to a splintering among black religious
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leaders. Some supported Ezekiel Bell’s United Black Coalition, feeling that their
parishioners deserved immediate improvement.52 Others continued to encourage the
NAACP throughout, advocating a slow but steady approach of gradual improvement
through compromise. In the end, the ministers provided little direction for Memphis
throughout the Black Monday and busing crises.
James Lawson, prominent Memphis minister and movement activist, summarized
the problems facing the divided black community and its stakes quite well, writing, “The
white power structure is committed to the destruction of black leadership.”53 The division
and infighting was only going to benefit whites that did not want to see black Memphians
gain more equality or control; it would not help the plight of black Memphians. However,
the solution was not as simple as unification. Lawson wisely continued that the white
power structure was not worried about black leadership “dedicated to the middle class,”
but leadership that focused on the poor.54 Lawson was certain that white elites were not
as concerned with the work of the NAACP, but groups led by men like Charles Cabbage
seriously distressed them.
The Black Monday protests served as a serious warning to the Memphis NAACP.
In order to continue to unite the black community, it would have to appeal to
neighborhood improvement projects and black pride – both difficult aims given the
practicalities of integrated education, which often took black students out of black
communities rather than reinforcing them. However, Maxine Smith and her allies
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believed they could represent the needs of the average black Memphian, and they worked
diligently and consistently over the five years following Black Monday to make that a
reality.
Busing and the Splintering of Consensus
Asaline Rodgers lived in the Shelby Forest area, between the northeast edges of
Memphis and the suburb of Millington. Unlike Smith and Chism, Rodgers’s
neighborhood was integrated, with black and white residents. She was thirty-eight and
living with her husband and three children. She and her musically talented family
described a safe neighborhood with little racism. She described that in her neighborhood,
black and white neighbors living in close proximity to one another helped diffuse
potential problems. According to Rodgers, integration had led to a positive impact on her
community.55
She worked as a teacher at the mostly black school Woodstock Elementary. When
school busing arrived, Rodgers was not concerned at all. All three of her children were
bused, several of them to mostly white Millington High School. Rodgers noted that her
community took the news with great aplomb. There were not many rallies opposing
busing in her area. Most importantly, Rodgers saw the benefits of busing. Although it
would be discontinued before full integration was reached, Rodgers realized that
“relationships were built.”56 Having lived in an integrated community, Rodgers thought
that the best chance for better race relations in Memphis was building close, personal
relationships with people of the opposite race. She had seen it happen in her own
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neighborhood, and through busing she witnessed it for her kids. Even neighborhoods in
Memphis like Rodgers’s that seemed to experience healthier relationships between black
and white Memphians benefitted from busing. Black citizens that already experienced a
more integrated lifestyle than many of their peers still strongly supported Maxine Smith
and the NAACP’s campaign for busing.
On the opposite side of Memphis in South Downtown, Elise Lewis Bailey was
thirty-one when the buses rolled. She grew up close to the Lorraine Motel, where Martin
Luther King, Jr. was assassinated. It was a heavily populated black neighborhood,
boosted numerically by nearby public housing, the Foote Homes. She was the oldest of
nine children who all pitched in to make life in South Downtown a little better.57
By the time of Plan A, the first, clustering-based busing plan, Bailey was married
with two kids, working as a teacher. However, she consistently supported busing. She
was heavily involved in the local NAACP and would eventually serve as a board
member. Bailey had walked out of school during the Black Monday protests, risking her
job. She knew the risks of a busing plan that might take her job from her, but still
supported busing. While concerned for the safety of her children, like many of the other
stories here, the potential benefits outweighed the likely costs.58 She believed that an
integrated school would provide better resources for her children to attain a stronger
education.
In the immediate aftermath of Black Monday protests, Maxine Smith remained
focused upon school integration. This stance was completely in line with the national
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NAACP office, which stressed school integration while ignoring problematic issues such
as the resulting “closure of schools that had been in black communities for decades” and
the possibility that “black school principals would lose their jobs.”59 Without considering
the costs, the need for equal and integrated schools seemed clear to Smith. Black students
made up fifty-four percent of the school system, while the school system maintained
fifty-five percent of their schools as all black, resulting in an almost completely
segregated dual school system.60 By those statistics, Smith felt the justification to fight
for busing was evident. To Smith, busing demanded a high cost, financial and personal,
but it was outweighed by the inequality propagated by continued separate schooling.
White resistance to desegregation had proved that the only effective method to fully
integrate the school system would be forcibly by busing.
The Memphis NAACP also hoped that school desegregation would lead to wider
neighborhood desegregation. Statistics showed extreme residential segregation, enforced
by discriminatory practices by the Memphis Housing Authority and realtors.61 Although
the NAACP hoped that integrated education would improve the lives of children and the
future of the black community, it could also dramatically improve the quality of
residential life if it triggered widespread residential desegregation. If students attended
integrated schools elsewhere in town, hopefully residential migration would follow,
integrating the neighborhoods around the schools.
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By 1972, Maxine Smith was preparing a final assault on segregated schooling in
Memphis through busing. With the pending arrival of Plan A, the NAACP seemed
prepared to affect change. Black Memphians held three of the nine seats on the Memphis
school board, quite an improvement from a decade prior. It was still not proportionate to
the nearly fifty percent of the population made up of African Americans, but it was
significant nonetheless.62 When Judge Robert McRae ordered the school board to create a
school-busing plan, Smith surely rejoiced. The school board had been stalling for years
under the guise of waiting for enrollment to stabilize following continuing annexations.63
There would be no more delays, and finally everything seemed to be going Smith’s way.
What followed, however, was the disappointment of Plan A, which bused far less
students than the NAACP had hoped for and left the majority of black students in allblack schools.
After the failure of Plan A, Maxine Smith was still left frustrated by Plan Z. The
NAACP had fought for sixty thousand students to be bused to achieve full integration.
Plan Z fell far short of that total. Smith was forced to decide whether the NAACP could
support such a compromised busing plan that would fail to deliver on their primary
objective. Smith was accustomed to compromise, but this was to be the final blow to
segregation. In the end, Smith ended up supporting Plan Z – better something than
nothing at all.64 At best, the victory of Plan Z was bittersweet. It bused nearly forty
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thousand students, but in the eyes of the NAACP it limited the potential gains of
desegregation.
Louis Lucas, the lead NAACP attorney, expressed that he did not agree with Plan
Z – not because it was a bad idea, but because it was not substantial enough. He had
hoped the final busing plan would completely desegregate the school system, but the
result was far from complete. However, he and the NAACP supported the plan because
the “result is a decrease in the amount of segregation.”65 Even though it was not a win by
the numerical standards the organization set out, the NAACP could count it as something
favorable that should be achieved. However, Plan Z was embattled from the beginning.
Before Plan Z was even finalized, the NAACP had been fighting resistance from
white Memphians who wanted to avoid busing altogether. In one particularly exciting
board of education meeting, an all-white parents’ organization and the NAACP showed
up to debate the busing issue. Mrs. James R. Smith spoke for the white parents’
organization, and Maxine Smith spoke for the NAACP. They got into a heated argument.
Mrs. James Smith argued for any method preventing busing, as it would “cause greater
harm to all the children and work a greater hardship upon parents, especially the working
class of people.”66 In addition, busing would in essence be a “violation of their civil
rights”67 Further, Mrs. James Smith asserted that busing would damage the educational
quality of neighborhood schools. The unacknowledged underlying assumption was that
black students in white schools would equal a drop in education standards. Meanwhile,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65
“School Board’s Plan Z Busing Wins Judge McRae’s Approval,” Memphis Commercial
Appeal, July 27, 1973.
66

Hoppe and Speck, Maxine Smith’s Unwilling Pupils, 138.

67

Ibid., 138.

!

76

!

Maxine Smith criticized the parents’ organization for its presumed interest in equal
education, arguing, “the white PTA has shown no interest in the past for quality
education for black children. Your past actions indicated that you will short change us
and our children and the only way we can share in the American dream is to require and
insist that black and white children go to school together regardless of cost.”68 Smith
realized the coded rhetoric the white PTA was using, and demanded integrated schooling.
She showed her commitment to integration over separate but equal by insisting on
integration regardless of the cost, even if that money could be used to better fund black
schools.
But white parents were not Maxine Smith’s only opponents. She also battled
Tennessee governor Winfield Dunn. Dunn rode issues of Law and Order and an antibusing platform to the Tennessee governorship, the first Republican governor in
Tennessee since Reconstruction. In late 1971, Dunn began advocating for a busing ban.
He formed a committee to find a way to avoid it in the state of Tennessee.69 Much like
the white PTA, Dunn stressed that avoiding busing was more cost effective and that it
would ultimately provide better education to children. The NAACP responded with a
strongly worded letter published in the Tri-State Defender. In the letter, the NAACP let
Dunn know that “it was certainly disgusting to read of your evading your moral
responsibility to provide leadership for our state during this busing crisis, promulgated
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and nurtured by racial bigots of this state.”70 Similar to her response to the white PTA,
Smith was unwilling to let Dunn off the hook for his coded language, insisting that
evasive action was equivalent to the racial bigots.
While Dunn and the white PTA both offered formal, political means to avoid
busing, not all opponents were so diplomatic. As soon as the busing plans were
announced, black schools and children were threatened. One caller to the school board
proclaimed: “we are going to blow that damn place up because we don’t want our kids
going to school with them dumb niggers.”71 As challenging as such threats could be, it
was similar to the types of threats civil rights activists had been dealing with for years.72
More significant was the carefully constructed, veiled racism associated with a
new association formed by a group of conservative parents called Citizens Against
Busing (CAB), formed in 1972. The largely white organization used the language of
conservatism to protest busing – not the language of racism. They were still racist in
many of their aims, but obfuscated them with coded language. Ironically, CAB utilized
many of the same tactics that white conservatives had derided the NAACP for just a few
years prior. For example, they encouraged mass absences from school and organized
marches to the school board, just like the Black Monday protests.73 When Maxine Smith
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had led these same tactics, they instigated a lawsuit against her and other leaders for
encouraging truancy. The veiled language calling for “law and order” or “public safety”
didn’t fool many in the black community. One member of the community pointed out
what many had surely already realized: “in many sections of the black community CAB
stands for ‘Citizens Against Blacks.’”74
Smith no doubt assumed that there would be staunch resistance from a white
community that was still very fearful of integration. The white racist fears of black
neighborhoods and schools epitomized by CAB reinforced these assumptions. And
although Smith certainly worked to convince them of the validity of busing, the Smith’s
responses to the white community represent more an attempt to silence dissent rather than
convert detractors. The NAACP did not need the white community to fully support
busing, just to quit trying to actively stop it.
From the beginning, the NAACP faced a challenging task in convincing black
families that busing would improve their quality of education.75 This was not the easiest
sales pitch. Smith saw busing as the only means to effectively integrate and achieve
equality, but many in the black community listened to leaders like Charles Cabbage or
the Invaders and questioned the value of integrated education. Although integration might
lead to white families eventually viewing black families as more equal, the danger faced
by black students limited the value of that eventual equality. Such a disruptive climate
could easily hinder the education of black students, who would benefit more from
separate but equal schooling. Mostly white schools such as Overton High School were
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not welcoming to minorities. In 1969, Overton had held a Civil War plantation-style
event at the school – not exactly an environment promoting equality for the few black
students at Overton.76
The NAACP also had to convince black parents that angry white parents would
not disrupt their children’s education. Meanwhile the white community was making
significant noise to the contrary through Citizens Against Busing, promising violence if
busing occurred. The NAACP worried about the problems of school desegregation
campaigns, realizing that they were “questionable tactics. They subject the adults behind
them to the charge of using children as pawns to adult power struggle.”77 Yet, now the
NAACP would have to convince parents that it was a worthwhile endeavor that would
not only benefit them, but also their children.
The first step in gaining support from black parents was to inform them. As Plans
A and Z developed, Maxine Smith and the rest of the NAACP worked to educate parents
on the benefits of busing. They handed out leaflets at school board meetings and
distributed over 15,000 in black neighborhoods.78 In some ways, this education plan
backfired. The NAACP educated parents most specifically about the benefits of the
NAACP busing plan. However, when McRae, the board, and the NAACP settled on a
compromise plan that bused over twenty thousand fewer students than advertised, black
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parents were slow to rally behind the NAACP compromise.79 Instead, many insisted upon
the full integration and complete benefits they had been promised by NAACP leadership.
The eventual compromise led to a change in tone from the NAACP. Initially,
Smith had focused upon complete desegregation. Plans A and Z would be the final step in
the process that began with the Northcross litigation and thirteen first graders. However,
once Smith agreed on the compromise, the focus became “less about busing as the best
way to achieve integration, and more about how busing was the best means to achieve
quality education for all children.”80 By attending better schools in wealthier
environments, the potential for a higher level of education was significantly increased,
the NAACP suggested. However, the environment many black students faced in such
schools often counteracted any potential benefits.
Despite the benefits of supposedly superior schools, black parents still had doubts
about Plan Z. How would teachers treat their students? Higher opportunity for learning
would not matter if teachers ignored or disparaged children like Allan Bradford. If angry
mobs prevented their children from having peace of mind, how would they achieve
anything in the schools? And intimidation was not the only possibility. The chance for
violence also lingered in the minds of parents. Maxine Smith admitted as much, agreeing,
“it was difficult to persuade the mothers that this was good for their kids.”81
Fortunately, Maxine Smith did not have to rely solely upon her word to convince
parents of the benefits of busing. She could utilize the 1966 report by sociologist James
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Coleman, “Equality of Educational Opportunity.”82 In his study, Coleman concluded that
children from the inner city or other areas of lower socio-economic status would achieve
more educationally when in school environments with more middle-income children.
Therefore, the study actually suggested that keeping black children in all-black schools in
economically depressed areas would be detrimental to their educational opportunity.
Coleman concluded that economic status was more important to determining educational
outcome than school funding. Therefore, according to Coleman, even an equally funded
separate school of poor, black students could not provide an equal education to an
integrated school with middle-class whites.
The Coleman Report, although published in 1966, was familiar to anyone
following the Northcross litigation, as McRae had invoked it on several occasions. In
fact, he had called in a doctor to comment on the benefits or risks to children in the
busing plan. The doctor concluded, citing the Coleman Report, that “a child’s sense of
control over his environment is one of the significant psychological factors contributing
to the learning process.”83 But the question remained to the court: where would black
children have more control over their environment? In some ways, busing seemed the
better option than separate but equal schooling. With more resources in an integrated
school, they could more easily control their educational outcomes. However, just as the
parents of the children worried, the court was concerned if that would be the actual
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outcome, or if being placed in potentially hazardous circumstances would cause
educational underperformance.
Not all groups were supportive of Coleman’s conclusions in the report. Black
Power activists and organizations in particular did not care for the report. Many Black
Power activists were advocating for all black schools in black neighborhoods. In their
minds, black teachers could more effectively teach these students race pride and heritage,
in addition to their core subjects. Floyd McKissick, former chairman of the activist group
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), argued that the report concluded that if schools
“mix Negroes with Negroes…you get stupidity.”84 Groups like CORE were encouraging
black pride, but when Coleman’s report suggested poor black children would perform
better only in white, middle-class schools, they were outraged.85 Such assertions by
Coleman insinuated black inferiority and contradicted many of the precepts Black Power
preached.
In the face of widespread disgust at Coleman’s report, Maxine Smith and the
NAACP embraced many of its precepts in their attempt to gain support from the divided
black community. This stance reflected the NAACP’s position as a primarily middleclass organization aimed at achieving equality through direct action challenges to the
American legal system. Integration was its goal, despite attempts to couch its aims in the
language of Black Power activists. Maxine Smith and the Memphis branch were unable
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to make Black Power ideas and school integration through busing cohesive, because the
two could not be blended. To embrace busing and integration was to imply that black
schools, students, and teachers were inferior, and that was antithetical to Black Power.
Smith also heard frequently from black parents concerned about a child’s physical
safety. Some parents went so far as to question the concept of school integration,
wondering if having children do the dirty work of civil rights activism was truly the best
plan.86 For some, the response was to declare busing a dangerous and failing idea. Others,
such as Reverend Billy Kyles, believed that it was the responsibility of adults to step up
and protect their children. In response to threats of violence from CAB leader Ken Keele,
Kyles told the Tri-State Defender, “As black men we are no longer prepared to let our
black women and our children go through howling mobs or be exposed to creeps waving
2x4s while we stand idly by and do nothing.”87 Maxine Smith could only wish that
everybody would respond with enthusiasm like Kyles; however, more often the loudest
were the unhappiest.
Some African Americans also worried about tax increases that might be required
to pay for busing. Plan Z especially came at a significant financial cost. Many feared that
an increased tax burden would be devastating on the black community.88 Many black
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neighborhoods were already economically depressed. An increase in the tax burden
would counteract any potential economic gains from community uplift programs.
There was certainly loud criticism of school busing and the NAACP in Memphis.
And that criticism was not unwarranted. Many of the consequences of busing could
directly harm the black community. However, the majority of African Americans
supported the decision because of the possibility it provided. The risks associated with
busing were substantial, but so were the rewards. Many who supported Smith’s plan
hoped that busing would be the final stepping-stone towards a life of equality for their
children. Black children being permitted to go to school at any school in the city was a
vital step to many. Unfortunately the white community’s actions prevented that, but that
does not counteract the importance of the support that Smith received.
Black people from multiple walks of life found unique ways to support busing,
despite other potentially competing concerns. Support for busing did not prevent them
from supporting other causes or from being critical at times. Oliver Smith, the Orange
Mound mechanic supported busing without question. Despite being aware of the dangers
of police brutality within his community, he “knew it was only the beginning for a time
of change.”89 In fact, he observed that black citizens in Orange Mound supported it
overwhelmingly. Smith supported neighborhood improvement and worried about safety
from the police, but that did not prevent him from realizing the potential gains of school
busing, and the respect of hopefully gaining respect upon gaining equal access to
education.
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While Oliver Smith was repairing cars in Orange Mound, a few blocks away in
East Memphis, twenty-three year old Chesteem Chism was living with her parents in a
packed house. Chism had six brothers and sisters, all still living with her father and
mother. She went to work for a paper manufacturing company. When she returned home
at the end of the day, her mother had a home-cooked meal ready for the family. On the
weekends, the family attended church regularly. Their neighborhood was a close
community, much like Chism’s own family. They stuck together for the good of
everyone.90
Although Chism was single and living at home when busing began, by the time
busing ended she would have a son of her own attending Memphis City Schools. From
the beginning of Plan A, Chism supported busing because “the African American
students had more of an opportunity in the white school for they had so much more.”91 Of
course like many others, Chism realized that busing did not come without risks. She grew
up attending a neighborhood school within the black community. There, Chism was
insulated from what the outside, white community thought of her. However, her son did
not have that benefit. Although the white schools brought more opportunity for him, he
did have to deal with significant strife from white students and parents. Chism described
the result as “chaos.”92 But the experience of her son did not change her opinion on
busing. Afterwards, Chism declared busing a failure because of the trouble caused by
white families, but she did not regret supporting it.
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After graduating from Memphis City Schools, Bonnie Jamerson attended the
newly integrated Memphis State University. No longer having to endure a daily hour on
the bus leaving East High School and heading for Booker T. Washington, she excelled at
Memphis State. In 1973, she was graduating from the university and preparing to enter
the job market as a teacher. It was a tumultuous time to enter the job market as a black
teacher in the integrating school system. Jamerson, more than most, was focused on
school busing and its potential outcomes. Despite the trouble busing caused Jamerson in
finding a job, she still supported busing overwhelmingly. Her own educational
experience pushed her to support a better opportunity for the next generation of black
children.93
Despite her support, Jamerson was keenly aware of the problems busing caused.
Her own job search alerted her to the struggles it created for the black community. She
would later describe that life “radically changed for the worse” during the busing saga.94
She compared the attitudes of many white citizens during the struggle to the Little Rock
Nine, when nine schoolchildren desegregated the Little Rock, Arkansas, school system in
the face of hateful protest from a white community policed by the National Guard.
Additionally, she recognized the exodus of people from the heart of the city where she
had lived her entire life. However, the struggles did not change her support or cause her
to regret her support. She stood by the NAACP and its push for busing because of the
opportunity it gave “to those who would not normally have the opportunity.”95
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Deborah Horton, who had been so confident of continued prejudice at Memphis
State University despite integration, nevertheless supported busing without hesitation.
She “did not believe that there could be separate but equal schooling.”96 Although the
criticism of busing was significant, even those who heard such critiques and often
understood them on a personal level, still supported busing. Additionally, they observed
their diverse neighborhoods in the suburbs, South Memphis, Orange Mound, or
Binghamton as overwhelmingly supporting the busing measure. And so, despite the
difficulties the NAACP faced, it still received strong support from throughout the black
community. Although many of the people examined above may not have been expected
to support busing, the black community largely delivered on the expectation that it would
rally to defend busing, despite personal objections.
One final perspective worth considering is that of Jesse Turner, Jr. Turner was the
son of the NAACP branch president Jesse Turner, Sr. Because of his parentage, Turner’s
support of busing was almost never in doubt. However, Turner had already made waves
in Memphis by integrating Christian Brothers High School, the first school integrated in
Memphis. At Christian Brothers he suffered through racial slurs and isolation before
eventually being accepted. Although it had been a difficult struggle, he was keenly aware
of the possibilities of integrated education. Yes, there would be difficulties to overcome
in the classroom, but once obstacles were eliminated the opportunities for a better
education were great. 97
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Turner concluded that busing was necessary. It might not have been completely
successful, but it could be a useful stepping-stone to complete equality. Without courtordered busing, he explained, nothing would have happened. Turner asserted that the true
success of busing could not be judged by the impact on the first day. There were lasting
consequences, good and bad, that in some cases did not become clear until long after the
first bus dropped off the first child in 1973.98
At the moment of the first bus delivering children to a new school in a new
neighborhood, several consequences for the Memphis NAACP were clear. First, the near
unanimous support it seemed to earlier hold was gone, and it would not return. The
divided leadership during Black Mondays revealed a fracturing black community.
Although it would be foolish to assume it had ever been completely united, it is clear that
divisions were becoming more evident. While integrated schooling had claimed
significant support since the Brown decision, busing highlighted a growing return to a
separate but equal schooling model.
Secondly, greater numbers of people were criticizing police brutality, poverty,
and unequal housing and discussing separate schooling. Black pride was becoming a
popular aspiration in schools and neighborhoods. This embrace of Black Power ideals
often led to greater support for local neighborhoods. The traditionally middle-class
NAACP struggled to connect with all of these issues because the contradictory nature of
the busing platform. Many wanted to support busing, but were concerned about the costs
to their neighborhoods that they had worked so hard to stabilize and improve.
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Finally, despite all of the controversy and splintering of black leadership, black
communities still overwhelmingly supported Plans A and Z. Even those who positioned
themselves in line with other issues such as poverty or neighborhood improvement often
supported busing because of the great opportunity it presented. Busing was devastating
for eventual NAACP support in Memphis because of the leadership fracture and its
eventual results, but busing itself was strongly supported. Many in the black community
still view busing favorably even today, though they often couch such support by
expressing its limitations.
Regardless of the struggles associated with busing, the majority of the black
community rallied around busing because of the great promise it offered. By the end of
the struggle, many might have agreed with the actions of Maxine Smith. A full victory
might not have been possible in the busing debate, but a half-victory compromise was
still progress in the right direction. And it certainly seemed more beneficial than no gains
at all. But there was still further division brewing, as parents questioned the effectiveness
of education through busing in its aftermath.
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Chapter 3
The New Mayor
Wyeth Chandler stood before a crowd of one thousand parents at Wooddale High
School in June of 1972. He was running for the coveted job to replace longtime Memphis
mayor and icon Henry Loeb. Chandler had big shoes to fill. On that evening in June,
Chandler began to make a name for himself among the white community as he
vociferously denounced busing. In a rousing speech, Chandler complained about the ills
of busing, and how he intended to fight it all the way to the top. The assembled crowd of
white faces roared in approval, giving him a standing ovation.1 Chandler would be one of
the faces of white resistance to busing, but Chandler operated in a different context than
previous white men who had resisted measures to foster racial equality.
After winning the election, Chandler faced a tall task in taking over for Henry Loeb. Over
his tenure, Loeb had guided Memphis carefully, managing to avoid any serious racial
pitfalls until April 4, 1968, when gunshots rang out in downtown Memphis.2 The next
few days witnessed the death of civil rights icon Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a flood of
political and civil rights dignitaries, and forced concessions out of Loeb that finished him
as a mayor. But it was this very event that forever changed politics in Memphis.
Even after King’s body left the city, followed by the storm surge of dignitaries,
Memphis was not the same. Loeb had relied on ruling with an iron fist while preventing
serious resistance by dividing the black community with acts of minor political
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patronage. A park here, a swimming pool there, and political favors for disparate black
ministers kept the black community quiet and divided. Loeb could say whatever he
wanted, no matter how intransigent, because he was the boss. But Chandler had no such
benefits. Chandler took over the city following the largest swells of the civil rights
movement. Racial intransigence was political suicide.
But Chandler was not powerless. He carefully crafted his policies and actions to
successfully defend his way of life. His actions, like many of his white constituents, were
not explicitly racial, but followed in a tradition paved by George Wallace and Richard
Nixon. As this tradition was forming across the country in the early 1970s, Chandler
joined in, utilizing calls for ‘Law and Order’ to garner wide support from a city tired of a
decade of social strife. Some of these votes were certainly racially motivated, but many
were equally as concerned, as Chandler was, with housing, crime, and education. And so,
as Chandler addressed the almost entirely white crowd at the Wooddale football game, he
spoke for a growing segment of the population that was frustrated with the overly activist
federal government, and more than anything wanted social calm. But that calm
simultaneously masked an intense frustration over racial issues, which could sometimes
peek through the carefully crafted rhetoric of law and order.3
Conservative white politicians in Memphis faced an identity crisis in the years
following Dr. King’s death. Throughout the civil rights movement, white politicians
across the South spoke out against integration. It was not an issue of safety, education, or
religion; it was about race. This intransigence had actually powered the civil rights
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movement forward. The school door-blocking antics of Alabama Governor George
Wallace or Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus attracted national attention, exactly what
activists needed. As long as opponents of integration continued acting in such blatantly
racist and uncompromising fashion, the activists would continue making gains.
The embrace of Black Power by many younger civil rights activists changed the
setting for conservative white politics as well. Black Power was much more
confrontational than more traditional nonviolent protest. Sit ins and peaceful marches had
prevented conservative politicians from occupying the moral high ground. Either civil
rights’ opponents were for the peaceful, Christian demonstrators in supporting equality,
or they were evil racists who set dogs on innocent children. The old dynamic of activism
left little room for middle ground. Instead of being ambivalent or uninvolved,
conservative white politicians were creating a culture that allowed the Ku Klux Klan and
other groups pushing for racial violence to flourish.
Some historians have suggested that white conservatives during the civil rights
movement were not as cut and dried. Speaking of Henry Loeb, the classic Old
Conservatism mayor of Memphis, Jason Sokol claims that although Loeb’s actions were
racist, Loeb genuinely believed his actions were helping black Memphians.4 Regardless
of the veracity of Sokol’s assertion, that does not change the public perception of figures
such as Loeb. Nonviolent protestors stuck them between a rock and a hard place. They
either gave up what they believed in to save their national public reputation, or they held
firm to their beliefs and were depicted as unrepentant racists.
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But Black Power provided a third option for these conservative politicians. The
confrontational tactics of Black Power activists meant that conservatives could be against
such groups, but still profess support for racial equality. Politicians looking for an
alternative, like Wyeth Chandler could oppose Black Power radicals like H. Rapp Brown
without condemning the older, more middle-class nonviolent movement. In this changed
context, racial conservatives could easily mount a defense of careful, slow integration as
opposed to working with uncompromising radicals, whom they associated with
revolutionary violence and urban riots.
Changing Conservatism
Politicians did not suddenly abandon old conservative ideals, but rather adapted
slowly as Black Power rose to prominence. A key example of this shift was longtime
South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, who had long set the example for other
conservatives in defending segregation and the Southern way of life. Thurmond was a
link between the Old and New Conservative movements largely because he reinvented
himself in the 1960s, changing his tactics to match the new political environment.5 Other
aspiring conservative politicians across the South mirrored his tactical adaptations.
Throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, Thurmond vociferously fought civil
rights campaigns, but his tactics changed over time. He filibustered in Congress for over
twenty-four hours in an attempt to stop civil rights legislation. He ran for President in
1948 as part of a States Rights Party, in protest of the Democratic Party’s civil rights
platform. He spoke out against the Federal government’s overreach into social issues. But
the face of racist intransigence in the Senate slowly adapted throughout the 1960s. In
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1964, he changed political parties, becoming a Republican. The rest of the South
followed his lead. The 1960s witnessed the solidly Democratic South transition to a
Republican stronghold. The South had been and remained Conservative, but the party
change signaled the tactical switch slowly emerging.
Gone were the defenses of racial purity. With the passage of civil rights
legislation in the 1960s, arguing on explicitly racial lines would be struck down judicially
and panned in the national media. Instead, conservatives like Thurmond began embracing
calls for “Law and Order.” With the rash of urban riots throughout the late 1960s, many
Americans viewed the calming of 1960s tensions as positive. After all, many no doubt
thought, positive gains had been made in civil rights, but the whole affair had gotten out
of control. They could support integration as long as it did not affect them or bring
violence to their community. But the last few years of the 1960s led many Americans to
question their support of civil rights. And Thurmond and other conservatives were
waiting for them with open arms and calls for a crackdown on urban violence. Insisting
that “disobedience embraces lawlessness,” Thurmond argued that allowing law-flouting
activism to continue would only worsen the safety issues in urban America.6
By the presidential election of 1968, which featured Republican Richard Nixon
taking on Hubert Humphrey and the ruins of Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, the
political climate had changed dramatically. The goodwill Democrats had received
through Johnson’s War on Poverty and support of civil rights had disintegrated in the
wake of the quagmire in Vietnam, soaring costs, and urban violence. Nixon and
Republicans attempted to build upon the earlier efforts of Barry Goldwater in embracing
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fiscal conservatism and lawfulness.7 The goals of financial conservatives and Southern
social conservatives overlapped through Nixon’s campaign. Nixon won the election, and
many credited his success to his endorsement and support from Thurmond and his
Southern allies. The fact that Thurmond, the former face of racial segregation, handed the
election to Nixon suggested that Jim Crow was far from gone from national politics;
although, perhaps the national debate on the subject had changed its vocabulary.8
Most significant in Thurmond’s decision was his support of Nixon over Democratic
candidate George Wallace, a fellow Southerner. Wallace had notoriously declared
“Segregation Forever” though by the 1968 election his language emphasized states’
rights. However, Thurmond’s unwavering support for Nixon suggests two things. First,
he was distancing himself from his openly segregationist past. By avoiding collusion with
Wallace, he kept many observers from concluding that Thurmond was the same man
draped in new clothes. Second, like many other conservative politicians, Thurmond
realized that a major political shift was necessary if the same conservatives were to retain
power in the South. Thurmond’s refusal to support Wallace was mirrored by church
leaders, as well, who also looked to distance themselves from their openly racist pasts.9
For politicians still attempting to halt the advance of an activist government, the
nationwide busing controversy signaled that Christmas had arrived early. Busing blurred
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lines between Left and Right, allowing many who traditionally might have identified as
liberal to jump to the side of Thurmond and Chandler, supposedly out of fears over
safety, desire for religious education, or a disdain for the overreach of the federal
government.10 The divisive issue allowed conservative politicians to gain support for
their anti-government expansion platform, all without condemning equality or
integration. When asked about busing, Thurmond argued, “if it improves the quality of
education, then busing is good. If it doesn’t, then I think it’s bad.”11 The new language
conservatives embraced condemned busing without casting politicians as the racist
demagogues they so often seemed during the 1960s. Although the reality beneath the
rhetoric may have been the same, the perception had changed, and that was more
important.
In Memphis, the election of Wyeth Chandler and his subsequent fight against
busing was the cap on political developments that had been growing at least since Nixon
ran for election in 1968. In 1968, Nixon had easily won a sizable majority of votes in
Shelby County. However, by 1972, Nixon’s local support had nearly doubled to sixtyfive percent of the vote, on the back of his anti-busing platform.12 This was a significant
benchmark of support in a city as diverse as Memphis. Republican Winfield Dunn rode
the wave of rising conservative support to the governorship of Tennessee, the first
Republican in that office in fifty years.13 Dunn took the election easily, but over
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significant black opposition, especially in Memphis. However, the signals were clear.
Conservative politics was resurgent, and the new language its politicians embraced was
powerful.
Chandler and the Changing Language of Dissent
When Chandler took over in 1972, the busing crisis was in full swing. Plan A was
on the way, and white Memphians were already panicked and looking to Chandler for a
solution. When he gave his speech at Wooddale High School, it was just another step in
his campaign for mayor. Chandler, the adopted son of former longtime Memphis mayor
Walter Chandler, had worked his way up the Memphis political system. He had already
served for four years on the Memphis City Council. In his time there, he had gained a
reputation for being strong-willed man, who understood his constituents. He was a man
of the people living his life among the working class, from living in middle-class
neighborhoods like Whitehaven and Bartlett, to drinking and celebrating in working-class
bars, like Zinnie’s.14
When he began his campaign for mayor, he could cast himself as a man of the
people. Busing played into his hand perfectly. It was a political issued being forced on
people by an activist federal government. He was the perfect everyman to understand
why it upset the people. He had the reputation of an outsider, but convenient placement
and connections of an insider. He could claim to be relating to his constituents and not
part of the machine, while also benefitting from his placement on the City Council and
his father’s connections. He was perfectly primed and placed for this moment, utilizing
the crisis of busing to rocket to political power.
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Following his election, Chandler immediately threw his entire weight into stopping the
busing program. Early in his term, he supported the existing resistance, the defendants in
the Northcross case. The school board, defending its desegregation actions, pointed out
numerous flaws in a busing plan. It stated that Memphis was “totally devoid of a
transportation system.” The Swann case, it argued, had succeeded in Charlotte, North
Carolina, because of its existing transportation infrastructure. The costs of building such a
system would be challenging enough, the board argued.15 The board also noted the
damage that busing would cause to extracurricular involvement at schools; students who
were bused would be unable to participate because of bus schedules.16 However, these
technical excuses were largely unconvincing to Judge McRae. And while busing’s many
detractors would support any reason to not bus and limit the reach of the government, the
board had yet to find a defensible reason busing violated their rights.
They found the perfect method to fight busing early in 1972 and went so far as to
claim reverse discrimination in their brief for the busing case. Busing existed “not for any
educational reason,” the school board argued, “but solely to achieve certain racial quotas
in the schools.”17 Deciding school placement based upon race, the board argued, “is as
noxious in 1972 as it was in 1954.”18 It seemed the perfect defense; busing was wrong
because it was race-conscious, whereas neighborhood schools ignored the color of
children’s skin. Notably, this defense neglected housing segregation in Memphis,
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whereby realtors, politicians, the school board, and many white citizens colluded to keep
African Americans out of white neighborhoods.
The reverse-racism defense immediately gained steam throughout the white
community. Chandler embraced the ideas quickly, realizing it provided the perfect
antidote to limiting the power expansion of the government in regard to civil rights, while
also not appearing to be a racist demagogue. Chandler almost never described black and
white children going to school together, instead speaking in generalities. If he ever had to
distinguish between two groups, he would resort to class based language. For example, as
Plan A began rolling, Chandler argued that he “cannot and will not urge any parent to
send his child into a ghetto school.”19 He never mentioned black or white, and he would
argue at length that it was not a racist comment. But the underlying the point was clear:
white parents, don’t send your children to poor, dangerous, black schools.
Colorblind rhetoric was a key component of politicians who embraced New
Conservatism. The movement traced its roots to Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign
in 1964. Although key for political change, Goldwater’s campaign was a monumental
failure electorally. Many attributed his failures to his positions on race. Goldwater loudly
embraced states’ rights, but did not adequately distance himself from the old Strom
Thurmonds. This failure did not go unnoticed by the national party. By Nixon’s election
in 1968, the Republican Party had embraced a color-blind platform. Their platform
claimed that racism was dead, therefore there was little left to do directly with race.20
This blindness protected them from accusations of racial insensitivity. Chandler
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incorporated the tactics of people like Strom Thurmond into the Memphis context,
condemning explicitly racial problems while denying that they were racial at all. How
could they be if racism were finished? Chandler had to walk a thinner line than most,
handling race in the city still known for killing Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. only a few
years previously.
Chandler also fought busing by advocating protection of the public school system.
Although many in the black community could see tangible examples of a system in need
of repair and reform, the white community was proud of its elite schools in new
buildings, such as East, Ridgeway, and Overton high schools. Chandler tried to threaten
the judiciary, claiming that busing would force the collapse of the public school system.
He suggested that “a sizable number of children will leave the city this year.”21 Chandler
held firmly to his stance that he was not protecting a few rich white kids in the eastern
parts of Memphis, but rather the system as a whole. As part of his stance, in response to
the approval of Plan Z, he informed the city: “I think busing of one student is bad, and I
think that busing of 39,904 students is 39,904 times as bad.”22
But Chandler and his ilk also needed political solutions that did not appear racist.
Chandler was well aware that protest and boycotts could not stop busing; he advocated
calm in his city. If people boycotted or were violent, they could be perceived as racists
clinging to the past. Chandler would only endorse busing “as a last resort,” but clung to
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the idea that “if this thing eventually is to be defeated it is going to be through legal
channels.”23
Throughout the heyday of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, men like Bull
Conner and Jim Clark provided the key to Martin Luther King’s success. Nonviolent
protest required violence to give it the moral high ground and the public outcry to cause
change. In Birmingham, Bull Conner struck a deal with the local Ku Klux Klan, allowing
them to beat Freedom Riders unabated. In 1963, he would notoriously set dogs and fire
hoses on the Birmingham demonstrators. In 1965, Sherriff Jim Clark infamously led the
horrific violence in Selma, including the bloodshed on Bloody Sunday at the Edmund
Pettus Bridge. Both men responded to King’s nonviolence with violence.24 In both cases,
when the public saw what happened on television, public outcry prevented government
officials from looking the other way. They had to take action.
Chandler had watched the civil rights movement develop while his adopted father
was mayor of Memphis. He had observed the mistakes of violent sheriffs and racist
demagogues. He knew that violence “has not helped at all” and “has only speeded up the
tempo of those trying to push tremendous social changes down the throats of other
people.”25 Instead, Chandler turned his focus to legal and political resistance. He urged
calm and peaceful behavior from anti-busing supporters, realizing the importance of
respectability if he was to win the war of public opinion, which had proved so important
in the past decade.
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Determined to prevent busing, Chandler and the city council refused to provide
gasoline for busing and even denied disbursement of funds destined for the school board
to pay for busing. To many, such as Judge McRae, these tactics were obstructionist and
outside of the law.26 To Chandler, however, they were simply hallmarks of his
conservative politics. The government’s role in financing and public education should be
more limited, so he forcibly attempted to sever the two.
Government meddling in education could cause severe harm to children, in
Chandler’s opinion. Opponents of busing trumpeted this idea, warning of the potential
dangers, explaining “a single bus accident out of the thousands of trips envisioned could
create a major tragedy – a tragedy which would be all the more appalling in light of the
fact that is was unaccompanied by any educational purpose.”27 The risk was too great,
Chandler’s allies argued. Additionally, the current system had an “outstanding record of
safety which has been achieved over a period of many years by the Memphis
neighborhood school operation.”28 Furthermore, they should consider the “extremely
poor traffic record of this community.”29 The words of kids within the community backed
up his assertions. Writing to Robert McRae, Terry Baskin and Terry Garrett, two ten year
olds complained of being “tired of getting up before daybreak.”30 The two ended the
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letter by telling McRae to “go jump in the Wolf River. Then stop BUSING!”31 Although
their commands lacked a certain logic, the two boys sided with the majority of the
conservative white community.
Chandler further strengthened his position by pointing to a progressive record on
race. Chandler appointed black city councilman James Netters to the administrative
assistant job within the mayor’s office. Netters was the first African American to hold
that office.32 If Chandler had been so progressive on race, he argued, why should anyone
question his motives on education? Compared to Loeb, Chandler’s appointments made
him look progressive. However, in reality he was just adapting to the context of the
1970s. To Chandler, success in race relations came from slow, gradual work, not rapid,
government-forced chaos as in the 1960s. He was the example of this slow progress with
appointments like Netters.
The national reach of Chandler’s politics not only secured his place as a leading
example of how to adapt Conservatism to the Deep South in the aftermath of the 1960s
civil rights activism, but also endeared him to his constituents. In late 1972, as busing
seemed imminent, Chandler began working on a City Charter amendment to “prohibit the
use of tax funds for school busing.”33 However, Chandler knew this was not the ultimate
solution. A City Charter amendment would not hold up in court following the laws of the
1960s. Instead, he bluntly stated to the press, “The only way busing is going to be
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stopped is by a constitutional amendment.”34 And Chandler was willing to do his part to
make this happen.
Chandler and City Councilman Jack McNeil embarked on a quest to pass an antibusing amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They planned to pass the amendment
through legislators on the state level first. Chandler volunteered his staff to address and
mail out over eight thousand letters to every state legislator in the nation, asking for their
support.35 Additionally, Chandler promised his constituents he would “personally step up
contacts with national leaders to bring about – at the earliest possible time – an
amendment to the Constitution to eliminate jurisdiction of local schools from federal
courts.”36
Chandler’s proposed amendment was not merely a public relations move, but in
fact a justifiable option. Chandler was part of a post-civil rights wave of conservative
resurgence. But to think of this conservatism as merely civil rights movement backlash or
“repackaged racism” fails to account for the “dramatic social and economic
transformation of the American South.”37 In fact, the national power of the revitalized
conservatives came from their control of the newly ascendant Sunbelt, the Southern belt
of the United States that was rapidly expanding economically and demographically
throughout the twentieth century, becoming politically ascendant in the 1970s.38 The
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Sunbelt stretched across the Southern United States from Atlantic to Pacific, and grew
economically by leaps and bounds based on national policy and military development.39
The Sunbelt encouraged economic growth by attracting industry through government
incentives.40 The economic boom triggered a population spike, which in turn held great
political power for Sunbelt areas. However, such growth was not automatic. Cities and
regions had to demonstrate a racially progressive political structure, or at the very least
one that would not embarrass the national government, before they received the funds.
Chandler deeply wanted Memphis to fit this mold. He failed.41 Although Memphis is
usually not included in the Sunbelt, it still benefitted from the Sunbelt boom to the rest of
its state.42
As white conservatives voted with their feet, relocating to Sunbelt areas, they
additionally adapted their rhetoric to maintain preferred status with the government. In
many cases, “white Southern conservatives were forced to abandon their traditional,
populist, and often starkly racist demagoguery and instead craft a new conservatism
predicated on the language of rights, freedoms, and individualism.”43 The economic
opportunity of the Sunbelt helped solidify a shift among the common people that
politicians were already implementing. Although Chandler failed in his attempts to blend
his politics with the economic growth of the Sunbelt, many Southern cities did succeed in
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their “protection of white privilege.” It was just well disguised.44 Cities across the South
exhibited policies that “delineated a pattern of white over black…which benefitted white
citizens more than black citizens, which favored predominantly white areas and
institutions over their black counterparts.”45 Conservative politicians like Chandler vied
for Sunbelt development, encouraging government money while trying to limit
overreaching federal regulation of those businesses at the same time.
And so, rapid structural and economic transformations across the South,
accompanied by local governments vying for Sunbelt federal funding, dramatically
changed the language of many conservatives, if not their actual intent. But these changes
were not limited to the South. In many ways, the South was leading the country. Policies
of protecting white privilege (through coded language) appealed to working-class whites
across the country. Presidential candidates such as Richard Nixon and George Wallace
capitalized on those goals. Northern working-class whites had traditionally voted
Democrat, but many were unsure of whom to vote for after Democrats wrote off their
concerns as racist.46 Nixon’s election helped inaugurate an age of Republican dominance
in national politics, a development aided by intervening “on behalf of southern school
districts, supporting efforts to curtail busing and slow the pace of school
desegregation.”47 During this age of renewed conservatism, only one Democrat, Jimmy
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Carter, would capture the White House.48 And Carter’s victory could largely be ascribed
to his outspoken stance on social issues through his devout embrace of Evangelical
religion, combined with an anti-Nixon Republican backlash.
Chandler’s policies fit in with these broader shifts in conservatism, proving very
popular at the local level. Chandler won three consecutive terms to the mayor’s office
despite economic woes in the city of Memphis.49 Many city council members allied
themselves with Chandler. Councilman Jack McBrayer, who had helped orchestrate the
massive mailing to the nation’s state legislators, led the obstructionist bloc in the city
government. First, in May 1972, McBrayer and the City Council passed an ordinance “to
prohibit the use of funds allocated to the Board of Education for the purpose of busing
school children to achieve racial balance.”50 When the School Board finally got the
ordinance overturned, instead of a check in the mail to cover the costs of busing, they
received a note stating the funds had not been paid “by directive of the Mayor and
Council.”51
While at first glance the actions of Chandler and the Council appear motivated by
a racial fear, it was more complicated. At best, they set out to preserve the status quo:
where people lived, what schools they went to, what jobs they could attain, and how
much of Memphis was integrated. Many white Memphians saw Chandler and his views
as the most in line with theirs. They had been ignored by the social revolution of the
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sixties. Rather than viewing themselves as racists refusing to integrate, they were a part
of a “conservative counterrevolution” to protect their lives.52 Paul Upton summarized the
feelings of many of these conservatives when he wrote to Judge McRae, lamenting, “I
guess I’m one of the Silent Majority, who has to work for a living, and pay taxes, who
has kept silent too long.”53
New conservative politics created a middle road between liberalism and racism
that had been absent during the 1960s. Politicians had found a way to oppose integration
measures without appearing to be the second coming of Bull Conner. Politicians such as
Wyeth Chandler, by cloaking their complaints in the language of conservatism, made it
difficult to ascertain their true motives. At best, their actions were unintentionally racist,
simply conservative politicians trying to rollback a decade of unwanted activist
government. But at worst, Chandler and his ilk were just as bigoted as previous Southern
leaders, albeit with a more impressive vocabulary.
Citizens Against Busing
Perhaps the best way to examine the true motives of those who embraced this
changing Southern conservatism is to look at the people who voted them into office. The
attitudes of the less tactful people who elect them can often reveal, if not the motives of
the politician, the motives of those who managed to get them elected in the first place. In
Chandler’s case, much of his electoral support came from the Citizens Against Busing
(CAB) organization and its leader, Ken Keele. Shortly after Chandler was elected mayor,
Keele was stirring white Memphians into a frenzy over school busing.
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“We had only one champion for what we stand for!” Keele yelled to the crowd
gathered at the Memphis Board of Education building in May of 1972. “He is now lying
in a hospital bed for what he believes!” Keele, was lamenting the shooting of presidential
candidate George Wallace. Keele finished his speech as the last of the marchers from his
afternoon demonstration trickled into the yard in front of the building. Once all were
present, the “good citizens” held a moment of silence for George Wallace before the
program continued. The parents slowly filed by a large oil drum, decorated with the
American red, white, and blue, and dropped torn school assignment cards into the can to
protest their children’s busing assignments under Plan A.54
The protests began a few months earlier with a nationally coordinated fake funeral
for neighborhood schools. It was to be a “day of mourning for the death of neighborhood
schools.”55 Hundreds of cars had jammed downtown streets at the lunch hour as angry
white parents followed the hearse to the school building. The funeral built to a climax
with Keele’s address. For CAB, politicians willing to support their cause were their
salvation. In his rhetoric, Keele pointed consistently to government invasion of their
private rights to educate their children.
However, the students themselves experienced busing in an entirely different way
from their parents. Nine months after the beginning of Plan A, many of the same parents
were still protesting, and even more left the public school system within the next year.
But at East High School, “THE prestige school for an exclusive, upper income white
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residential area,” with “marble hallways, ornate stairwell…, and hand-carved intricate
white oak moldings around windows and doors,” the story was bit different.56 The
Washington Post had just published an in-depth examination of the Plan A integration at
East. The paper had only good things to say of the integration there, pointing to “frequent
praise” of John Wesley, East’s new principal. Wesley took over when the previous
principal “resigned rather than see his school integrated.”57
Pam Beckler, the white, teenage cheer captain at East, spoke for many of the
white students when she expressed that “at first, I didn’t think it was going to be a good
idea…. I had my mind closed to it.” Her best friend Susan Hyde, head of the Booster
club, agreed, simply exclaiming “I cried!” Both did not support busing or integration, and
their displeasure was not limited to the classroom. Pam was “as prejudiced as they
come,” while Susan would get angry “when I’d be at a dance or a restaurant and there
were black people there.” But now things had changed. After busing had been running for
some time, they both agreed that “it’s one of the greatest things that ever happened.”
Some students, admittedly a very small sample size, thought busing had turned
out wonderfully. But many of their parents still fought it tooth and nail. Although Susan
and Pam were certainly not typical, their opinions reveal an interesting viewpoint. Their
free-thinking ideas were limited, of course. When discussing dating black men, Susan
said, “I don’t think I could go on a date with them,” to which Pam quickly cut in, “I
couldn’t… I couldn’t do that to my parents.” Both described their parents as “very
prejudiced.” Pam explained she had “always been brought up that the majority of blacks
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were trash.” Susan even confessed to giving black friends rides home, and quickly
answered the interviewer’s question, “No, we never tell our parents!”58
Black students were aware of white parents’ prejudice. Student Jeff Hastings
claimed that most white students who did not like him and his friends were “taught” to
“hate us” by their parents.59 And while the Post claimed racial harmony at East, parents
such as Jane Strauch felt very differently. Strauch wrote to McRae, “When we first read
of the proposed plan for pairing East and Lester schools, we thought it must be a
monstrous joke. Surely there could be no more unlikely exchange anywhere in the city of
Memphis!”60 Despite potentially positive gains among youth, the adults who controlled
the machinery of education were perhaps even more empowered in their battle against
busing by what they saw and heard from the students. To many white parents, the idea of
their daughters freely intermingling with black teenage boys would send more than a
shiver down their spines.61
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In Memphis, the most palpable result of protest against busing was Ken Keele’s
Citizens Against Busing (CAB). Tens of thousands of families joined CAB.62 These
families were all white. According to Keele, most families, black and white, preferred
neighborhood schools for the safety of their children.63 The Memphis Commercial
Appeal was a steadfast supporter of CAB in its editorials, stressing that with regard to
white flight from the busing of public schools, “racial prejudice is another factor,” but the
primary factor is “distaste for busing, and a fear of declining quality of education.”64 For
many, but not all, members of CAB, their distaste for busing was not simple racism, but a
fear that their children would be unsafe at the new school or further away from their
watchful gaze. This was often filtered through the assumption that black students,
especially black boys, were dangerous hooligans. But there were far fewer complaints
about potential rapes and murders during Plan A, when the schools’ students were bused
to were close to home.
After Plan A busing was announced, CAB began protesting. CAB parents
complained often and loudly in attempts to protect their children. During one
demonstration, CAB encouraged parents against busing to keep their kids home. Thirtysix percent of Memphis City Schools students were counted absent for two days, with the
heavily white, eastern parts of the city hit the hardest.65 Additionally, during the hearings
that decided on Plan Z, a small group of white mothers from the white suburb of Frayser
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protested outside the courthouse, demanding safety for their children. Their protest
directly followed a riot at Trezevant, where forty policemen had to be called in to restore
order. The mothers, of course, blamed bused black students.66
CAB grew in popularity through the growing anger of parents, and supported
itself through collections at rallies, door-to-door sales, school fairs, contributions from
local churches, and membership dues.67 Five thousand families were officially duespaying members. The five thousand families were all white, although, two black
neighborhoods had discussed forming their own chapters of Citizens Against Busing to
protect their neighborhood schools.68 These neighborhoods may have decided to protest
busing in a different way rather than associate with CAB’s rhetoric and its fear of black
communities.
The white families who joined CAB were primarily concerned for the safety of
their children. Like Chandler, they argued that their fear was not due to race but low
economic status and crime. The racial element was a coincidence. Some voiced their
concerns by complaining about having “to ask little children to provide the solution.”69
Others pointed to riots at local schools, such as Fairley High School. Although CAB
parents proclaimed that their children should not have to go to such dangerous
communities, Maxine Smith’s NAACP argued that the fight was not solely due to black
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teenagers, even though the police reported it that way. Smith explained that the police
“threatened to shoot one of the blacks in the head if he said anything and referred to him
as a ‘nigger.’”70 Additionally, the black students were the only ones charged with assault,
battery, and suspended from school.71
Although CAB began by protesting the actions of McRae and his court, Keele’s
organization also encouraged flight from the public school system. Citizens Against
Busing rapidly organized a number of CAB schools as an alternative for parents to avoid
busing. In January of 1973, CAB boasted twenty-six independent schools with five
thousand students. The schools were often hosted in community churches.72 The schools
were very popular at first, but rapidly collapsed as students left for more structured
private schools, which often possessed accreditation and good financing, unlike CAB
schools.73 During their most significant year of operation, more than twenty CAB
teachers were working without pay because the organization could not afford the
schools.74
However, departing for other schools was not their only form of protest. Many
families could not afford private school tuition. Once the less-expensive CAB schools
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collapsed, many fleeing whites were forced to return to Memphis City Schools. Others
had not been able to leave in the first place. In the early days of Plan A, CAB organized a
mass walkout. At Trezevant High School, 150 students walked out in protest of busing.
The principal defiantly claimed, “we’re going to have school here even if there are only
two people going to classes…we’re going to have discipline.”75 Through active and
public resistance, CAB sought to make its disproval of busing evident.
To characterize all the departing students at once is very difficult. McRae himself
realized their diversity when he explained that “the number of white students who fled
due to an unwillingness to attend school with black students is subject to many reasons,
and the number was not static.”76 Further, flight was the only option open to many
students and parents to make their point, the “only weapon anti-busing groups have until
a congressional amendment that will outlaw busing is passed.”77
So who were CAB members and what motivated them? In their study produced in
1976, David Nevin and Robert E. Bills examined Citizens Against Busing and made
several conclusions. First, the schools they created as an escape from the integrated
school system were overwhelmingly pro-conservative and very much at odds with
modern liberalism.78 In particular, Nevin and Bills claimed that CAB schools did not
teach the moral responsibility to aid one’s fellow man.79 In this way, CAB schools
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reflected an embrace of Chandler’s New Conservative tactics and a rejection of 1960s
liberalism. To CAB members, the safety (or separation from the unknown) of their
families was more important than the welfare of others from different parts of society.
Each family’s well-being was its own responsibility. This language was new and it
allowed families to protest racial solutions without appearing explicitly racist. One
parent, who would send his child to newly formed private school Briarcrest Christian
School, said of paying high tuition, “It’s worth every penny knowing they’re there,
knowing they’re alright.”80 And although this language provided them a means of protest
without embracing racism, their decisions were rooted in racially motivated assumptions.
For several CAB members, their racism was more upfront. Many accused Judge
McRae of collusion with the local NAACP. One, in addition to calling him “the sorriest
bastard that ever walked the earth,” suggested that he was “probably getting some kind of
kickback or payoff from the nigger [Maxine Smith].”81 Another went further, saying “you
probably sleep with Maxine Smith.”82 The author further warned, “these white children
aren’t use [sic] to the horrible ways and filthy language the niggers use.”83
One parent was especially worried about his daughter because she could no longer
attend the all-white, walking-distance neighborhood school. He threatened, “before I let
my young girls be bused, I will go to jail and maybe resort to other measures….Those
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dam [sic] niggers…they carry knives and try to rape the girls.”84 Another threatened to
stop the problems at schools and protect his family’s rights by “starting a white
organization like the NAACP or KKK for white people only.”85 (McRae could only
wonder what a “KKK for white people only” would look like.) Others criticized McRae
and his team for “wrecking the finest school system in the country,” asking for “a new
judge with some brains.”86
While only the words of some angry citizens, these examples are nonetheless
revealing. Certainly, Ken Keele or Mayor Wyeth Chandler would never use such
language. The general lack of examples of such blatant racism from the majority of CAB
suggests that the organization understood the new dialogue of conservatism well enough
to avoid racism. Additionally, the authors of the two letters refused to reveal their names,
perhaps suggesting that even though they were writing openly racist comments, they
realized such criticism was no longer acceptable from respectable citizens. Ultimately,
the racism of some angry parents does not condemn the whole, but it certainly raises the
question of motive. If these parents felt accepted within CAB, it speaks to the
organization’s culture and racial assumptions.
There were other parents who did not proclaim hatred for African Americans, but
still found coexistence between black and white in a school to be impossible. The two
groups were too different, they argued. In one example, a concerned father wrote to
McRae to complain of shenanigans at the Central High School talent show. His daughter
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was one of the performers who was allegedly disrespected by the black students who
came on stage during the performances to “interfere with the acts.” These types of
cultural disconnects, according to the father, reinforced to his daughter “that the races can
never mingle peacefully.”87
Still, the vast majority of white families who opposed busing found ways to voice
their concerns that avoided discussing race. Dianne Woitesek was twenty-eight when
busing began in Memphis. She lived in an overwhelmingly white, middle class part of
town, Parkway Village. She described her life in 1973 as “not really easy, but it was not a
hard life.”88 Her family owned an automotive racing business. Although later a successful
business, at the time Woitesek’s family business was struggling.
Woitesek watched her sister’s children be bused across the city. Her family did
not support busing because of what they witnessed. The children were so far removed
from their neighborhood, there was no way to be a part of the school and support the
children. Additionally, busing just seemed like a bad idea at a worse time. Woitesek felt
that “things were starting to quiet down” following the turbulent 1960s.89 However,
busing would overturn everything all over again. Many in the white community viewed
busing like Woitesek, a new problem that would disrupt life all over again. They failed to
see busing as a way to improve schools, instead only seeing it as a headache. Racial fears,
though unmentioned, were often implicit in such testimonies.
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In mostly white East Memphis, Wayne Boyd was a self-described “conservative,”
attending college at Memphis State University.90 He lived in a largely college-aged
neighborhood around the university. It was full of “low-key” people, many returning
from service in Vietnam.91 Boyd viewed busing as a colossal failure. He was specifically
distressed about the waste of money. As a conservative, he already worried about an
increasing tax burden on the population. Additionally, he and his fellow conservatives
had watched a decade of government growth and military escalation in Vietnam. Busing
would be a disservice to those returning wounded veterans in his neighborhood, causing
undue stress and proving that the government had not learned its lesson.
Boyd was also concerned about the safety of children in poor neighborhoods.
Education with such circumstances could only lead to riots. Even if the government
insisted on spending the money, Boyd believed that its best use would be improving
schools as they currently existed. But money spent shipping people around was money
wasted and the very example of government excess. Like many members of CAB and the
white community at large, Boyd did not explicitly see race as his reason for criticizing
busing.
In the wealthier Blueridge subdivision of Memphis, Charles Petrey was the father
of a family of five. He and his wife had three kids aged eight, ten, and twelve. His
neighborhood was filled with people who went to church together. Looking back on
busing, Petrey described a transformational moment. In his eyes, Memphis was a great
place to live with some of the best schools in the nation where it was safe to walk
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downtown at night. However, after busing Memphis became the opposite, and busing
was to blame. According to Petrey, the lack of school choice and of forced integration
had led to a collapse of the whole system, especially because of white flight. Petrey
pointed specifically to the failure of school discipline. Although he did not say it
specifically, many who sided with Petrey no doubt knew the main reason for the failure
of school discipline: integration. Petrey, like many others, not only pointed to busing as a
failure, but as a key moment in the destruction of Memphis.92
People like Petrey, Boyd, and Woitesek were all fairly conservative white citizens
before busing. While revealing, their arguments are not necessarily surprising. They
reflect what many white Memphians believed, explaining their alignment with Chandler
and other conservative politicians. However, these were not the only types of white
citizens who opposed busing. Pat Watson was a twenty-seven year old white woman
living in Midtown. She and her husband were politically liberal. They had actually
marched with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. However, even the Watsons did not support
busing.
Watson was teaching in a local black school when busing began. She was in the
odd position of being a white teacher at a black school watching white students being
bused into her school. However, despite her past support of school integration, Watson
and her husband did not support Memphis busing. They were extremely concerned about
the financing of the plan. Additionally, they thought it did not make sense and would not
be effective. Even though they supported its aims, they seemed convinced that the tactics
would not work. The Watsons were far from the only white liberals in Memphis not
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supporting busing. Perhaps it was exhaustion with social strife, as a decade of stress and
anxiety stemming from racial activism had worn them down. Or maybe it was a fear of
what would happen to their children, as integration became more personal. Or perhaps
they were convinced it simply could not work.93 In reality, it was probably a blending of
all of them.
Within the white community, opposition to busing was widespread. Some were
longtime conservatives who protested with little change to their racist language. Some
who disagreed were liberals like the Watsons who were exhausted from the social strife
of the past decade. Others, however, were adherents of the resurgent conservative
movement, intent on taking back their country. Chandler represented these people so well
because he was one of them. He knew the same feelings they experienced. However,
there was one major consequence to busing that held massive repercussions not only for
the black or white communities, but also for the city of Memphis and its entire school
system. Chandler and his allies feared that busing, in combination with other factors at
the time, would damage community cohesion and doom neighborhood schools.
Dale Hughes was an eleven-year-old student during busing. He lived in the white,
working-class suburb of Frayser. He lived in a two-parent household. His father worked
and his mother stayed at home to take care of the family. He made the honor roll at
school. His parents were very involved in his life, holding him accountable for his grades
and making school a priority. He enjoyed sports and playing outside. And, like many of
his contemporaries, he was a white child living in a mostly white neighborhood with very
little interaction with other races. He attended local Grandview Heights Elementary,
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which he described as a very clean school with strict, involved teachers who held
students accountable.94
Frayser was one of the most heavily bused Memphis communities. When Plan Z
was announced, Hughes was to be bused to a mostly black school. In response, his
parents pulled him out and sent him to private school. His family viewed busing as
“government interference” in matters that should be private.95 His family, like many
white families in Memphis, blamed busing for a significant decline in the quality of
Memphis public schooling. His parents took part in the numerous protests against busing
to make their voices heard. In his Frayser neighborhood, over twenty children moved
within two years.
Some white parents, like Hughes’s parents, fought for a stop to busing, looking to
protect their children, suggesting that “the time has passed for the schools to be the
testing ground for theories on social change.”96 However, to the black community, the
benefits outweighed the costs. Geneva Ford, a black teacher, argued, “All the schools
should be fully integrated…because then the white parents would work hard to have
quality education everywhere.” She added, “We could not achieve full integration
without busing, because when blacks move into a neighborhood, whites move out.”97
Ford was correct on half of her assertions. Indeed, over the next several decades, moves
east by African American families were matched by white flight to ever-expanding
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distances. But white families were not just leaving the neighborhoods. They were fleeing
the school system in record numbers for private, religious institutions.
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Chapter 4
The Jesus Men
Years before the busing crisis, a small group of Christians braved the December
cold to meet at Jackson Avenue Church of Christ in the Memphis suburb of Frayser. As
the members of Jackson Avenue understood it, the world had been on the edge of
destruction. World War II had ended, and the Cold War had begun. Their religion was
under direct threat from the Soviets. Instilling Christian values in the next generation had
never been more important. To these parents, the Cold War was not only about a political
struggle, but also a religious one.1
The members of the meeting discussed options on how best to preserve their faith
in the face of the new threat. The suggestion that immediately gained traction was for a
Church of Christ school. The school could involve daily Bible study and prayer. Teachers
could be respectable church members who could provide powerful examples of Christian
leadership to the impressionable young generation. The group received 339 commitments
that night. Within a month the committee had chosen a site, the Highland Street Church
of Christ, located on the outskirts of Midtown in the Memphis State University area. In
1952, Memphis Christian School opened its doors.2
Within one year, the school had outgrown the church building at Highland. The
school purchased a Depression-era mansion towards the outside of the city. The King
Mansion and its surrounding acreage would provide Memphis Christian its new home,
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with adequate space for continued growth.3 Despite the purchase of new land and the
continually rising enrollment, the school was struggling. The cost of establishing a new
school, outfitting it with acceptable textbooks and supplies, paying respectable teachers,
and now owning property were difficult burdens for the school. Throughout the 1950s,
Memphis Christian fought for its survival, with its continued existence often not
guaranteed beyond the current school year. However, by 1975, the school had blossomed
into the second largest private school in the country, boasting an enrollment of three
thousand across ten elementary satellites and the high school campus at the old King
Mansion, with a waiting list of two thousand.4
How did a school that fought for its very existence for over fifteen years somehow
become one of the largest private schools in the country? The busing order provides a
large part of the answer; the timetable of Memphis Christian’s growth leaves little
question there. Memphis Christian was hardly the only Memphis Christian academy with
massive growth during the busing crisis. Many Memphis private schools grew and in
some cases thrived prior to busing (or even the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education
decision).5 In the 1970s, however, the evangelical religious revival powering throughout
the South provided an important influence within the busing crisis, adding a vital layer to
an already complicated story. Realizing the religious motivations of parents does not
absolve them of their racist actions and white flight, but it does help historians understand
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
“History of Harding Academy,”1. Harding Academy Collection, 4.
4

David Nevin and Robert Bills, The Schools that Fear Built: Segregationist Academies in the
South (Washington D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), 8.
5

Marcus D. Pohlman, Opportunity Lost: Race and Poverty in the Memphis City Schools
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2008), 84.

!

126

!
!

the language of their protests and their unique viewpoints. By examining the creation
and theology of Memphis Christian school and its peers, it becomes apparent that the
relationship between religion and busing in the South is significant and intertwined.
The Rise of Private, Religious Education
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court, led by Earl Warren, announced its
decision in the Brown v. Board of Education case, declaring segregation illegal. Separate
was “inherently unequal.” Initially, many in the South continued business as usual,
clinging to segregation until the federal government slowly forced change on a nearly
case-by-case basis throughout the 1960s. Many fled integration as it came to their towns,
either for private schools or all-white suburban schools.
In 1956, Memphis Christian’s collapse looked imminent. Enrollment had slipped,
leaving inadequate financial support for its numerous bills. As a last-ditch attempt to save
the school, the Board of Directors requested that Harding University take ownership and
responsibility of the school.6 Harding University was a small, private university located
about three hours away in Searcy, Arkansas. Although the university was small by
national standards, it was one of the premier Church of Christ universities in the country.
It was beginning to experience explosive growth as evangelicalism erupted across the
South. Therefore, Harding University was a natural choice. The university took
ownership of the school, renaming it Memphis Harding Academy. Within ten years,
enrollment was stabilized and the system was beginning to experience some growth.7

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
“History of Harding Academy,” 6. Harding Academy Collection.
7

!

Ibid., 7.

127

!
!

Upon takeover, the university’s first step was to put its people in charge. The
university’s first choice to run the school was one of its rising stars, Harold Bowie, who
would preside over Harding Academy for the next thirty-seven years, supervise its
growth from an enrollment of 300 to 3,000, and pioneer and market a new version of
Christian education that took root across the South.8 Bowie’s “hands on” leadership had a
powerful impact on Harding Academy and private education in the South that “cannot be
overstated in any way.”9 Bowie brought a culture change to Harding that went beyond a
growth-oriented, satellite school based vision, but included his overwhelmingly positive
worldview. Bowie frequently appeared on campus as Santa Claus during Christmas
season, and was renowned for singing in offices and classrooms on employees’
birthdays.10
One of the major reasons for Bowie’s initial success was the satellite school
concept. Memphis generally embraced a neighborhood school concept that often affected
private school enrollment. However, Bowie utilized Church of Christ church buildings in
disparate parts of the city to grow the school’s enrollment. Often, by the time students
reached high school age, they had bought into the school’s mission and culture, and they
were willing to make the drive to the East Memphis campus. He opened the first satellite
in the white suburban area of Whitehaven in 1964. Following this initial success,
locations opened in other white suburbs, with East Memphis in 1965, Raleigh in 1968,
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and another Whitehaven location in 1969. Over twelve satellites opened by 1975, mostly
in largely white suburbs ringing Memphis.11
The satellite concept had numerous effects on Harding. First, by the opening of
the second satellite, Bowie had already stabilized enrollment back at its initial starting
point of 300.12 In addition to finding students that would not normally attend Harding
because of geography, the satellite concept embedded the school within neighborhoods
culturally. This was very important, because as Plan Z invaded their neighborhoods and
changed their schools, neighborhoods could view Harding as part of the community that
was both theirs and secure from governmental invasion. Harding and its peers who
followed its lead found themselves at the compelling juncture of an evangelical
revolution, a revolt against government control, and a fear of racial integration – and
these schools worked these angles to their advantage.
As schools such as Harding experienced explosive growth throughout the 1970s,
the Memphis City School system suffered from rapid decline. For example, Plan A paired
Shannon and Grandview Schools, which were only three miles apart, but culturally they
could have been in different countries. Shannon was located in North Memphis, a heavily
populated, lower-income black neighborhood. Grandview was in Frayser, an up-andcoming white suburb. The student bodies of the two schools reflected the population of
their regions, with each achieving “one-race school” status by meeting Judge Robert
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McRae’s rule of eighty percent one race. The two neighborhoods were divided by
Interstate 40, which acted as a virtual wall separating the two.13
According to Plan Z, Grandview would receive all first to third graders from both
schools, while Shannon would receive all fourth to sixth graders from the two. Ideally,
this would create equal racial representation at both schools. However, when the plan was
put into action, the results were quite the opposite. At Shannon, large numbers of white
students never showed up. The plan anticipated 430 new white students at Shannon, but
only 86 arrived. This left Shannon as a virtual one-race school despite its direct mention
in Plan Z. The destruction caused by Plan Z was not limited to Shannon. At Grandview,
black students showed up in the expected numbers. But the white students fled
Grandview, as well, in anticipation of the arrival of black students. Although not enough
white students left to make Grandview an one-race black school, it did become a black
majority with about 200 white students, leaving while 349 black students arrived, giving
them a sixty to forty percentage majority.14
Many in Memphis tried to explain away the massive white flight, suggesting that
whites had been departing the system in droves long before busing began.15 But the
enrollment at institutions such as Bowie’s Harding suggested differently. In the summer
of 1972, nearly 10,000 white students left the city school system in fear of future busing
action. Once Plan A was announced, 7,000 more left prior to its implementation in
January 1973. By 1978, several years in to the busing experiment, 40,000 white children,
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more than half of the system’s white enrollment, had fled.16 This flight rescued Harding’s
enrollment and future, sending their enrollment to 3,000. But the flight was too
significant to be absorbed by the existing private schools. By the end of 1973, there were
roughly 100 private school options within the Memphis city limits, while the 170 public
schools suffered from massive losses.17 Private school enrollment went from 13,000 in
1970 to over 35,000 in 1974, qualifying the Memphis private school system as the largest
such system in the country.18
Elliston Baptist Academy was one of many schools to emerge in response to the
busing crisis. Elliston Baptist Academy was located in southeastern Memphis just inside
Interstate 240, the loop that surrounds the city. The school was founded out of the
Elliston Baptist church building. For decades, the church had serviced the Parkway
Village neighborhood, a working-class white neighborhood. Parkway Village schools
were hit especially hard by busing flight. By the numbers, Elliston Baptist Academy went
from a starting enrollment of 320 to 1,800 just three years later, all during the busing
crisis. Free labor donated by church and community members built facilities including
classrooms, a gymnasium, and an auxiliary building across the street on donated
property.19 The numbers seem to tell a clear story of a segregation academy rapidly
cobbled together by desperate white families fleeing the city school system. However,
while this narrative is not necessarily untrue, it is certainly more convoluted.
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Pastor Floyd Simmons was leading Elliston Baptist Church at the time. Simmons
admitted, “I would never have dreamed of starting a school, hadn’t it been for busing.”20
However, to Simmons it was more about faith and signs from God. In response to his
distress and that of his community, Simmons spent several nights in deep prayer and
devotion. Finally, one night Simmons felt he had received a message from God, pointing
him to scriptures that stressed the importance of indoctrinating youth in the faith before it
was too late. The message to Simmons was clear: too many young people were leaving
the faith and the turmoil in the school system was to blame. Inherent in these claims was
the assumption that interaction with the black community was causing declining faith,
suggesting that the black community was somehow less wholesome and full of crime. In
response, Simmons and his fellows started the school specifically to convert and
consolidate the faith of the next generation. By Simmons’s estimation, approximately
1,000 students “made public decisions for Christ” in the school’s first three years.21
Briarcrest Christian School, another school founded by the Baptist community in
Memphis during busing, told a similar story. Briarcrest opened its doors in 1973, just as
Memphis was reeling from the initial work of Plan A and the announced threats of Plan
Z. In its first year, Briarcrest enrolled 1800 elementary and junior high students through
eleven East Memphis church locations, similar to the satellite school model Harding had
recently pioneered.22 One year later, Briarcrest opened a brand-new six million dollar
high school building, boasted an enrollment of 2,200, and employed one of the most
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respected principals from the city school system. Briarcrest was well on its way to being
the largest private school in the country by the end of the decade.23
Joe Clayton was a twenty-year employee of the Memphis City School system. In
the 1970s, he was the principal of Overton High School, an elite, all-white school in
southeastern Memphis close to Parkway Village. By all accounts, Clayton was one of the
best administrators in the system school. White families aspired to have their students
attend Overton. The school benefitted by graduating 600 seniors in 1973, the largest
graduating class in the Memphis City School system ever at that time. However, when
Briarcrest, the upstart new school came knocking, Clayton jumped ship. Clayton
described the decision as difficult due to his long stint in public education, but explained
his choice by saying, “God had other plans for my life.”24 Clearly Clayton was not the
only one who felt this way, as Briarcrest became “a miracle school….It just took off and
never looked back,” according to Clayton.25
Harding, Elliston Baptist, and Briarcrest are a small sampling of the numerous
religious institutions that grew significantly during the busing crisis in Memphis. The raw
numbers seem to suggest that these schools were essentially segregationist academies,
profiting off of the racism of their customers. The schools themselves strongly argued
otherwise. When approached by some social scientists examining Memphis education in
the mid-1970s, a spokesman for Briarcrest argued, “We’re definitely not connected with
the CAB [Citizens Against Busing] schools – we’re in no way trying to oppose
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desegregation….The Catholics and the Church of Christ have quality schools, but the
Baptists don’t. Now we will.”26 The CAB schools existed for no purpose beyond
separating white children from black children, even though this was filtered through a
fear for safety. But evangelical schools such as Briarcrest, Harding, and Elliston do not
quite fit the same mold as the CAB schools. Although racism (conscious or not) played a
key role in the establishment and growth of these schools, the religious angle of saving
the next generation impacted their decisions. In the cases of many participants in the
schools, their religious devotion could mask their subtle racism, even to themselves. Yet,
these religious motivations were not something that simply emerged as a convenient
cover for racism; in fact, their arguments dovetailed with an emerging Great Awakening
among evangelicals. The two were inseparable.
By the end of the busing crisis in 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of
the United States. One key bloc within Reagan’s coalition was the Christian Right,
composed mostly of Southern and Sunbelt evangelicals. The Christian Right, like New
Conservatism, had been growing for some time, only to explode onto the scene through
resistance to busing. In fact, the basic philosophies of the Christian Right had been
forming in the 1960s, only to be powered forward by developments of the 1970s.27
The Theology of Christian Schools and Busing
The 1960s brought only frustration to a unified Christian cause. The civil rights
movement divided religious response, as not only denominations but also individual
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churches often split on their view of the movement. However, as the civil rights
movement simmered out of public consciousness, unity among church leaders’ views on
race began to coalesce.28 The church certainly had prompts to respond to in the sixties,
but often lacked the unity to seriously address it until the seventies. For example, in 1962
the Supreme Court found teacher-led prayer unconstitutional in Engel v. Vitale. In 1963
Abington School District v. Schempp outlawed Bible reading in public schools.29 Most
Christians no doubt saw these developments as attacks on their vision of a Christian
nation, but they lacked the cohesion to respond in great strength. The first major, national
response to banned school prayer was in 1969. This short fight was representative of a
growing evangelical movement that was rapidly gaining power in places like Memphis.30
Although the strength of evangelical organizations was just gaining attention in
the late 1960s, the numbers agree that it had been in the works for some time. Over a
fifty-year period from 1940 to 1990, the Southern Baptist Convention tripled in members
from five to eighteen million. By 1971, members of the Southern Baptist Convention,
Churches of Christ, and Lutheran Church accounted for eight percent of the United States
population. Enrollment in private Christian schools reflected this growth, with 2.5 million
students attending over 18,000 Christian schools located mostly in the South by the mid
1980s. 31
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Theologically, this newly strong movement held some interesting ground. On the
one hand, it focused more on the vertical relationship with God, assuring its adherents
and the next generation were saved.32 However, they also were greatly motivated by the
horizontal relationship with those that surrounded them through “social uplift,” as many
were concerned about the moral decline of the country.33 A social gospel would seem to
suggest improving the world around them, including the much poorer black
neighborhoods located nearby. However, the social uplift doctrine of evangelicals seemed
to be restricted by whiteness. In this way, establishing private Christian schools to defend
Christianity, indoctrinate and save the next generation, and improve the community as a
whole fueled the growth of the Christian Right. Church was moving out of church
buildings and into government institutions, like education.34
For many parents, choosing a private religious school was not just about
protecting students’ safety, but also about protecting their eternal futures. Busing was not
just a safety risk by taking students out of a known neighborhood; it was a salvation risk
by exposing their children to all types of immorality that they would not have
encountered otherwise. Many Memphians tried to warn Judge Robert McRae of the
spiritual risks of busing. Memphis ministers in particular made sure their voices were
heard. John Scott, minister at White Station Church of Christ, which hosted one of
Harding’s first satellite locations, wrote McRae a letter in 1970. In his letter, he stressed
the damage busing would cause communities and young minds who could not handle this
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type of trauma.35 W.S. Bishop, minister at the Rugby Park Assembly of God church in
Frayser, similarly expressed his fears about busing, threatening McRae that his church
would leave the city school system if busing reached them.36
Pastor George A. Hern of Baptist Church in Frayser disagreed with busing,
arguing, “It will probably complicate things still further.”37 Hern claimed that not only
was busing “costly, illogical, and impractical,” but also that “there is very real question as
to whether even the negro parents and children themselves want it.”38 And while many
took more sophisticated paths for arguing against busing, embracing some tactics of New
Conservatism, some still clung to overt racism. One unsigned correspondent to McRae
wrote, “Those who are demanding integration are going against God’s law.”39 He
concluded by urging McRae to “desert your own kind and be with the Devil.”40
While the reaction of religious figures to busing was overwhelmingly negative, it
did not always take the form of angry and threatening letters. At the start of Plan A, a
group of ministers began campaigning in support of peaceful obedience of busing laws.
The group believed that “the law of our land must be upheld.”41 They called on all
citizens “to reduce emotions, to act responsibly, and to work towards a calmer
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atmosphere.”42 However, despite the difference in tone, this group was no more
supportive of busing than the more inflammatory W. S. Bishop. Within their appeals, the
group made key references to scriptures about obeying the authority of the land in which
you are living. Their words of calm were not an endorsement of busing. Instead, it was
support for a Biblical concept of obedience to the state. Their urgings can also be read as
an attempt to prevent rioting. But when McRae charged forward with busing, it left
evangelical parents and their pastors with seemingly no option but to leave the system for
private schools to protect their children’s eternal salvation.
Although the numerous religious schools that emerged around the busing
controversy were diverse by denomination and theology, there were remarkable
similarities that help create a general mold of these institutions. Social scientists David
Nevin and Robert E. Bills compiled a study in 1976 on many religious schools, including
several from Memphis. Some schools were no doubt “segregation academies designed to
escape court-ordered racial integration,” but many were also equally angry about “sex
education or classroom prayer as they were about integration.”43 In all of the schools, the
religious part of the school held preeminence, “education itself is secondary.”44 Prior to
busing, private schooling was only for the wealthiest Memphians. However, with the
onset of Plan A, the customers of private schools changed dramatically. Many of the
schools attracted large numbers of lower-middle class white families who struggled with
the costs of the schools. These families often hailed from Parkway Village and Frayser,
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white working-class sections of town ringing the white eastern exterior, while attendance
from the mostly black inner city was negligible.45
An interest in promoting Christian values ran through everything these schools
decided. The new schools often met in churches, especially early in their existence. It was
financially prudent and allowed the schools to get organized. Further, the meeting place
enforced the purpose of instruction from the moment a student walked in the door. These
arrangements often meant that many of the schools had a dearth of educational supplies
such as textbooks or slide projectors.46 The schools’ enforcement of Christian ideals went
beyond the spaces they met. Most schools employed stringent dress and hair codes to
regulate student appearance. Rejection of student dress codes was often viewed as a
significant rejection of authority, on par with talking back to a teacher or cursing.47
In their study of the schools as they were emerging, Nevin and Bills lamented the
dearth of information, complicated by the schools’ refusal to report significant
information.48 However, in spite of the lack of information for scholars, parents were
adequately pleased, as they invested significant portions of their incomes in them. To
parents, the rapid growth of the schools was completely understandable. The threats from
public education to safety and morality suddenly seemed increased with the busing order.
Further, these schools radiated a “sense of mission,” which parents and students alike
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could buy into and feel as if they were taking positive steps religiously and culturally
towards solving problems.
It is clear that parents’ minds were often in accordance with those of the founders
in their missional stance. For example, Simmons stressed the need to reach the younger
generation and solidify its faith as a key component of Elliston Baptist Academy. In a
Bills and Nevin survey, well over 1300 parents, 44% of those surveyed and more than
any other option, chose the ability “to distinguish right from wrong and to guide their
actions accordingly” as the most important job of the school.49 With regard to curriculum,
parents were overwhelmingly pleased or unconcerned with educational standards. A
small minority of parents criticized the level of education provided or the amount of
homework required. Typically, parents were pleased or had no opinion. 50
Perhaps most interesting in the parent survey was the distance students lived from
their schools. While many in CAB argued that distance from home led to the primary
danger of busing, the vast majority, sixty-one percent, lived five miles or more away
from their school of choice.51 Parents were not choosing a school because of its proximity
to home. When one considers the vast number of private schools in Memphis, right
around 100 at the time, mostly concentrated in white areas, it seems that parents would
have their choice of school located very close to home. Instead, parents of children in the
religious private schools mostly run by evangelical denominations frequently drove over
five miles to reach their school. This suggests a deeper commitment to the mission of a
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particular school, beyond simply selecting the closest, cheapest option to avoid complete
integration. It also reveals a deeper hypocrisy about parents’ criticisms of busing. Clearly
the schools were not only effective at creating a mission, but also at getting parents and
students to buy in. But did parents’ belief in the school’s mission provide the primary
reasoning for leaving the public school system, or was it simply a helpful metric to select
an alternative to the school system they had already decided to leave?
As impassioned families left the city school system and joined the various private
religious schools, the schools rapidly expanded to accommodate the surge in attendance.
Briarcrest built its six million dollar high school campus, widely acclaimed as the finest
quality school in the country. (The school even boasted about its ice cream machine in
the cafeteria.)52 Clayton argued that he could easily understand why people chose his
school over the city system or even CAB schools. He felt that the “rowdiness” and
disorganization of CAB schools turned people away. Meanwhile, Clayton believed
teachers were drawn to institutions such as Briarcrest for the opportunity to share their
personal views with students, something certainly limited by the recent Supreme Court
decisions.53 As Briarcrest expanded, so too did many others. The Southern Baptist
Educational Center (SBEC) was founded and opened in the fall of 1973. The school was
located in the Whitehaven area, an affluent southern suburb of Memphis, home to
Graceland, the house of Elvis Presley. When it opened, SBEC began with an enrollment
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of 1,270 students, operating on a two million dollar campus completed through the efforts
of ten local Baptist churches.54
There were of course exceptions to the massive growth of the private schools, but
they were quite few. The most significant example is that of Memphis Parochial Schools.
As Briarcrest and SBEC attracted student bodies in excess of 1,000 students, the Catholic
schools of Memphis stubbornly refused to grow. Although multiple messages came out
of the schools suggesting why they refused to accept large numbers of new students, the
most consistent message was one of protecting the city schools. The Catholic schools
took care not to support busing publicly, as this would probably doom their existing
white enrollment; but they did publicly attempt to staunch the rush of students out of the
city school system. The Parochial Schools of Memphis, however, are the exception to the
rule.55
The correlation of the busing order and the rise of Briarcrest, Elliston Baptist,
SBEC, and others is quite clear. Despite what the schools and the parents themselves may
have said, the founding dates are condemning. At best, flight from busing was a
contributing factor to their creation, at worst, the sole one. Yet, there were private
religious schools in Memphis prior to busing as well. How did they fare throughout this
crisis? Here, Harding Academy provides an excellent example. Under the leadership of
Harold Bowie, Harding was growing prior to the fear of busing, but its enrollment
exploded during the crisis itself.
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Harding Academy: A Case Study
Harold Bowie came to Harding Academy in 1961 as the school was sinking
toward dissolution. By the end of the decade, he had stabilized the schools enrollment.
The senior class of 1970 provides an interesting snapshot of the school Bowie had built.
The neighborhood school concept, defended so energetically by Citizens Against Busing,
was evident in Harding in the early 1970s as well. Although students in the senior class
of 1970 hailed from over thirty distinct neighborhoods within the greater Memphis area,
only two contributed more than four students. Those two neighborhoods were the
immediate Harding neighborhood surrounding the school and Sherwood, which was
geographically closest to the Harding neighborhood (see figure 1, pg. 144). Therefore,
although the private, Church of Christ affiliation drew families from the distant eastern
ends of the city, the bulk of families were drawn from the immediate geographic area
around the city. This trend holds true for the classes below the seniors in 1970 as well.56
In 1970, Harding drew significantly from Churches of Christ, compared to other
religions and Christian denominations. Over three-quarters of the class of 1970 were
from Churches of Christ, with no other denomination registering as a significant minority
(see figure 2, page 145). Additionally, Harding students were at Harding for the long
haul, with over half attending Harding for over six years.57 If students who attended
Harding for all four years of high school are included, the number of students at Harding
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Harding Academy Admission and Transcript Records (hereafter Harding Academy Records),
“Class of 1970,” located at Harding Academy of Memphis Library.
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The records do not indicate any specific number of attended years beyond six. However, based
on previous schools listed for these students (often none), it is safe to assume that the majority of
them spent their entire academic career in the Harding system. Harding Academy Records, “Class
of 1970.”
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for a significant time period goes over seventy-five percent. Relatively, very few students
switched to Harding for just a junior or senior year (see figure 3, page 145).58

Figure 1: Harding Academy Class of 1970 Neighborhoods59
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Harding Academy Admission and Transcript Records (hereafter Harding Academy Records),
“Class of 1970.”
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Foreign exchange students and those with “unknown” residence information are not included in
this chart.
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Figure 2: Harding Class of 1970 Religious Denominations

Figure 3: Harding Class of 1970 Years Enrolled
It is very clear in 1970, Harding was first and foremost a Church of Christ school.
The school was also supported by its neighborhood. If Harding did draw students from
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outside of its geographic area, they were almost always Church of Christ.60 Therefore,
Harding’s two major draws in 1970 were geographic proximity and denominational
affiliation. Parents who paid tuition were either supporting something they saw as a
beneficial institution in their neighborhood, or they were paying to provide religious
support and encouragement specific to their preferred denomination. Bowie had
stabilized school enrollment around this strategy, but it was yet to be seen if this model
was sustainable over the long term.
As Judge Robert McRae announced and enforced Plans A and Z, whites fled the
city school system and Harding’s enrollment exploded. The boost to Harding’s
enrollment went far beyond the years Plans A and Z were initiated. Harding profited from
the enrollment boon throughout the 1980s (see figure 4, page 147).61 The nature of the
growth sheds light on busing in Memphis. Harding diversified in interesting ways. The
diversification of Harding’s student body can represent broad white flight from racial
integration, or another manifestation of the growing religious revival in the South, or
some combination of the two.
Harding’s classes incorporated a variety of Christian denominations it had never
seen before, beginning in great numbers by 1973. At first, this would seem to suggest that
Harding lost its Church of Christ identity during the busing crisis due to a flooding of
other denominations. In fact, Harding only briefly lost its Church of Christ majority.
From 1970-78, Harding steadfastly maintained a Church of Christ majority within its
student body, with the final percentage hovering just under seventy-five percent (see
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figure 5, page 148).62 However, upon closer examination, the numbers are a good deal
more complicated, and vary based upon a number of factors.

Figure 4: Harding Total Senior Class Enrollment, 1970-1982
At the height of the busing crisis, many students enrolled in Harding for only a
few years. In some cases, these students left the city schools only to return two or fewer
years later. In a much more frequent occurrence, these students left the city schools for
their final years of high school to graduate from Harding within two years. Whereas
nearly seventy-five percent had been at Harding four or more years in 1970, from 19731978, that number was significantly reduced as one-third of students attended Harding for
three or fewer years (see figure 6, page 148).63 This influx of students for only a short
period shapes the religious denomination totals.
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Figure 5: Harding Seniors’ Religious Denominations, 1970-1978

Figure 6: Harding Seniors’ Total Years at Harding, 1973-1978
When religious denomination totals are filtered by years enrolled at Harding, the
totals begin to look different. Of students who attended Harding for five or more years,
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roughly seventy-five percent were Church of Christ (see figure 7, below). Meanwhile,
when looking at students who were at Harding for two or fewer years, the number of
Church of Christ students drops to just over fifty percent (see figure 8, page 150). So,
although Harding gained many students throughout the 1970s, very few could claim to
have been at Harding for five or more years by 1978 and to have arrived after busing.
This suggests that most of Harding’s short-term gains from busing were not Church of
Christ, the school’s typical near-complete majority demographic.

Figure 7: Religions Denominations of Harding Students Enrolled 5 or more years,
Classes of 1970-1978
By the mid-1970s, Briarcrest and Harding were the number one and two largest
private schools in the country, respectively. Briarcrest was founded by Baptist churches
in Memphis, opened in 1973, and grew significantly in 1974. Harding’s senior class of
1974 contained the its percentage of Church of Christ students. The class of 1975,
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however, witnessed a rebound in Church of Christ students. Meanwhile, the class of 1974
also holds the highest percent of Baptists for the 1970s. (see figure 9, page 151).64

Figure 8: Religious Denominations of Harding Students Enrolled 2 or less years,
Classes of 1970-1978
This suggests that Harding’s initial boom of students then shifted to Briarcrest,
while Harding continued to grow. The shift in Baptists does suggest that at first many
were simply trying to get out of the city school system as quickly as possible. As more
options developed, many families tweaked their private school choices. The departures
from Harding for Briarcrest, while Harding continued to grow, meant that students
continued to leave the city schools after the initial boom following the implementation of
Plans A and Z. This is probably a result of families attempting to stick out integration,
only to find the racial demographics of schools wildly different than had been projected
because of white flight.
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Figure 9: Harding Class of 1974 Religious Denominations
The second major component to Harding’s diversification was the neighborhoods
of students’ families. In 1970, although there was a diverse list of neighborhoods
involved, most students came from the majority-white geographic areas immediately
around the school, Harding and Sherwood. With a significant increase in student
enrollment, an increase in diversity of neighborhoods is not entirely surprising. However,
several neighborhoods contributed students on a significant level. The location and
demographics of those neighborhoods is what makes their contributions even more
significant. From 1973-1978, Whitehaven, an affluent, white neighborhood in South
Memphis, actually enrolled more students than those in the immediate Harding
neighborhood. The adjoining Parkway Village and Oakhaven neighborhoods, both
working-class white areas immediately south of the Harding area, also made substantial
contributions.65 Finally, the white working-class suburb of Frayser contributed significant
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Some statistics combine Oakhaven and Parkway Village, while others leave them as two
separate neighborhoods. If combined, the student total would be the highest of all neighborhoods.
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numbers to student enrollment, passing Sherwood, but not quite reaching Harding
neighborhood numbers (see figure 10, below).66

Figure 10: Harding Student Neighborhoods, Classes of 1973-1978
These numbers certainly suggest a changing demographic for Harding Academy.
The core two neighborhoods that supplied most of the school’s students increased to five
total neighborhoods. The new additions to Harding’s student pool all hold one key
similarity: they are nearly all-white suburbs recently incorporated into the city system.
These white enclaves had been suburban escapes from the city. However, the regions had
recently been incorporated and were now under the busing order. They all occupied land
on the border of black neighborhoods, thus making them prime targets for both Plans A
and Z. Although white Memphians across the city fled busing for private schools such as
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Harding, they came with special intensity from recently annexed areas that perceived
themselves as under severe threats, such as Whitehaven, Frayser, and Parkway VillageOakhaven.
Another interesting trend shows up when filtering these results by years students
were enrolled at Harding. Students who attended Harding for five or more years from
1970-78 came from the Harding and Sherwood neighborhoods in much greater
proportions. For example, the Harding neighborhood number barely decreased from the
total of all students from 1973-78, when the criteria is changed to those who were
enrolled for five or more years. By contrast, Whitehaven lost over fifty students, Frayser
lost nearly forty, and Parkway Village-Oakhaven lost nearly fifty when short-term
students are eliminated (figure 11, page 154).67 These numbers suggest that Harding grew
significantly after 1973 through the Parkway Village-Oakhaven, Frayser, and
Whitehaven neighborhoods. New students from those neighborhoods were much more
likely to be short-term students rather than long-term participants in Harding’s “mission.”
The numbers from Harding suggest that the school’s self-promoting narratives
were questionable. The schools embraced a sense of mission, a goal of keeping the
younger generation strongly within their religious denomination. But the students who
eventually found their way into Harding had very little to do with its mission. Although
they shared Christian values, a difference of denomination can be a significant challenge
to overcome in many evangelical groups. To many evangelical groups, especially Church
of Christ, denominational difference was not just doctrinal idiosyncrasies, but an identity
with deep emotional attachments. Some Churches of Christ even viewed other Christian
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denominations as blasphemous. So, for a family to place their child in a school that was
of a different denomination could be of significant importance. They could agree with the
school on an overall Christian mission, but the differences of opinion regarding
denomination could represent a greater sacrifice from a family than one would initially
think. Additionally, their choice of schools hardly represented the neighborhood schools
concept so many opponents of busing embraced, as families commuted across the city to
avoid busing.

Figure 11: Neighborhoods of Harding Students Enrolled 5 or more years, Classes of
1970-1978
This evidence reveals both racist flight and a more complicated picture of the
busing crisis. Many whites used language of economics and safety to describe their
decision for switching schools. Many of the parents enrolling at Harding answered a
prompt explaining their desire to enroll by describing fears about student safety. The
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other most frequent response dealt with the positives of Christian education.68 And to
many parents, these were not altogether different things. To many highly religious
evangelicals, a student’s safety was significantly tied to their salvation. And the
likelihood of students’ acceptance of salvation was directly tied to environment. Parents
were already worried about the physical dangers of leaving their neighborhoods. But they
were also worried about the spiritual dangers of a government and society rapidly
spiraling away from a righteous path. How could such a government be trusted? It was
not just a matter of physical safety, but a fear of the dangers of government education –
that the presence of African Americans and godless curriculum would permanently
destroy hopes for their children’s salvation. And this racial fear could be explicit,
implicit, or both.
Jerry Midyett was a young dentist who had just opened his practice in the
Kingsbury neighborhood, by one of the largest white public schools in the city. He had
two young daughters, so his life was centered on his young family and his growing
practice. Midyett sent his family to Harding. Midyett had been involved with Harding
prior to busing, but he nonetheless noted some interesting points as to why the school
grew like it did. The distinction lay in “integration” versus “racial balance.”69 No one
criticized integration any more, he argued, and that had already been accomplished.
However, did complete racial balance in schools matter? Or, since students could
hypothetically attend any school they chose, wasn’t that all the action that was needed?
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Interview of Jerry Midyett by Karli Williamson, August 7, 2015 in the Busing Oral History
Collection, Harding Academy of Memphis Library, processed by Author (2015) (hereafter
Busing Oral History Collection).
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Religious schools such as Harding and Briarcrest certainly occupy a unique
position within the busing crisis. On the one hand, they represent an important moment
for the growing political and cultural power of conservative evangelicals. The schools
embraced the missions of outreach to their communities and indoctrinating the next
generation. However, those communities were all white. And while many parents who
switched at the time would argue that it was mere coincidence and an effect of
economics, the data suggests intentional and timely flight from what had been viewed as
safely white enclaves as soon as the government threatened them. To the parents, they
were living out their Christian mission. To others, their flight from racial integration was
obvious.
Numerically, the Memphis City Schools have never recovered. Memphis private
schools currently maintain enrollments of roughly 21,000 students, just over only 10,000
fewer than in 1973. Admittedly, the city has grown, but that is little comfort to a school
system watching money continually depart its halls for “safety” out east.70 McRae and his
allies attempted to strike back at the private school sector, with numerous lawsuits
charging discrimination, but the schools were able to avoid significant penalty through
token desegregation. McRae passed a further decree banning city schools from playing
private schools in athletics if the schools “formed or in its enrollment significantly
expanded at or about the time of or subsequent to…December 10, 1971.”71
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As white flight from the schools increased, the private schools gained students
and wealth. Today, private schools ring the eastern edge of the city of Memphis.
Briarcrest has moved outside the city limits. SBEC has changed names and is located in
North Mississippi. Many other schools founded during the busing crisis have moved to
the outer limits of the city. The wealthier, white parents of their students are at the
boundary of the city as well. Which moved first? It’s a chicken and egg argument.
However, what is clear is that court-ordered busing triggered massive flight from the city
school system.
Fear, racism, and religious fervor all motivated that flight. Once the flight had
begun, it was irreversible. For many parents, that period in the 1970s is no longer tainted
with racial reasoning; they simply cast it as a spiritual reawakening. However, the reality
was otherwise. One of the many who feared what busing might cause was Joy Lomax
Martin, who told McRae in an undated letter, “You should have started the integration on
the outer edges of city so that people could not move out to escape.”72 The massive
departures from the city devastated numerous aspects of Memphis life. However, both
white flight and busing held even more consequences for the very fabric of individual
neighborhoods, black and white. It was the loss of the neighborhood school and the
disappearance of neighborhood cohesion that caused the greatest anxiety about busing
from Memphians, both white and black.
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Chapter 5
The Nervous Neighbors
Ken Bennett was a true Memphian. He was born and raised in the city. He lived
with his mom, a devout Christian, and his unchurched father. He was part of a lower
middle class white family. As a young boy, he delivered newspapers with a school buddy
to help the family out. He started mowing lawns once he “was old enough to push a lawn
mower.” He went to Messick High School, one of the older schools in the Memphis area,
and volunteer coached and refereed at Presbyterian Day School.1
Bennett lived “fifty feet from Orange Mound,” the traditionally black
neighborhood in south East Memphis. The area was full of rental properties, with many
in the neighborhood belonging to Bennett’s lower middle class. Because of his proximity
to Orange Mound, Bennett had an advantage when the Memphis School Board
implemented busing. He already lived in a relatively integrated neighborhood and
attended a significantly integrated school. He was not bused out of his neighborhood,
although black students from Hamilton High School and white students from White
Station High School were bused into Messick. When he graduated high school only two
years into busing, Bennett’s class was roughly one-third African American and two-thirds
white.2
No doubt due to the fact that busing hardly affected his life, Bennett did not see
the policy as a problem. According to him, “we didn’t really have any conflicts,” and the
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Ken Bennett interview by Karli Williamson, Aug. 11, 2015 in the Busing Oral History
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further integration of Messick was “pretty cool.” However, as insignificantly affected by
busing as he was, even Bennett could find reason to be frustrated by busing. Bennett
highlighted the problem seemingly every Memphian could agree on, regardless of race or
social status. “The downside,” Bennett later explained, “was tearing apart
neighborhoods….the sense of community began to erode.”3 The loss of cohesive
neighborhoods through the destruction of the schools continues to affect Memphis today.
Because they worried about the integrity of communities or neighborhood schools
did not necessarily mean that those families did not support busing. This is especially true
among African Americans; many worried about their communities, while simultaneously
supporting the NAACP in its push for busing. Others, like white educator Daphne Starr,
were racially progressive, yet clung to neighborhood schools in spite of busing. Starr
argued, “I am against busing both as a parent and as an educator. But…I am for
neighborhood schools….I am also for full integration.” She added, “Busing is a very poor
means to an end.”4
Among the Memphians who supported neighborhood schools and protecting their
communities, they had at least four distinct reasons: a defense of middle-class
domesticity, Black Power influenced neighborhood unity and uplift plans, concerns for
their children, and worries about the safety of schools not located in their neighborhoods.
Of these four, two were overwhelmingly white concerns, while the other two were
overwhelmingly black. The school board made this point clearly in the original busing
case, arguing, “the desires of parents, both black and white, to have their children
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educated in neighborhood schools has been made clear by witnesses for both parties.”5
Although divided in their rationale, their unity on the importance of neighborhood
schools is all the more important in light of their destruction at the hands of busing.6
However, the question that lingers is how much the success of a neighborhood school
was tied to integration. While assumptions are easy to make, it is difficult to establish a
definitive answer, as so many white opponents of busing embraced rhetoric that avoided
race completely. Despite what their language may say, the eventual voting with their feet
and increasing white flight seem to confirm that race was always a key part to the story,
regardless what the rhetoric says.
Memphis’s history of residential segregation supports the involvement of race in
the neighborhood school defense, despite what white opponents claim. Following the
Civil War, large numbers of African Americans had migrated into Memphis from the
Mississippi Delta. As they migrated in, they settled predominantly in northeast and
southeast Memphis.7 These neighborhoods remained segregated, both due to segregation
law and because fear for safety on the part of black residents. By the 1960s, black
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neighborhoods had expanded, but the line between white and black was clearer than ever.
The northern and southern fringes of the city remained black, though they had become
more distinct neighborhoods. Orange Mound, Binghampton, Hollywood, and Beale
Street were widely recognized as black parts of town, off limits to whites hoping to retain
respectability.8 Since residential patterns were enforced through a variety of measures,
schools remained firmly segregated. Therefore, the defense of neighborhood schools as
superior was essential a defense of segregated schooling.
Middle Class Domesticity
At the height of the busing crisis, Dexter and Peggy Lowery were part of a large
crowd of parents packed into Bartlett High School for an informational meeting about
busing. The Lowerys could not find anyone in the sizable audience who seemed in favor
of busing. As the plan for the Bartlett area was laid out, many parents, including the
Lowerys, became more agitated. Many of their children were to be bused from
Shadowlawn High School to Bartlett High School. Although relative to other busing
routes, the distance from Shadowlawn to Bartlett was not very significant, this setup
inspired particularly excessive ire. The parental disproval triggered the necessity of the
school board meeting with angry parents that night at Bartlett High.9
When the busing crisis exploded in 1973, Dexter and Peggy Lowery were fortyfour and forty-two, respectively. In the mid-1960s, following Dexter’s military service,
the Lowerys settled in Bartlett, a northeast suburb of Memphis. It was a relatively sleepy
suburb of around two thousand people. The area had one grocery, one auto repair shop,
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and two churches. It was very similar to the nearby Frayser and Raleigh suburbs, in that it
was a haven for working-class families reaching for middle-class stability. Most houses
in the neighborhood were two to three bedrooms with one or one-and-a-half baths, an
attainable purchase to working class families who saved their money carefully.10
The Lowerys opened a family optical dispensary. They worked long hours in the
shop. Peggy worked with Dexter, as she was “the only help we could afford.”11 They
created their own merchandise displays and cleaned their own store at the end of the day.
Their children spent many afternoons in the back of the shop as their parents worked.
Stories of “Middle-Class domestic peril” dominated American news in the early 1970s,
with accounts of families unable to maintain the suburban dream lifestyle so many
Americans fought for after World War II.12 Families like the Lowerys read and watched
the stories with rapt attention. Many parents were rattled by the fear of losing their social
status and economic position.
Nationally, the 1970s was a decade of crisis. Numerous national disasters such as
the ongoing conflict in Vietnam and the Iranian hostage crisis led Americans to feel
insecure. Families began to see themselves as “innocent victims of foreign aggression”
which was forcefully attempting to rip their hard fought distinctions of middle-class
respectability from them.13 As working-class families struggling for middle-class
respectability fought against foreign pressures, they could often see the government as a
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similar pressure, especially when their local governments began to force busing upon
them.
Busing was especially cumbersome for families reaching for the middle class,
because the location of their house determined which neighborhood schools their children
attended. Families like the Lowerys moved to Bartlett, Whitehaven, Frayser, or Raleigh
for the opportunities it provided their children for the future. But now, children were
taken out of their neighborhoods. It was “yet another failed social experiment,” according
to the Lowerys. “We did not support it, nor did most parents.”14
That evening in Bartlett, the Lowerys took note of a young black couple sitting
beside them. The couple was especially distraught. They had saved for years to buy a
house in the Shadowlawn district. Shadowlawn was one of the newest and nicest schools
in the area. For the young couple, like the Lowerys, the move was a calculated jump not
only to improve their fortunes, but also to provide better future options for their children.
And now their daughter would be bused to Bartlett. The government was yet another of
the myriad factors pressuring families, threatening to take away their hard-fought middle
class respectability.15
The Lowerys no doubt recounted that particular tale on purpose. In their memory,
resistance to busing was not about race, but about respect and government meddling. And
although it is hard to absolve white Memphians of racial prejudice, it is also difficult to
prove. Again and again, white and black Memphians lamented the loss of their
neighborhood schools. According to the Lowerys, “busing effectively destroyed
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neighborhood schools.”16 When they were bused away from their neighborhoods for
school, “parental and student involvement” suffered, causing many afterschool activities
and programs to crumble.17 Of course, black students at their schools could be the true
reason white middle-class families perceived such educational loss, but they rarely
admitted such biases anymore.
Peggy Lowery attempted to battle this apathy by spending hours on the phone
with the school board throughout the first year of busing. The Lowerys were very
concerned about two of their children’s new teachers. Their daughter’s teacher
“obviously did NOT want to be there and took her anger out on all the students. It was
not their fault she had been reassigned across town.”18 They were even more frustrated
with their other child’s teacher:
Our son’s teacher could not even tell time. The children had to tell her when it
was time for classes to change. Needless to say she could not teach the children much.
Eventually, both teachers were removed. The first back to her previous school and the
latter was moved to the library. They then had to assign her an assistant to manage the
library.19
However, despite the best efforts of parents like the Lowerys, parent and student
engagement in schools slowly dropped off due to distance. Although the Lowerys could
agree after the fact that there were “issues to be addressed along the lines of equality,”
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many parents were unwilling to accept that busing was the answer to the solution because
of the potential cost to neighborhood schools.20
Although the Lowerys had taken note of the black family who shared their
concerns about maintaining their middle class lifestyle in the suburbs, this was a largely
white concern. Leon Sanderson and his family lived in Whitehaven. He was a preaching
minister at a local Church of Christ. When busing arrived, the Sandersons chose to send
their kids to Harding Academy. For Sanderson, it was a choice of neighborhood
schooling over long-distance travel for his kids. Harding operated a satellite school in
Sanderson’s home church, Holmes Road Church of Christ. His kids could walk to school
if they so chose. However, many other white families in Whitehaven who were unable to
flee to the private system watched as their children were bused across town into largely
black neighborhoods.21
Middle-class families were upset about busing for several reasons. The first
major reason was the drain on their local neighborhood schools, often leading to their
collapse or closure. A second reason was that by being forced to send their children on
buses to less economically secure neighborhoods, families felt they were sacrificing their
middle-class privileges. The nice, new schools like Shadowlawn were privileges they had
saved their wages to reach, not to watch their children be bused into schools in poorer
areas in town that suffered from a lack of funding and school board attention.
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Ann Little was a long time resident of East Memphis. She, her husband, and their
three daughters lived on the east side of Orange Mound. The neighborhood was relatively
stable and full of older families. However, with the advent of busing, Little observed a
change in the neighborhood’s demographics. Families from disadvantaged economic
areas slowly moved towards their new schools. Little was most distraught about her
daughters having to go on a long bus ride to go to a different school in an unknown
neighborhood.22 Perhaps the racial demographics of that distant location was truly was
concerned Little about the drive the most.
Cheryl Smith, a teenager also living in East Memphis at the time had similar
complaints from the child’s perspective. Neighborhood schools were part of their
communities. There was local pride in a school. However, when children were bused
across the city, those connections were lost. Cheryl loved her neighborhood. She had
grown up there. Many families that lived in the area had children her age. Most of the
neighborhood children walked to school. However, with the advent of busing, many of
them began waking up early to catch the bus across town.23
The story in South Memphis was the same. Jesse Goode was from a “working
family.”24 He had a wife, two daughters, and a son. His neighborhood was mostly white.
Similar to the Lowerys, Goode had worked hard to achieve his family’s solid working
class lifestyle. He worked at Memphis Light Gas and Water, the local utility company.
His community was very tight-knit. Most of his neighbors went to church with him, and
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they all socialized together. With the advent of busing, two of Goode’s children remained
at their local neighborhood school. However, one of his daughters was bused fourteen
miles to Arlington, a far east suburb of Memphis. Goode admitted that he did not trust
African Americans around his children, so busing was already a challenge for him.
However, Arlington was a very white community. Like the Lowerys, it was more that he
felt his rights had been taken away by busing. One of the consequences he noted when
observing the development of his local neighborhood school where two of his children
remained was that “sporting events became less attended.”25 The disintegration of
neighborhood schools came in pieces, rather than all at once.
Charlie and Fairy Ann Owens, fellow South Memphis residents, expressed similar
concerns. They were a young family living close to the Memphis Airport. Charlie was a
gun salesman. His wife stayed at home with the two kids, a hallmark of the desired
middle class lifestyle. However, busing was not a welcome occurrence for the Owens
family. The last thing they wanted was for their children to have “to leave their element
to go somewhere where they weren’t used to.”26 They had chosen the setting for their
children, and they did not think the government should have a say in the matter.
White working class families also fled to the north of Memphis, to the popular
suburbs of Raleigh and Frayser, which would supply so many students to Harding
Academy. Marcia Moore had just recently moved to Memphis from the Mississippi
Delta. Moore worked at Mid America Seminary. She no doubt chose Frayser thinking the
area would remain stable for a long time. What she witnessed instead was a
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neighborhood that went through rapid turnover, with a spiking crime rate and crash in
economic valuation. Like many of her contemporaries, Moore pointed to the damage
done to neighborhood schools. Neighborhood schools “build up community,” but without
the schools, communities could collapse, just as Frayser had.27 In reality, weakening
communities had numerous causes beyond busing, including federal funding for housing
and businesses and the growth of the interstate system.
In nearby Raleigh, Donna Baucum was a teenager. She was one of five children in
her family. Their neighborhood was very white and located “far from black
neighborhoods.”28 Her suburb featured large houses on spacious lots. Baucum’s house
had a lake in the back. She attended Raleigh-Egypt High School, at the time a “new,
modern school.”29 Baucum and her immediate neighbors were spared busing, but, they
witnessed many of their friends from across town go on rides of twenty or more minutes
into black neighborhoods for school. Baucum pointed to the greatness of neighborhoods
schools that she was able to attend and the shortcomings of those who were bused.
Children “should go to neighborhood schools and not be forced to go farther away with
kids they don’t know.”30
Throughout these white, mostly suburban perspectives, a few traits are very clear.
Most of these families fought hard for their middle-class status, including the school their
children were privileged to attend. To them, busing seemed like government overreach,
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snatching away their status. Many would turn to local government for an answer. At
minimum, they all decried the loss of their neighborhood schools. Not only did they rob
their children of the precise education they had chosen for them, but also it adversely
affected their neighborhoods. Without a common school gluing the neighborhood
together, many of them argued, their communities collapsed economically and descended
into crime. Finally, it’s hard to ignore that this is a mostly-white perspective, suggesting
that this defense of busing could very easily be masking racial concerns on behalf of
suburban white families.
Neighborhood Pride and Uplift
While some white families like the Lowerys sought to protect their middle class
domesticity, other black Memphians like Rose Johnson viewed the neighborhood schools
issue from a different perspective. She was especially concerned about the cultural unity
in her black neighborhood. She was a twelve-year-old girl, living with her parents in a
black neighborhood in South Memphis called Gas Lights Square. Her parents pushed her
to always do her best work. Much of their encouragement came from their strong
embrace of Christianity. They “attended church and bible studies religiously.”31 In fact,
her father traveled the country singing with a gospel quartet that often accompanied
Christian authors.
Johnson attended her neighborhood school of Hamilton Middle School
throughout the busing crisis. From her perspective, Hamilton was an “outstanding
school,” and she was heavily involved in the school’s athletics and academics.32 Parents,
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grandparents, and neighbors from Gas Lights Square attended events at the school,
supporting the neighborhood kids. The neighborhood school model was working just as
well in the black community at Hamilton as many whites in Bartlett hoped for
Shadowlawn. The neighborhood seemed to have a shared set of ideals, and neighbors
worked together on community upkeep. The school united the neighborhood, and the
community benefitted because of it.
However, just as the Lowerys noted the downsides and decline of neighborhood
schools associated with busing, many in the black community such as Rose Johnson felt
the same way. Children were being taken “from their neighborhoods to schools that they
weren’t particularly welcomed in.”33 Most African American schools in Memphis were
disadvantaged, but many black Memphians still fought for their neighborhood schools.
The community could lose too much through the loss of their schools. Although many
Memphians found it hard to quantify, they lamented the loss of these schools, or tried to
find a way that equality could be achieved without busing.
Poverty was a very definitive problem causing distress to many in Memphis.
Louis Hayes was a black woman living in poverty in South Memphis. Although her
family was poor, they “managed.”34 Hayes worked long hours cleaning white family’s
homes. She observed the struggles for her family because of poverty. When busing
arrived, she strongly supported it. Despite the damage that could happen to neighborhood
schools, she knew that a strong education was vital to her family breaking the cycle of
poverty. And in her experience, that level of education was not in their community.
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Hayes’s community in South Memphis was not the only area in town that had
been struggling with poverty. Of course, this was a symptom of the systemic racism
throughout the city. The case in Memphis was dire. Memphis was home to the “largest
single pocket of poverty in Tennessee” at twenty-seven and a half percent.35 Many linked
the poverty in Memphis’s downtrodden communities with a lack of or poor quality of
education.36 When quizzed about poor performance in black schools, Plan Z architect
O.Z. Stephens argued strongly that it was “not a function of race.”37 He went on to
explain that it was “primarily a function of black students’ traditionally low
socioeconomic level.”38 Stephens knew what everyone in the black community was
already aware of: black schools were struggling because they were underfunded. Then,
poor education kept many African Americans from achieving economic stability. This
further weakened neighborhoods and schools, looping the cycle right back to the
beginning.
It was these very problems of cyclical poverty due to systemic racism that many
Black Power organizations sought to combat. Revivals of black neighborhood schools in
black communities were encouraging signs of progress. Many in these communities
defended their schools because they were finally becoming a source of pride through the
hard work of activists, often in spite of intransigence from the school board. And so, even
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though their reasons were often different than those in white neighborhoods, many in the
black community defended neighborhood schools with pride.
Although racial reasons certainly could have undergirded these defenses of
neighborhoods schools and community, it is noteworthy that to some degree, both sides
defended their neighborhoods against disruption via busing. Barry Lomax was a teenager
in Whitehaven during busing. Although Whitehaven was an overwhelmingly white
suburb, supplying many white flight pupils to private Christian academies, Lomax was
black and lived with his mother. Lomax’s father had died earlier in a car crash. His
family lived in the smallest house on the street. He often felt out of place, saying it
seemed as though he “was being chased by the white man.”39
Lomax continued to feel out of place at school. He attended Whitehaven High
School, where he was still in a significant minority. When busing was announced, he was
initially excited for his school to begin to have more racial balance. However, he got
anxious when he began to consider all of the potential problems that could occur from
black and white teenagers being in such close proximity in a high-stress environment.
Lomax noted the potential benefit of a better education for many African Americans, but
worried that exposure to “verbal abuse” and white “hatred” would be detrimental.40
Lomax’s concerns seem to echo a general anxiety over neighborhood integration.
There was a growing sense of pride and comfort in most black neighborhoods. Many
black families found themselves stuck. They wanted the opportunity for a better
education for their children, but they did not want to lose the sense of community that
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had flourished in areas such as Orange Mound.41 Although Memphians across racial
lines clearly loved their neighborhood schools, arguments against busing but supporting
neighborhood schools were not always simply about protecting the neighborhood. One
large group was concerned about middle class domesticity, while a second group worried
about the community’s health and unity.
Fear and Safety
A third reason Memphians fought for neighborhood schools was out of fear.
People from different parts of the city would point out different things to be afraid of in
busing. Some feared the safety of the bus rides, others were nervous about the distance
from a parent’s watchful eye, while others still were nervous about the neighborhood of
their child’s new school because of their biased perceptions. Memphians feared for the
safety of their children, although white and black families tended to be concerned about
different things. These fears were often couched in the language of protecting
neighborhood schools, or more specifically, keeping children closer to parents, although
they could often be hiding racial motivations.
For many white parents, the root of the problem was a parental distrust of their
children’s decisions, paired with continued elements of fear and racism. The 1970s
created what Philip Jenkins has called a “Climate of Fear.” It led many parents to become
overly concerned with the safety of their children, due to upticks in serial killers,
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kidnappings, racial violence, and foreign conflicts.42 These crises were all part of “a
series of public panics over children’s well-being” that “intensified parental anxieties.”43
Parents worried about the now more public fears of “teen pregnancy, stranger abduction,
child abuse, illicit drugs, juvenile crime, and flagging academic performance.”44
Although these things had always been present in American society, following the
cultural upheaval of the 1960s they were much more prominent and widespread. For
example, statistics revealed that the 1970s witnessed a steep rise in the “use of drugs in
secondary school and a sharp drop in the age at which adolescents became sexually
active.”45 Additionally, family demographics changed significantly in the 1970s, with a
significant rise “in the divorce rate, single-parent households, and working mothers.”46
For many white Memphians, the root cause of all the danger was a deteriorating society,
rotting from the inside due to “moral decay,” the solution to which was “stability.”47
Parents sought to combat these threats by keeping their children closer, which busing
contradicted.
Busing was an overwhelmingly white concern largely because white fear was so
tied up in a fear of black students. However, a major source of fear for both white and
black Memphians was that their children would travel a great distance from home. One of
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the local newspapers, the Commercial Appeal, noted a general fear from parents at the
thought of kids travelling “forty-five minutes one way a day.”48 Charlotte Boggs shared
these concerns. Boggs and her husband lived in East Memphis in the majority white
Colonial Acres neighborhood. Her husband worked full time while also attending school.
They had three young daughters, all under the age of six.49
Boggs had grown up in Memphis, attending white Central High School. She loved
her childhood neighborhood and felt a sense of security there. Neighbors talked to each
other over their fences and kids played outside with friends from around the
neighborhood. She still sensed these attitudes early in her time as a parent, remembering
a “wonderful neighbor named Mamma Den” who would take care of neighborhood kids
“like they belonged to her.”50 But the advent of busing slowly weakened these
neighborhood structures. With people constantly traveling rather than staying put in their
own neighborhoods, levels of trust with neighbors decreased. Instead of being known
entities, communities because unknown dangers.
In addition to weakening the schools where kids were being taken from, busing
also weakened the schools where kids were transported. Boggs supported integration,
stressing the importance of equal opportunity regardless of background. Boggs herself
had experienced a very poor, though very happy, lifestyle as a child. But busing to
achieve equality wreaked havoc on after school activities for parents and students.
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Students who were bused often missed out on sports and other extracurricular activities
so that they wouldn’t miss the bus. When communities tried to plan neighborhood
functions, it was almost impossible to plan it at a time when all families could be there
because of bus schedules. Finally, Boggs lamented the loss of high attendance at PTA
meetings. For many lower income families, “it was miserable to try and get parents to
PTA meetings and activities because they didn’t have transportation.”51 A lack of
parental involvement in schools created numerous other problems involving both
academic performance and administration accountability.
Boggs strongly supported racial equality, but she witnessed mixed results from
busing. Two of Boggs’s three daughters were bused. Her oldest daughter, Lauren, was
bused from Colonial Elementary to Hanley Elementary, on the northern edge of Orange
Mound. Lauren was one of three white children in the class. It was an uncomfortable
environment, but Boggs did not recall any significant troubles. Three years later Boggs’s
youngest, Samantha, was bused in the same situation. After three years of busing, white
flight, and parent disengagement, the situation was much worse. Samantha received “no
education that year. NONE.”52 Her daughter was so miserable she would miss the bus on
purpose. It was not a function of black teachers and peers, but merely the losses suffered
by the school system. Meanwhile, her second daughter, Ashley, was in the optional
program at Willow Oaks, “where she thrived with a black teacher and a black
principal.”53 As the example of Boggs’s family exemplifies, even families who supported
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the goals of busing lamented the decline of the long-term health of the schools and
communities involved.
Nancy Robinson led a similar life to Boggs. She was also a leading a young
family with her salesman husband, living in East Memphis. She lived in a neighborhood
close to Memphis State University. It was a young part of town, with mostly young
couples with small children. Robinson had one daughter. She was to be bused across
town. Robinson was especially worried about the distance involved in busing. Many
children were late to classes or missed others due to the length of the trip, or unavoidable
problems like traffic or car accidents. And what if her child missed the bus or was taken
to the wrong location? It was not a risk Robinson was willing to take. She, like many
other white families in Memphis who could afford it, sent her daughter to a nearby
private school to avoid putting her on a bus.54
Concerns about the distance and time involved in the process of busing were not
limited to white parents. Black parents were also concerned. Reverend Walter Peggs was
a new minister in South Memphis during busing and led a small family. He had recently
returned home from military service where he’d fractured several bones in his arm.
During his travels with the military, Peggs had been able to experience the world. His
views of other cultures certainly made his return to the United States and segregated
Memphis jarring. He observed that things were beginning to improve slowly. For
example, he was accepted within the military. However, when Peggs returned to
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Memphis following the war to go to school, he arrived just in time to experience
busing.55
Peggs certainly recognized the benefit of integrated schooling. His military
service created a comfort level with race that few in Memphis could understand. Yet,
despite his experiences personally and what he observed in his travels, he did not support
busing. Sending his children so far from him concerned him greatly. There was no
support system “if kids got lost.”56 Within the “Climate of Fear” pervading the United
States in the 1970s, how could Peggs trust that beneficent strangers would take care of
kids who were lost of confused?
Peggs was no stranger to intimidating circumstances. In the 1960s he had
participated in sit-ins, walk-ins, and boycotts for desegregation. He was not afraid of
marching into white Memphis, or even sending his kids there. But he was concerned
about them going to a part of town where he knew little to nobody. He was concerned
about what could happen if he was not there to look after them. Busing high school
students worried parents enough, but sometimes it was first graders being bused fortyfive minutes across town. The distance children traveled from their home weighed
heavily on their parents, especially if their children were becoming the racial minority at
their new school.57
Marie Davis was a young mother living in South Memphis. She had a loving,
Christian family, and she and her husband had recently taken the dive into
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homeownership. Davis was a third grade teacher in the Memphis City School system.
She was teaching at Sherwood High School, a mostly white school that was in the
process of being desegregated prior to busing, although only at a token level. During
busing, Sherwood was paired with majority black Hamilton High School. Busing was a
positive experience for Davis in that she recognized the benefits, specifically for the
black community.58
However, Davis noted several negative consequences of busing. Specifically,
Davis focused on the loss of the neighborhood schools. Because so many black children
specifically were being bused out of their neighborhoods, parents could not communicate
with teachers. Key for any student’s success is a parent maintaining accountability with
the student and the school, and busing times rendered that near impossible. For black and
white families alike, the mechanics of busing brought on added struggles. The length of
the trips made them late to classes, wasted valuable schoolwork time, weakened schools
and communities on both ends of the busing route, and divorced parents from the school
system. Then, of course, there was the overwhelming trepidation most parents met when
confronted with sending their child across town.
Many parents and their children had been raised with certain assumptions about
the other race and had a racial etiquette embedded on their minds from early childhood.59
Even though the civil rights movement in the 1960s had changed this for some, many still
had legacies of this training on their mind. This led to certain assumptions on the part of
white parents, as well as the mistreatment of some black students. It did not help matters
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that the black, urban neighborhoods suffered from a disproportionate amount of poverty
and crime. These assumptions, often revealed through their words to McRae and in
newspapers, help shed light on the true reasons many white parents resisted busing, and it
boiled down to race.
One parent whose daughter taught in the school system warned Judge McRae that
“you would cringe at the language some older black boys use toward young white
girls.”60 Other parents were more concerned about violence, such as “a razor cutting” at
South Side and a young white girl who allegedly “was put in a hospital because she
turned down a date with a black boy.”61 Another anonymous author, who was worried
following the violence at Trezevant, declared, “I can say that we will not be back at
school until the black students are removed.”62 Unfortunately, few parents were as
straightforward in their complaints against busing, making their references to the dangers
of new schools ambiguous with relation to race.
Trish Galloway was a white teenager living in Eads, a mostly white, rural suburb
east of Memphis. She had grown up in a close family. They raised animals together and
attended the local Baptist church. She was not particularly close to her neighbors,
however, due in part to the rural setting, where the next farm was a significant walk
away. In her spare time, she babysat for members of the country club to make a little
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money for herself. Most of her time was spent in school at Collierville High School, a
majority white school servicing far east and southeast suburbs.63
With the advent of busing, Galloway’s circumstances changed significantly.
Although Collierville High had already begun desegregating, it was a token integration at
best, nothing in comparison to the scale busing was about to unleash. Galloway observed
danger all around her at the suddenly much more diverse Collierville High. One day a
knife was pulled on another white girl by a black boy, one of the many black students
bused in by Plan Z. Galloway, along with many others, noted misbehavior among black
students bused to white schools. In many cases, this was probably a biased perspective,
but to many white parents it confirmed their fears. Their neighborhoods were no longer
safe, and the places their children were sent were not safe.64
Across town in North Memphis, Wanda Faye Adkins held similar fears. At the
start of the 1970s, life was going just the way she wanted it to go. Her husband was home
from military service. They had a steady paycheck and a “slower and calmer life.”65
Adkins worked as a secretary, and like many others interviewed about busing, Adkins
remembered the time before busing as a time kids could play freely in the streets, in stark
contrast to a time afterwards. But when busing arrived, everything changed for Adkins.
Prior to moving to Memphis, Adkins had grown up in Kansas. Growing up, she
had seen very few nonwhite people. When she moved to Memphis, the diversity that
greeted her was a bit overwhelming. Similar to the fears of many parents, she had just
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ventured into a great unknown and was unsure of how to react. At the time of Plan Z,
Adkins had a young son named Jimmy. He was an undersized kid for his age. Adkins was
especially worried for his safety. Would he be okay on the bus ride? Would he be
exposed to any danger or drugs he would not encounter otherwise? Or what if he “heard
things” he shouldn’t hear?66 Like many other white parents, Adkins viewed busing as
unsafe, ultimately sending her children to private schools. The “Climate of Fear” fed this
anxiety. The bus ride itself was dangerous, as it removed children from their parents’
watchful gaze. Then, dangerous communities (of African Americans) could expose their
children to drugs, language, and violence. Busing would further destroy their
neighborhoods by weakening their sense of community. Finally, busing erected barriers
to parental involvement in the children’s education, making it exceedingly difficult for
PTAs to have any significant impact.
While the white community seemed to react the most to busing within a “Climate
of Fear” framework, segments of the black community did, as well. Two black
communities in particular came very close to forming CAB chapters to protest the loss of
their neighborhood schools.67 But once again, it is difficult to characterize the entire
population – the opinions were quite varied. While some people were concerned about
overall community health, others were more narrow in their focus. One member of the
black community wrote to McRae to complain specifically about black athletes being
targeted for busing to improve athletics at white schools and drain black schools of
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talent.68 Despite these examples to the contrary, most in the black community supported
busing because it would improve their children’s educations, a need not felt by most
white parents. If black parents feared the travel or the danger of a new school for their
child, it was overridden by the benefits of a top-flight education at an institution such as
East High School. Many white parents had nothing against improving education for black
students, as long as it did not affect their children. Mrs. Fred Allenbaugh asked, “surely
there is a more sane way of achieving racial balance that will appease our black
community?”69
One of the biggest fears of black parents was the danger that faced their children
through busing. Would the children be verbally or physically abused? Would they have to
face any sort of intimidation? Would teachers treat them as equals and enforce discipline
to protect them? Removing children from their community was a big enough challenge.
But how would their students cope with discrimination they feared they would face? Was
the risk of potential danger worth the possible benefits that could be reaped from a
stronger education?
Deborah Westbrook was a black teenager living with her large family in North
Memphis. It was a loving family. Westbrook was the quiet one, often hiding behind her
protective brothers. Life had been relatively nice for Westbrook. Her family lived in a
new house in a recent residential development. Although her family did not make a lot of
money, they had a house, had friendly neighbors, and had close relationships with each
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other. Because of their great relationships with neighbors, their community felt very safe,
with little noticeable crime.70
Westbrook had always loved school. She especially enjoyed Physical Education.
She had worked her way through the Memphis City School system with great success.
She enjoyed elementary school at mostly black Caldwell Elementary. Then, after a
disappointing stint at Manassas Middle, she transferred to Cyprus Middle, which was
much more to her liking. By the time busing arrived, she was attending Northside High
School. Throughout her education, she was always within a few blocks of her school and
attended majority black institutions. She was a hard-working student, her mother was a
“stickler” for education, even though she didn’t graduate herself.71 Westbrook
remembered that despite the distractions of high school, more students seemed to be
enjoying school and were more involved on campus prior to the start of Plan Z.
When busing arrived, Westbrook was not directly affected. She was not ordered
to be bused, as she attended one of the several all-black schools that were unaffected by
Plan Z. However, Westbrook did not support busing. Like many other African
Americans, she valued the potential education, but was concerned by the costs. Watching
her friends leave their neighborhoods distressed her. Additionally, she observed that
many white teachers held black students to a lower standard, limiting the benefits of the
improved education. She also noted a decrease in respect for black Memphians as busing
continued. Perhaps this was due to the fearful hysteria reigning in white Memphis at the
time. Finally, she was especially concerned about her friends’ safety. She was worried
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they would face physical violence and intimidation, including people who might “brick
the bus.”72 Westbrook worried that her friends who left their neighborhoods might not
come back.
Westbrook’s opposition to busing was especially notable not just because she was
a black teenager who could benefit from busing, but also because she was no stranger to
protest. Westbrook vividly remembered participating in Black Mondays, the NAACP-led
campaign to improve school conditions for black students. Skipping school on Mondays
was deemed acceptable to the school-loving Westbrook, but traveling out of her
neighborhood to a white school was not. The dangers were too high. Westbrook linked
busing with a decline in area communities. Looking back, Westbrook had difficulty
drawing any positives out of school busing in Memphis.
Yvonne Luster lived in Whitehaven, the mostly white southern suburb. Luster’s
neighborhood was a community in transition, with white families moving out, and black
families like Yvonne’s moving in. Although moving into a more upscale neighborhood
was very good for Luster’s family as they moved into the lower middle class, it certainly
had drawbacks. The police heavily patrolled and brutally enforced the law, often unjustly
arresting or detaining neighbors from Luster’s community of mostly college graduates.73
During busing, Luster was working as a teacher at Lincoln Junior High School,
teaching seventh and eighth grade English. Within her classroom, she observed
prejudices based upon race. Luster was especially worried about the dangers of busing for
children like her students. As a teacher in the school system, Luster frequently heard
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frustrating stories of the danger for black students during busing. Some white students
“would have knives and stab people then throw it under the seat so no one would claim
it.”74 Of course, when administrators stepped in black students were always blamed.
Black students also suffered from other discriminatory practices and violence.
Despite her opposition to busing and the dangers black students felt, Luster did
not use her position within the school system to advocate for any change. Luster
maintained her silence because “I was scared for my life.”75 She worried that it would be
more detrimental to the system if she raised her voice. Resistance towards busing was so
strong within the white community that many black Memphians were intimidated. Or, at
the very least, many were nervous about letting their children be the ones to take the
brunt of the violence, especially people like Luster who were already concerned about
possible violence directed at them.
Shirley Fields-Smith was also living in South Memphis during busing, although
she lived in a predominantly black neighborhood. It was not low income, but it wasn’t a
white neighborhood. Life for Fields-Smith in the 1970s was “rough,” and she
experienced prejudice on a daily basis.76 Black Memphians “had to go through a lot of
things” that white Memphians did not.77 When busing began, Fields-Smith had just
graduated high school and was employed at her first job at a McDonalds, working eight
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hours a day at a rate of $1.25 per hour. Despite the racial challenges of Memphis, she was
happy with her job and her life.
Fields-Smith observed the terror at Southside High School, a majority white
school that was to be bused across town to the mostly black Booker T. Washington High
School. Even though busing would hypothetically improve education for black
Memphians, Fields-Smith was uncertain if she wanted to support it. As she watched
busing enrage white families in her part of town, she grew nervous for the safety of her
friends and family. In a perfect world her family should receive the same level of
education as its white neighbors, but the risk of riots and unfair teachers gave many like
Fields-Smith pause. Fields-Smith reluctantly decided to support busing. However, in
retrospect she felt that busing offered very few advantages to African Americans. Yes,
some black children now received a better education. But, Fields-Smith felt it drove
racial animosity underground rather than eliminating it. Dealing with racial equality in
the aftermath of busing became more challenging, because whites had become so adept at
hiding their true feelings through the experience of busing.78
Dr. Warner Dickerson provides one final, though more extreme, example of fears
of busing from within the black community. In 1973, Dickerson was thirty-six years old.
He was a sharecropper’s son. His father could not read or write, so Dickerson was
motivated to get a superior education. Most of his education was in county schools close
to where his father was a sharecropper. However, for high school he attended the
Memphis City Schools. Through hard work and perseverance, he graduated college as
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well as earning a Masters degree in Mathematics. With his initial education completed,
he began teaching at Carver High School in Memphis.79
When Dickerson and his family came to Memphis, they moved into the Parkway
Village neighborhood. It was almost exclusively white and would feed a significant
number of students into Harding Academy during busing. Purchasing a house in a
predominantly white neighborhood was never easy for African Americans, but it was
even more challenging for Dickerson. He was heavily involved with the Memphis branch
of the NAACP. At different times throughout his life, he held positions on the Executive
Committee, Education Chair, Vice President, and Branch President. Needless to say, few
white Memphians wanted him living in their neighborhood.80
Dickerson taught at mostly black Carver High School during the 1968 Sanitation
Workers’ Strike, when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis. Far
from simply a math teacher, Dickerson worked to motivate his young students to ignore
the barriers society tried to place on them as black Americans. Encouraging students not
to dwell on their second hand textbooks, Dickerson could remind them as he often did,
“don’t complain about what you don’t have – make do with what you do have.”81 His
students became heavily involved in the Sanitation Strike through Black Power groups.
Dickerson marched both with his students and with Dr. King when he joined the strikers
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downtown. Throughout his involvement in the civil rights movement he was stalked,
persecuted, and received several death threats.82
Dickerson knew the dangers of busing more than most other black Memphians.
Time and again, he had proven he was not afraid to challenge it. However, his knowledge
of the dangers that could await children certainly affected his opinion on the matter. On
the other hand, he was heavily involved in the local NAACP and Black Mondays
protests. He knew schooling for black children needed to be improved, regardless of cost.
In the end, like so many other black Memphians, Dickerson decided to support busing.
Despite his support, he remained aware of the “horror” that many black children
experienced throughout the process.83 He knew the harm busing could cause children,
physically and emotionally as he battled some of the same demons himself. His daughter
received a death threat over the phone, while he and his family had to move because of
stalking. Additionally, he recognized the inconveniences it created for parents who
became less involved. But the “positives outweigh the negatives,” even if the total count
was exceedingly close.84
Just like white parents, many black parents like Dickerson felt extreme anxiety for
their children during busing. However, black families faced more concrete threats to the
safety of their children, who were often essentially desegregating schools. There was a
tremendous emotional and physical cost to the task, and the 1970s “Climate of Fear” and
sudden rise of protectiveness of children made those costs seem even more severe.
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Fear, often expressed in geographic terms to protect their communities, was the
most common form of dissent to busing for both black and white Memphians. And
although their language focused upon securing their neighborhoods, it was often much
more about keeping races segregated.85 White parents especially spoke about protecting
the academic quality of their schools, but when the busing experiment occasionally went
well, these same parents had trouble accepting that their schools had actually improved.
In truth, many of these parents were defining academic quality by racial demographics.
The pairing of Lester High School and East High School exemplifies this reality.
Shortly before the beginning of Plan A, the school board announced that
predominantly black Lester High School would be paired with predominantly white East
High School. East was one of the banner schools of the white community. The thought of
it being filled with fifty percent black students from Lester High School horrified many
whites. Logistically, it was a smart move. Lester was mere blocks from the East campus.
Many parents, such as Mildred Byrd, expressed their dismay, lamenting, “I hated to see
East paired with Lester. I’m older and I’m never going to change my attitudes….I’m not
happy…but I don’t have any other choice”86
To the surprise of many Memphians, the Lester-East pairing actually went
relatively well. One local newspaper heaped the accolades for the success on the two
white principals of the schools. At first, parents were “tense,” but after visiting the
schools “to look around,” they calmed down.87 In fact, after observation one parent told
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the paper “we’re going to have the best school in town.”88 Charles Garrett, one of the two
principals, was very clear about where the success came from. Garrett, who was the
Lester principal, pointed to a newly formed parent sub council as a major component of
why the experiment went so well. Positive parental involvement led to students accepting
the situation and embracing it rather than rebelling. Despite the positive situation
developing at Lester and East, parents such as Mildred Byrd still refused to admit that
busing was positive, even when faced with a clear success story.
But why did Lester-East go so well, when most other busing situations across the
city generally were viewed so poorly? There are several aspects of the Lester-East
example that were not common across the city and probably aided in its success. First,
Lester and East were geographically among the closest schools bused. While many kids
rode on forty-five minute bus rides, it was possible to stand between East and Lester and
still be able to see both. And so, although there was integration, the neighborhood school
ideal was not disrupted. Children were still going to school in their own community.
They could all still walk to school. Many of the parents who worried about letting their
children out of sight were not as concerned. For both black and white parents, being so
geographically close to the schools brought peace, allowing many to support the move.
Similarly, community involvement in the schools remained high, unlike at so many
others. The parent sub council, credited with such a large role in the experiment’s
success, would not have been possible at the vast majority of the busing routes in the city.
The distance was too great.
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Finally, the Lester-East example soothed white parents’ fears by placing a white
principal at each school. Many white parents were nervous about their children entering a
black school. Many were no doubt especially concerned about the black adults running
such a school. It cannot be ignored that in one of the few success stories, both schools
employed a white principal. This no doubt served as a security blanket for many white
parents. They felt that Lester might not be so dangerous, after all, if Mr. Garrett was the
principal. And so, although the Lester-East example brought about successful integration,
it did so because of several unique factors. Keeping the students within one community
was a boon for the neighborhood, parent involvement, and student buy-in. However,
some of these unique factors limited its long-term impact. For example, the remaining
white dominance in positions of authority may have comforted many white parents, but it
was a significant limitation to true equality.
The destruction of neighborhood schools was a significant factor contributing to
the failure of busing. More significant integration, though unpleasant to many white
families, could be achieved successfully if kept within the neighborhood school system,
as in Lester-East. However, not every school had a suitable partner school. Instead, black
and white parents were left to decry children leaving their community and panic loudly
about the possible dangers that awaited their children. These dangers were magnified by a
nation-wide panic known as the “Climate of Fear.” These fears played a significant role
in the perpetuation of struggles of Memphis’s school system. The fallout from busing
would extend long beyond the initial stresses of the announcement. As communities lost
their cohesion with the disappearance of neighborhood schools, whites fled the system,
and public schooling in Memphis changed forever.
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The fears of children’s safety and the loss of neighborhood community began the
moment busing was announced. Regardless of race, Memphians were concerned about
the organization and dangers of busing. Many questioned whether such a plan could
actually succeed. However, fear for their children and communities took precedent over
everything else. Was there not a better way to achieve this goal without endangering
those two? But what did that fear mean? Were their words literally true, or were they
really masking racial bias. When coupled with the other language and conclusions
observed in conclusion with busing, it is hard to avoid the belief that race was thoroughly
wrapped up in all elements of anti-busing organization. But despite how much race was
involved in their disproval of busing, all parents seemed to agree that it was not safe to
make children the foot soldiers for social change. After the announcement of busing, one
of the three white planners was interviewed. In a statement that would probably be
happily echoed by all the nervous parents in Memphis, he said, “I guess I just happen to
think that whatever the sins of a past generation, those sins should not be visited on boys
and girls of the present generation.”89
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Conclusion
Busing – Success or Failure?
Donna Russell was a married white woman in her thirties. She and her husband
were relatively new to the Memphis area. She had previously lived in Berkeley,
California, and Detroit. Her first impression of Memphis was that it was “a very pleasant
place to live in the 1970s.”1 Russell’s impressions of Memphis are all the more important
because of her previous stops. Berkeley, the liberal outpost of the United States, and
Detroit, the northern city that shared so many similarities with Memphis, gave Russell a
special lens into viewing Memphis. She had witnessed an extremely progressive
landscape. She had also seen a diverse city with racial problems. Detroit in the late 1960s
and early 1970s was already struggling with the poverty and crime that would come to
define it during the late twentieth century.2 But, Memphis was pleasant. Or so she
initially thought.
Russell drove downtown everyday from her suburban home in Germantown to
work at the U.S. Federal District Court. She was court clerk. From her front row seat, she
watched McRae announce Plans A and Z and rapidly become the most hated man in
Memphis. She was there as hate mail poured into the District Court for years. Amongst
all the hate mail, McRae even received several death threats. Although initially thinking
of Memphis as a happy and carefree locale, busing shattered the misleading, glittering
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facade. Russell later observed, “Apparently, underneath all the superficial politeness
existed a racially-segregated city.”3
Memphis had never been the shimmering example of racial harmony Russell
initially perceived. However, busing unusually strained race relations in Memphis.
Similar to Boston or Oakland, other cities where busing has been studied, race and class
played significant roles in the tensions that arose. However, in Memphis, the Deep South
personality of the city created a distinctive environment. In addition to those traditional
pressures, Memphis added the struggles of Evangelical religious identity, Southern
“New” Conservatism, tensions between Black Power activists and older NAACP
supporters, and neighborhood schooling. The result was a city whose placid exterior
erupted into layers of conflict along racial, class, religious, and geographic lines. The
conflict is especially important because it had a profound impact upon Memphis, shaping
an important dialogue about racism in modern Southern cities such as Memphis.
In the early 1980s, Plan Z was stripped down to a far-less significant busing plan,
though the damage had already been done. In 1992, the Northpoint case that started it all
decades previously was “placed on inactive status.”4 Seven years later in 1999 the case
was formally discharged.5 Although busing had begun with the biggest of bangs, it
departed gradually, almost a whimper without notice. In 2006, the United States Supreme
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Court struck down school busing plans as unconstitutional, essentially undoing the Swann
case that had forced McRae into action over thirty years earlier.6
In his retirement, Judge McRae worked long hours at the University of Memphis
library, compiling papers on the busing saga.7 When McRae died in 2004 at the age of
eighty-two, he was still defending his actions as federal judge. He argued, “Yes it
worked….people are going to debate that because they disagree on what the purpose was,
but yes, it worked. The plan was to get rid of a biracial school system. It did. It wasn’t
part of the plan to run the whites off. They just left.”8 McRae’s answer was both right and
wrong. The school system looked very different than it did in 1970, but it was still
disturbingly close to a biracial school system.
However, despite the remnants of a segregated school system and the chaos that
stemmed from busing, there were still significant positives that came out of busing.
Interaction with other races, often avoided in Memphis, was forced. This led to a more
realistic and fact-based understanding about each other. Mrs. Susan Fox, a white teacher
who suddenly found herself teaching a good number of black students as opposed to her
original all-white classes, “realized that most of the things I heard about Negroes were
false.”9 In other forced interactions, Mr. Theodore Johnson, principal at one of the newly
integrated schools, described a world where students came together from different racial
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and socio-economic backgrounds without having “to do any apologizing for who they are
or what they are.”10 Mrs. C. C. Cowart, a white mother nervous about Plan Z, found out
that it worked better than she anticipated. Her child’s school turned out to be roughly
even demographically, and most of the protesting students who deserted to Citizens
Against Busing schools returned soon.11
As beneficial as these forced interactions could be, voluntary interactions could be
even more beneficial. For example, in North Memphis a biracial group of parents from
different backgrounds began meeting “to discuss methods of preventing racial crisis and
to initiate a task force.”12 These types of interactions would have been exceedingly rare,
but because of Plans A and Z, parents felt it was necessary to reach out for the safety of
their children. So in some ways, McRae was correct. Busing was a success; it allowed for
greater interaction and discussion among black and white Memphians. However, not
every Memphian chose to use those interactions productively. Unfortunately, the majority
of such interactions seemed to be negative.
The busing experiment in Memphis found societal tensions that in some cases had
been hiding below the surface and dragged them out for all the world to see. Within the
black community, it magnified a split in leadership over tactics. Equality was a unifying
goal among all types of activists. However, how to achieve and maintain equality was a
significant sticking point. Younger activists tended to support Black Power ideals. In the
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context of busing, this meant improving black schools and communities rather than
integrating into white schools where black kids would be treated as inferior second-class
citizens. Meanwhile, older and more middle-class activists supported integration as the
only true route to educational equality. Although the black community largely supported
the Memphis NAACP through the busing saga, it was not without severe anxiety and
trepidation. The cost-benefit analysis convinced many that the potential for a significantly
greater education was worth the associated risks.
Among white Memphians, busing helped complete the arrival of New
Conservatism. Across the country, whites had been looking for new ways to handle the
governmental excesses of the 1960s. Within the South, many were focused especially on
how to limit, roll back, or dispel integration. New Conservatism gave them their answer.
Rather than forcing integration, busing accelerated white flight in Memphis. Parents
claiming a need for smaller, local government that would not intrude on their private
affairs left the school system for private academies and fled city limits for increasingly
further suburbs. Although busing did not trigger these trends, it accelerated them and
lifted them into the mainstream. Busing gave an acceptable, non-racial language to white
Memphians hoping to fight integration.
The private religious schools that emerged from busing played a specific role in
the chaos, as well. Even for families that didn’t embrace the defenses of New
Conservatism, private Christian academies such as Harding Academy or Briarcrest
Christian provided another opportunity for white parents. It allowed them to defend their
removal from the integrated school system with the word of a higher power – God.
Christian academies sold the idea that society was decaying into sin. The best solution,
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they told parents, was to isolate themselves by leaving the public sphere. Although none
overtly claimed that the sin was spawned by racial integration, the correlation between
neighborhoods, numbers, and demographics of Christian school enrollment in the 1970s
is fairly clear, even as these private schools stressed the abolition of prayer in public
schools or the importance of Christian training throughout their school age curriculum.
Finally, parents of all races in Memphis lamented the loss of neighborhood
schooling. Although some white families were no doubt using neighborhood schooling as
a coded excuse to prevent integration, it also held significant consequences for Memphis.
As parents feared for the safety of their children in foreign environments, far from their
watchful eyes, communities slowly lost cohesion. Traits such as neighborhood unity or
trusting your neighbors slowly began to erode, replaced instead by insular households.
Further, schools suffered from a lack of parent involvement due to distance.
If McRae was correct in asserting that busing was a success by his definition, it
certainly left a destructive wake in its path. Ultimately, busing can be assessed in several
ways: judicial, social, communal, and educational. McRae’s view was judicial. Busing
achieved the requirements of the law as defined by the Swann verdict. McRae refused to
act in Memphis busing until he was forced to do so by the Supreme Court’s decision, so
McRae’s interpretation had always been rather narrow. By his definition, it was a
success. However, in the long run, the judicial perspective on busing is more complex.
Because the Supreme Court struck down the necessity of busing in 2006, admittedly after
McRae’s death, Memphis busing was not a long-term success. It accomplished its aims in
the short term, satisfying Swann requirements, but in the long-term it proved non-
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essential. Because of the changing judicial standard, it is not effective to solely measure
busing’s success along judicial lines.
If judging the success of busing from a social perspective, the question becomes,
“did Memphis integrate?” The question is more complicated. Initially, busing was fairly
successful at this. Many, though not all, schools became significantly more diverse than
they were before Plan A. Numerous one race schools were diversified. However, it is
hard to ignore the white flight for suburbs and private schooling. Many of the whites who
fled to the suburbs joined Shelby County Schools. Memphis is located within Shelby
County, but the Shelby County School system initially only had control over
unincorporated segments of the county. According to a 2013 study, the population of
Memphis City Schools was over seventy percent black. But in suburban Shelby County
Schools, only thirty percent of the students were black.13 Additionally, the majority of
schools in the Memphis City School system were over ninety-five percent black, meaning
the majority of the school system were one-race schools by McRae’s definition.14
Although McRae claimed to have destroyed the dual school system, it seemed in 2004 to
have just taken another form.
Questions of community success follow similar debates. Looking at Memphis
today, the city remains fairly segregated residentially. Although progress has been made,
it certainly does not fit as an unqualified success. Additionally, although busing has
ended and schools have largely returned to a neighborhood school approach, many
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communities do not embrace their schools with the same involvement they did prior to
busing. Part of this is certainly a cultural issue, wherein parents are simply less-involved
in the day-to-day activities at their child’s school. But some of this is a reaction to busing.
Families and schools had forged bonds over generations of involvement. Busing severed
those connections, in some places for more than a decade. Rebuilding those same levels
of trust and community does not happen overnight. Additionally, the continued flight to
the suburbs by white Memphians continues to sabotage any attempts at community
rebuilding. In 2007, it was estimated that “1,000 (mostly white) Memphians leave the city
for the suburbs each year.”15
Finally, in terms of education, busing elicits, at best, a mixed bag. Education for
black school children has improved in many ways due to receiving equal resources from
the school system. However, the flight of wealthy white students to suburban school
districts and private academies robbed Memphis City Schools of wealth and influence.
Many schools, especially those in poorer, overwhelmingly black neighborhoods, still
suffer from inadequate funding. Since 2010, fifteen schools in Memphis have been taken
over by the state government run Achievement School District due to poor academic
performance.16 It is hard to ignore that all of these schools are poverty-stricken areas.
These schools are in the very neighborhoods that working-class whites once sought to
defend from busing before running away from the buses carrying dark faces from across
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town. Once again, this is not all solely due to busing, but its influence cannot be
overstated.
In 2011, educational strife rocked Memphis yet again. The overwhelmingly poor
and black Memphis City Schools voted to give up their charter and be absorbed by the
overwhelmingly wealthy and white Shelby County Schools. Legal maneuverings related
to the action delayed the actual merger until the fall of 2013. Obviously, there were some
key differences between the merger and busing the 1970s. Students would not be taken
out of their communities. So poor students would remain in their neighborhoods, rather
than distressing the affluent by arriving in their neighborhood.
However, despite the differences, the similarities between the merger and
Memphis busing did not go unnoticed. The merger would force wealthier whites to take
some responsibility in providing an equal educational experience for disadvantaged black
children. Joe Clayton, the white principal who fled the school system during busing to
become the principal of Briarcrest Christian School, was now a board member for Shelby
County Schools. Clayton could not help but note the similarities between the two
moments. “There’s that same element of fear,” he explained. However, Clayton
suggested that during school busing “it was a physical, personal fear. Today the fear is
about the academic decline of the Shelby schools.”17 But the fear around the merger was
still somehow connected to race, as even Clayton was aware. When asked about race
relations, Clayton admitted, “I don’t think we’ve improved much since the 1970s.”18 In
addition to the racial implications of the merger, class also played a significant role. The
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median incomes of families in Memphis City Schools and Shelby County Schools are
drastically different. The average in Memphis is $32,000 annually compared to $92,000
in the unincorporated county.19
In response to the merger, all six unincorporated municipalities voted to create
their own school districts, separate from the Shelby County School System. Those
municipalities took effect in 2014, one year after the merger. Therefore, it is very difficult
to attain very many accurate statistics on the merger itself, as the demographics of the
new, merged school system continue to change. The departure of the six municipalities
took more than 25,000 students out of the school system and fifty-two million dollars out
of its budget.20
The results of Memphis busing and the school merger were eerily similar. In the
1970s, the school system lost roughly forty thousand of the estimated seventy-one
thousand white students in the Memphis City Schools.21 Both times, attempts to create
equal educational experiences for poor black students and more affluent white students
failed due to white flight. Despite busing’s best intentions, it is hard to overcome a
population that can continually vote with their feet and run. Although McRae occupied a
central place in Memphis history as its most hated figure throughout the busing crisis,
that distinction has faded with time. The average Memphian probably has little idea who
Robert McRae was or what he did to become so disliked. Because Memphians have
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moved on to the next great integration crisis to be terrified about, and once again a
significant number of Memphians have wriggled their way out of it.
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